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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I examine the reasons w hy the U.S. film industry lost 
the GATT-Uruguay Round negotiations on audiovisual services and  
intellectual property rights (IPRs) related to copyright. I revisit the political 
economy approach to communication and im plem ent Mosco's (1996) 
suggestions on the approach's renewal. Mosco notes that political econom ists 
of com m unication thematically view the state as supporting transnational 
business (1996, p. 94). However, Jarvie's (1992) analysis of the relationship  
between the U.S. governm ent and film industry between 1920 and 1950 
suggests that this 'support' theme does not adequately capture the often  
antagonistic and unproductive relationship between the two parties. I extend 
Jarvie's (1992) work by developing themes from his scholarship and applying 
them to a case study on the Uruguay Round.
I review the literature on the media-cultural im perialism  thesis and focus 
on Herbert Schiller's (1969 [1992], 1976, 1989) scholarship. Schiller's thesis 
implies that outcomes in international relations are dictated by dom estic 
determ inants such as the influence of corporate lobbyists. However, I argue 
that the reasons w hy Hollywood lost lie not in domestic determ inants alone, 
but in a broader perspective (derived from the discipline of in te rnational 
relations) that focuses on the interaction between domestic trade politics and  
international relations (Putnam, 1988 [1993]). Putnam  characterises 
international negotiations as an interactive process involving the bargaining 
between negotiators and the separate discussions each delegation has w ith  
constituents in its domestic market on the ratification of the agreement. I 
assess them es from Jarvie's work and propositions from Schiller's thesis 
using Putnam 's (1988 [1993]) two-level analysis and empirical evidence from  
primary docum ents and thirty-five interviews conducted over a three-year 
period (1994 to 1997) with U.S. and European negotiators and film executives.
I argue that U.S. domestic trade politics ham pered efforts by U.S. 
negotiators to reach a bilateral accord on audiovisual services and IPRs related 
to copyright because of linkages forged by EU Member States between progress 
in those talks and progress in talks on agriculture, m aritim e transport 
services, geographic indications related to wines and anti-dumping. A second 
obstacle to a bilateral accord was an influential hawkish m inority of the  
Hollywood lobby, who set an aggressive agenda for U.S. negotiators and set off 
a chain reaction in the final moments of the Round that led to Hollywood's 
defeat.
Finally, I present an alternative scenario to the argum ent (cf. W aregne, 
1994; Dehousse and Havelange, 1994; Joachimowicz and Berenboom, 1994) 
that the French government dictated the outcome of the audiovisual services 
and IPRs negotiations. My scenario emphasises the preem inent status of the  
General Affairs Council, the role of EU Member States other than  France, and 
Commission efforts to forge a bilateral deal. In the end, the hawks dictated 
the outcome of the audiovisual services talks, while a majority of EU 
Member States dictated the outcome of the talks on IPRs related to copyright.
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ACRONYMS
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RIAA — Recording Industry Association of America
SAC — Sector Advisory Committee
SPAC — U.S. Services Policy Advisory Committee
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TNC — Transnational corporation
UIP — United International Pictures
UN — United Nations
USTR — United States Trade Representative (formerly STR) 
VOD — Video-on-demand
WIPO — W orld Intellectual Property Organisation 
WTO — W orld Trade Organisation
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INTRODUCTION
Media scholars should take note of the U.S. governm ent's inability to  
satisfy the U.S. film industry in the GATT-Uruguay Round. Scholarship 
abounds on the success of the U.S. film industry in foreign markets. One 
camp focuses purely on commercial and economic reasons (c.f. Bjom, 1992; 
Hoskins and Mirus, 1988; Hoskins and Mcfadyen, 1991; Kruse, 1994; Pragnell, 
1985; Pool, 1990; Wasko, 1985). A second camp focuses on the com parative 
economic advantage of English-language producers (c.f. Collins, 1989, 1994; 
W ildman and Siwek, 1988). And a third camp highlights, to varying degrees, 
commercial and economic reasons along w ith the effects of two W orld W ars 
a n d /o r  the close relationship between the U.S. governm ent and Hollywood 
film companies (c.f. Bettig, 1990; Guback, 1969,1977,1985; Jarvie, 1992; Schiller, 
1969 [1992]; 1989; Strauss, 1930; Thompson, 1985; Tunstall, 1977 [1994]). But 
very little research, if any, has been done on situations in which the U.S. 
governm ent has failed to remove barriers to Hollywood's products in foreign 
m arkets.
Even more significant, Hollywood's defeat in the Uruguay Round was the  
fourth in a series of defeats for the film industry under the U.S. governm ent's 
stewardship between 1986 and 1993: Canada's cultural industries w ere
excluded from the 1988 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) and 1992 
N orth American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),1 and the European
1Article 2005(1) of the CUFTA exempts most of Canada's cultural industries 
from the treaty's provisions (CUFTA, 1988, p. 396), while annex 2106 of the 
NAFTA contains the cultural exclusion language found in Article 2005(1) 
(NAFTA, 1992, p. 21-11).
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Com m unity enacted the 1989 Television W ithout Frontiers Directive2 
(Council of the EU, 1989; hereinafter Television Directive). In this
dissertation I examine the reasons why Hollywood lost the Round. I present 
the most comprehensive analysis of the Round's audiovisual sector talks3 
w ritten to date, incorporating the perspectives of all significant players and 
exam ining key details, some of which are adm ittedly sensitive, to correct 
some of the problems of previous accounts. A distinguished scholar at The 
LSE described the study of trade negotiations as watching a poker game and 
trying to determine what each player is thinking and the hand  each player 
holds. However, by interviewing the participants in the R ound's audiovisual 
sector talks — who were willing to show me their 'hands' — I in a sense 
joined the game and watched as it progressed.
2Article 4 of the Directive (Quotas on European Programming) states: 
"Member states shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means, that 
broadcasters reserve for European works...a majority proportion of their 
transm ission time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports events, 
games, advertising and teletext services. This proportion, having regard to 
the broadcaster's international, educational, cultural and en terta inm ent 
responsibilities to its viewing public, should be achieved progressively, on the 
basis of suitable criteria" (OJ L 298,17 October 1989, p. 26). Article 5 (Quotas on  
European Independent Productions) states: "Member states shall ensure,
w here practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve at least 
10 percent of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed to news, 
sports events, games, advertising and teletext services, or alternatively, at the 
discretion of the member state, at least 10 percent of their program m ing 
budget for European works created by producers who are independent of 
broadcasters. This must be done progressively on basis of suitable criteria, 
earm arking an adequate proportion for recent works (within five years of 
production) (OJ L 298,17 October 1989, p. 27).
3 In this dissertation 'audiovisual sector talks' will often serve as a shorthand 
phrase for the Uruguay Round's negotiations on audiovisual services and 
IPRs related to copyright.
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I also confirm the interdisciplinary nature of m edia studies by building a 
theoretical bridge between the political economy approach to com m unication  
and international relations. I examine why Hollywood lost by assessing 
Herbert Schiller's (1969 [1992], 1976, 1989) media-cultural im perialism 4 thesis. 
Schiller (1976) defines media-cultural imperialism as the spread of capitalism: 
the "sum  of the processes by which a society is brought into the m odern  
world system and how its dom inating stratum  is attracted, pressured, forced, 
and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or 
even promote, the values and structures of the dom inating center of the 
system" (p. 9).5 Schiller (1969 [1992], 1989) argues that U.S. m edia 
corporations, whose leaders sit on the U.S. Business Roundtable of 
Industrialists, dominate W estern European cultures and m edia systems w ith
4Scholars disagree over the definition of 'im perialism .' Etherington (1984) 
notes the m ultidisciplinary nature of studying imperialism  and the problem  
of the w ord's shifting meaning. Cohen (1973) argues that the term  
im perialism  "has become too emotive and value-laden, too tied up w ith  
partisan politics and propaganda as a catchword or slogan. Indeed, for some it 
has actually become an epithet...." (p. 9) Nevertheless, if one had to chose 
am ong the myriad of definitions, Cohen's based on "the asymmetry of 
dom inance and dependence" best represents the m eaning of the word. 
Cohen defines it as "any relationship of effective dom ination or control; 
political or economic, direct or indirect, of one nation over another" (p. 16).
5It is often difficult to distinguish between media and cultural im perialism . 
Put simply, where does the media side of im perialism  end and the cultural 
side begin? Tomlinson (1991) advises against defining m edia-cultural 
im perialism  because of the "hybrid nature of the term," suggesting instead 
that the concepts "m ust be assembled out of [their] discourse" (p. 3). Schiller
(1991) asserts that the "cultural and economic spheres are indivisible" (p. 14). 
Lee (1980) argues that program m ing exports and foreign ownership m ust be 
considered along with, inter alia, the effects of the 'capitalist w orld views' on, 
and 'infringem ent' of, a receiving nation's way of life. Yet Roach (1990) 
argues that media imperialism is simply a political theory, no aspect of w hich 
pertains to message reception.
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support from the U.S. governm ent.6 Schiller's thesis offers m edia scholars a 
paradigm to apply to the Uruguay Round audiovisual negotiations and to th e  
contemporary U.S. governm ent/m edia corporation relationship in m u lti­
sector trade negotiations. His thesis implies that outcomes in in te rnational 
relations are dictated by domestic determ inants such as the influence of 
corporate lobbyists. However, evidence suggests that the reasons w hy 
Hollywood lost lie not in domestic determ inants alone, but in a broader 
perspective from the discipline of international relations that focuses on the  
interaction between domestic trade politics and international relations 
(Putnam, 1988 [1993]). Putnam  (1988 [1993]) characterises in te rnational 
negotiations as an interactive process involving two levels: the bargaining 
between negotiators and the separate discussions each delegation has w ith  
constituents in its domestic market on the ratification of the agreement.
Why bring media studies together w ith international relations theory and 
methods? To start, studying the trade in audiovisual products is not sim ply 
about the economics and social-psychological influence (if any) of these 
products on the audiences of receiving nations; it is also about in te rnational 
relations — the ways in which nations interact w ith each other at political 
and economic levels, and the political, social and economic effects of these
6W hat makes Schiller's revised thesis so difficult to examine is that a 
complete statement of it cannot be found in one text and that he tends to be 
inconsistent with his terminology. One m ust piece his thesis together using 
several texts and articles. For example, Schiller believes the num ber one 
priority of all the U.S. Roundtable members is the rem oval of barriers to 
information flows across the globe, and that this priority cuts across all 
industry categories. But Schiller (1989) limits his criticism to the assistance 
provided to U.S. m edia corporations by the U.S. governm ent both 
domestically and abroad. And Schiller refers in one instance to transnational 
corporate culture in general, and in another to U.S. corporate dominance.
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interactions on both individual nations and the global system as a whole. 
Furthermore, the study of trade in audiovisual products requires an  
interdisciplinary approach to solving research problems. While econom ists 
apply their own econometric models and historians use their ow n 
historiographic techniques, mass com m unication researchers m ust be 
methodological borrowers. W hen a research problem invo lves 
understanding trade negotiations associated w ith film and telev ision  
programmes, legal scholars, political scientists and experts in in ternational 
relations usually examine the give-and-take of the talks, while media scholars 
determine the cultural and industrial implications of the talks. But does th is 
division of labour make sense?7 Golding and Murdock (1996) w rite that 
researchers in the social sciences and hum anities "tend to approach 
communications w ith rather different interests and reference points, ev en  
when there is a strong desire to cut across disciplinary boundaries, as there 
often is" (p. 12).8
Sim ilarly, Gomery (1994) argues that media scholars should be aware of the  
division of labour that places responsibility for influencing com m unication  
policy in the hands of lawyers, while m edia scholars, particularly m edia 
economists, evaluate proposals for regulation and analyse their effects. 
Gomery believes m edia scholars should take a more active role in  the 
lobbying process.
8Levy and Gurevitch (1994) note that the field is split into redeem ers and 
reformers, the former advocating that m edia studies become a separate 
discipline; the latter interested in strengthening interdisciplinary ties. The 
reformers are on the right track. Miller (1983), a classic redeem er, 
distinguishes between the early days of m edia studies — "derivative, 
borrowing heavily from the theoretical and empirical contributions of 
scholars in other social and behavioral sciences" (p. 40) — and today, w ith  
media research m oving toward 'm aturity7 as graduate program m es confer 
degrees on media scholars, rather than other departm ents conferring degrees 
on scholars with a particular interest in media. The danger of his com parison 
is that it denigrates the derivative nature of m edia studies and implies that 
scholars who venture outside the com m unication departm ent in search of
13
I also extend the work of Mosco (1996) by im plem enting some of h is 
suggestions for the 'renewal' of the political economic approach to 
communication. Mosco suggests scholars take a closer look at the role of the  
state in the media industry. He notes that political economists of 
com m unication thematically view the state as supporting transnational 
business (p. 94). However, Jarvie's (1992) analysis of Hollywood's export 
system between 1920 and 1950 includes details of the relationship between the  
U.S. governm ent and film industry. His work, based on 10 years of research 
and relying primarily on documentary evidence, suggests that this 'support' 
them e does not adequately capture the often antagonistic and unproductive  
relationship between the two parties. Indeed, very little is known about the  
contem porary relationship between the U.S. governm ent and film industry  
because of the reluctance of Hollywood executives and U.S. trade officials to 
discuss their joint activities, and because of the difficulty of obtaining prim ary 
docum ents related to negotiations on film and TV exports.9 I extend Jarvie's
theory and methodology are heretical, or, as Miller puts it, too eager "to 
describe themselves and their scholarly interests using labels from o ther 
fields" (ibid). Miller and his fellow redeemers fail to see that by accepting the  
field's historical links with other departments, by borrowing theory and 
m ethods w hen appropriate, and even by collaborating on interdisciplinary 
research projects, media scholars will strengthen their intellectual bona fides. 
Contributions to the advancem ent of media studies will often be 
contributions to the advancement of other disciplines and vice versa.
9On the U.S. motion picture industry, Guback (1979) comments: "Com panies 
and trade associations in the industry dispense inform ation w hen it serves 
their interests. The industry exercises a monopoly of knowledge and 
therefore is in a position to impose selective ignorance" (p. 230). To be fair, 
Guback should have included the U.S. government, EU Member States and 
EU supranational institutions in his comment as well, for they, too, dispense 
inform ation 'w hen it serves their interest.'
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(1992) work on the U.S. governm ent/film  industry relationship using 
empirical evidence from prim ary documents and interviews conducted over 
a three-year period (1994 to 1997).
Hollywood Lobby
s
In April 1994 the eighth Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) officially concluded in Marrakesh, Morocco, after the
m ultilateral trade negotiations had commenced seven years earlier in Punta 
del Este, Uruguay. Technically the negotiations had ended four m on ths 
earlier in Geneva, Switzerland, where trade delegations from 125 countries 
had gathered to engage in last-minute bargaining towards the global 
liberalisation of trade in goods and services. Milestones reached in the 
U ruguay Round include the coverage for the first time of the agriculture10 
and services sectors11 and intellectual property,12 and the signing of a new
10Ingersent, Rayner and Hine (1994) comment: "Previous rounds in the
GATT had fostered a process of trade liberalisation in industrial products but 
had been unable to reduce agricultural trade barriers and distortions" (p. 1). 
The authors add: "In the absence of effective international rules and
disciplines, domestic pressures led to increased distortions in world
agricultural trade in the period leading up to the launch of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations" (ibid).
11The reasons why trade in services had not been covered by previous GATT 
rounds are many and varied. However, McCulloch (1990) argues that not all 
services industries desire global liberalisation of trade: "Diverse in m any 
respects, the services industries do not share comm on objectives w ith respect 
to expansion abroad. Indeed, some industries w ith well-established foreign 
operations are hesitant to participate in a generic sectoral push  to expand 
m arket access abroad lest their own firm-specific and industry-specific needs 
receive less favourable attention from foreign governm ents (p. 341). Also, 
prior to the Uruguay Round countries had viewed efforts to rem ove barriers 
to trade in services as a threat to national sovereignty, as m any services are 
highly regulated to protect both consumer and economy alike (Com m ission 
of the European Communities, 1995b). In the Uruguay Round, the services 
sector included financial services, telecommunications, m aritim e transport 
services and audiovisual services.
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intergovernm ental treaty that, inter alia, created the W orld Trade 
Organisation (WTO), which now serves as the GATT's new adm inistrative 
body — in effect establishing the first bona fide organisation to oversee the  
functions and structure of the GATT since the abortive effort to create the  
International Trade Organisation (ITO) in the late 1940s.13
Among the throng of U.S. lobbyists in Geneva were representatives of the  
U.S. m otion picture, television and music industries,14 who expected the U.S.
12Maskus and Konan (1994) note that "in the 1970s, most developed countries 
adopted a relatively benign attitude about any damages their firms may have 
suffered as a result of weak foreign protection" (p. 403). However, M askus 
(1990) argues that because global trade in intellectual property rose faster th an  
overall m erchandise and m anufacturing trade in the 1980s, developed 
countries shifted their attention towards strengthening global rules and 
disciplines in IP.
13Between 1946 and 1948, four international conferences were held to develop 
the GATT and the charter for the Agreement's governing body, the ITO 
(Jackson, 1969). At the fourth conference, known formally as the 1948 U N  
Conference on Trade and Employment (the Havana Charter) held in H avana, 
Cuba, a draft charter for the ITO was signed, but, according to Jackson, the 
United States failed to ratify the charter, thereby turning the GATT into "a 
very different type of instrum ent than had been originally envisaged" (pp. 50- 
51). Jackson adds: "A pragmatic and sometimes groping attitude towards 
constitutional and legal structures was thus forced upon GATT, which found 
itself w ithout an adequate legal and constitutional base and required to fill a 
vacuum  created by the failure of the ITO" (p. 51). Dam (1970) describes the 
first GATT as assuming "the commercial-policy role that had been assigned to 
the ITO" (p. 11). Feketekuty (1988) notes that "the ITO w ould have established 
international disciplines in m any areas not traditionally covered by the 
GATT, such as competition policy, investm ent policy, and services" (p. 156). 
N ot until almost 50 years later during the Uruguay Round w ould 
m ultilateral negotiations lead successfully to a new w orld trade governing 
body known as the WTO and the final GATT return to its original role as an 
instrum ent of trade liberalisation.
14During the Round members of the lobby included officials from the M otion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) and executives from Fox Studios,
MCA-Universal, W alt Disney, the Recording Industry Association of America
16
governm ent to strike a bilateral deal15 w ith European Com m ission16 
negotiators on audiovisual services (market access,17 national treatm ent18 and
(RIAA) and the talent guilds. A majority of the lobby's members were 
executives and lawyers from the U.S. film industry. In this dissertation I 
focus on the film members of the lobby and refer to the music members w hen  
appropriate. The MPAA and its foreign arm, the M otion Picture Association 
(MPA), represent the eight major Hollywood studios: The W alt Disney Co., 
W arner Bros., Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., 
Universal Studios Inc., Param ount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp., and Turner Pictures.
15To avoid confusion, one m ust make a distinction between bilateral trade 
agreements negotiated between two governm ents (such as the CUFTA 
between the United States and Canada) and a GATT bilateral agreem ent 
negotiated between two governments (such as the United States and EU) that 
m ust be m ultilateralised (accepted by the rest of the participants in the  
negotiation). However, both kinds of bilateral agreements can involve m ore 
than one industry sector in the negotiations. Bettig (1990) notes that the U.S. 
governm ent supports U.S. media corporations on a bilateral basis in their 
efforts to protect intellectual property in foreign markets because "the 
increasing importance of information-based products and services for the U.S. 
economy requires an international intellectual property system that 
guarantees rem uneration to owners of copyrights and patents (largely 
transnational corporations)" (p. 58).
16The European Commission oversees all treaties, proposes and im plem ents 
the Union's legislation and negotiates trade agreements on behalf of M em ber 
States. Each of the 20 Commissioners has responsibility for one or more of 
the Commission's departments called Directorates-General. The key T)Gs' 
responsible for audiovisual issues are DG-X (information, com m unication, 
culture and audiovisual media), which initiates policy on the free m ovem en t 
of services related to products and services originating from the United States* 
such as films and quotas restrictions; DG-XV (internal m arkets and financial 
services), which also formulates policy on free m ovem ent of products and 
services issues in general, including media concentration, intellectual 
property and the Information Society; and DG-1 (external economic relations), 
DG-IV (competition) and DG-XIII (telecommunications, inform ation m arket 
and exploitation of research).
17Article XVI(l) of the GATS on 'm arket access' provides that each contracting
party "shall accord services and service suppliers of any other M ember
treatm ent no less favourable than that provided for under the term s, 
lim itations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule" (GATT,
17
M FN19) in the GATS and on national treatm ent of IPRs related to copyright 
in the TRIPs20 that covered both areas under GATT rules and disciplines and
1994b, p. 341). This principle applies to the four modes of service supply set 
out in Article 1(2): cross-border (trade crosses from one country to another, 
such as satellite broadcasts), consum ption abroad (nationals of one country 
consume services in another country, such as tourism), commercial presence 
(service supplier establishes itself in another country, such as a foreign 
subsidiary of an entertainm ent corporation) and presence of natural persons 
(natural persons who temporarily provide a service in another country, such 
as a self-employed person) (ibid, p. 328). The cross-border and com m ercial 
presence modes have the m ost relevance to the audiovisual sector. The 
GATT W orking Group on Audiovisual Services (1990b) defines audiovisual 
services as "any activity related to the production, distribution and 
broadcasting of audiovisual works whatever the means used" (W orking 
Group, draft Article 2 of Annex, p. 1).
18Article XVII(l) of the GATS on 'national treatm ent' provides that a 
signatory "shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, 
in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatm ent no less 
favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers" 
(GATT, 1994b, p. 342). Note that national treatm ent applies to both im ported 
services and to foreign service suppliers in the domestic market (Com m ission 
of the European Communities, 1995b, p. 30). Note also that GATS principles 
are not m utually exclusive: for example, satellite transmissions of
program m ing and films require access to a country's telecom m unications 
system, and "the notions of national treatm ent and m arket access therefore 
become interchangeable since they both hinge on access to a country's 
network" (GATT W orking Group, 1990a, pp. 4-5). Nevertheless, Article 
XX(1) requires all Members to place com m itm ents to m arket access and 
national treatment in a schedule.
19The principle of MFN (most-favoured-nation) is the mainstay of the GATT. 
Article 11(1) of the GATS states: "With respect to any measure covered by this 
Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to 
services and service suppliers of any other Member treatm ent no less 
favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any 
other country (GATT, 1994b, p. 329). However, Article 11(2) states: "A
Member may m aintain a m easure inconsistent w ith paragraph 1 provided 
that such a measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of, the Annex on  
Article II Exemptions" (ibid).
20Intellectual property rights related to copyright are the rights of IPRs owners 
to control the copying of their work. Industries, known in the United States
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therefore removed non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to the export of U.S. films, 
television shows and sound recordings. The lobby was particularly interested 
in preventing EU Member States21 from imposing a quota higher than 51 
percent on European program m ing in the Television Directive and from  
applying the quota to new broadcasting technologies and systems (such as 
video-on-demand). According to an MPAA official, the Hollywood lobby 
feared being excluded from EU markets — the U.S. film industry 's22 m ost 
lucrative export markets (interview with author, 23 February 1996).23
as the 'core copyright industries/ that create copyrighted works as their 
prim ary product include the m otion picture industry (TV, theatrical and 
home video), music and recording industry, publishing industry, com puter 
software industry, legitimate theatre, advertising and the radio, television 
and cable broadcasting industries (Siwek and Furchtgott-Roth, 1995, p. 5). 
Article 3(1) of the TRIPs on 'national treatm ent' states: "Each Member shall 
accord to the nationals of other Members treatm ent no less favourable th an  
that it accords to its own nationals w ith regard to the protection of intellectual 
property, subject to the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the Paris 
Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or 
the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits. In respect 
of performers, producers of phonogram s and broadcasting organizations, this 
obligation only applies in respect of the rights provided under this 
Agreement" (GATT, 1994, p. 368).
21The twelve EU Member States during the Round were Belgium, Denm ark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK.
^Throughout this dissertation I will refer to the historical and contem porary 
relationship between the U.S. governm ent and 'U.S. film industry,' despite 
the fact that the U.S. film industry, which usually includes the U.S. television 
industry, has become absorbed by larger media corporations.
23W ildm an and Siwek (1988) concur that "foreign sales are critical to the 
health of the U.S. film industry" (p. 35). Finding that in some years export 
revenues and rentals have provided the industry w ith as m uch as half of its 
total income, the authors admit: "Regulations and events that affect the trade 
of films between the United States and other nations are therefore of v ital 
interest to the success of the American motion picture industry" (1988, p. 35).
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According to the lobby, the Television Directive threatened the over $3.5 
billion in trade surplus generated each year by the U.S. film industry (MPEAA 
News Release, 26 April 1991). Another m ain concern of the lobby was EU 
Member States' levies on the sale of recording devices an d /o r blank audio 
and video tapes to compensate authors, producers and perform ers for hom e 
recording; and Member States' subsidies generated in part by levies on box- 
office receipts to fund domestic productions.24 The Hollywood lobby w anted 
EU Member States to allocate on a non-discrim inatory basis to U.S. authors, 
producers and performers as m uch of the proceeds from the levies as they 
allocated to EU entities.25
GATT 'M arketplace'
That U.S./EU audiovisual agreements on m arket access and na tional 
treatm ent of IPRs related to copyright were not reached does not dim inish  the 
importance of the debate that crescendoed over the Round's seven-year 
period on global trade in cultural products between America's advocacy of 
free trade and market liberalisation to maximise the contribution of the U.S. 
copyright industries (see Figure 1) to the U.S. economy,26 and EU M em ber
24For a comprehensive analysis of state levy systems on private copying 
throughout Eastern and W estern Europe, see Stichting de Thuiskopie (1997). 
According to the report, most European countries have passed na tional 
legislation for levies on either equipm ent or tapes (audio and visual) or both, 
adm inistered by collecting societies, and distributed to audio and video 
authors, performers and producers based on percentages determ ined by either 
legislators or rightsholders.
25W hat complicates matters is that often the terminology used for an issue 
depends on the 'eye of the beholder.' For example, 'levies' on aud iovisual 
products, the proceeds from which m ight go to a Member State's production 
fund, can also be viewed as 'subsidies,' which may or may not have a 
distortive effect on trade.
26As Figure 1 suggests, the core copyright industries' real annual growth rate
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States' varying degrees of support for governm ent intervention and m arket 
protection to m inim ise external influences on their cultural identities and 
external competitive pressures on their domestic cultural industries.27 To a 
country w ith a long-standing suspicion of free-trade such as France, U.S. 
dem ands for a standstill on the Television Directive and a clarification of its 
applicability to new forms of delivery technology and systems smacked of 
m edia-cultural imperialism  and threatened its cultural identity.28 H ow ever, 
to U.S. film lobbyists, preventing the Television Directive from applying, 
inter alia, to terrestrial television broadcasting and to 'on-dem and' services 
m ade good business sense, as restrictions on U.S. content m ight affect sales of 
syndicated programmes or even affect the launch of new TV shows and films.
(adjusted for inflation) has been more than twice the growth rate of the  
economy as a whole (Siwek and Furchtgott-Roth, 1995, p. 6).
27Jack Lang (1988), former French minister of culture, argues that the 'fragility7 
of Europe's cultural industries makes governm ent intervention and support 
imperative. Lang lists as features of Europe's industries the fact that each 
product is a prototype and economies of scde cannot apply particularly w hen  
production companies often produce only one film; that cultural products are 
sensitive to criticism and need support because some masterpieces are n o t 
successful until long after their creators' death; and that Europe's language 
diversity makes it impossible to produce one film and release it th roughou t 
the varying markets. Collins (1993) argues that several assum ptions 
underpin  Europe's policy of interventionism  in the audiovisual sector: "(1) 
that societies are held together solely through a shared culture; (2) that free 
trade and the market do not provide the cultural order necessary to m ain ta in  
social cohesion; (3) that political authorities m ust redress m arket failure; and 
(4) that the mass media, particularly television, are vital agencies in  
m aintaining and reproducing social cohesion (p. 362).
28Here I rely on Fiske's (1989) definition of culture as "the constant process of 
producing meanings of and from our social experience" (p. 1).
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Figure 1 Estimated Average Annual Real Growth Rate (percent)
1977-1993 1987-1993 1991-1993
Core Copyright Indus. 5.8 4.5 5.6
US Economy____________ 2A_________2d_________2.7
Source: Siwek, S., & Furchtgott-Roth, H. (1995) Copyright industries in the US Economy: 
1977-1993. [Report summary provided by the International Intellectual Property Alliance, 
Washington, DC, p. 6.]
However, legal scholars on both sides of the Atlantic (cf. Garret, 1994; 
Waregne, 1994) tend to view the Uruguay Round audiovisual sector talks as 
simply a clash between cultural and commercial interests.29 Yet the 
negotiations embodied a great deal more. Evidence suggests that the outcom e 
of the talks had as m uch to do with issues outside the audiovisual sector 
involving U.S. and EU politics as it did with issues inside the sector. To U.S. 
negotiators, the Hollywood lobby's expectations had to be weighed against 
those of other U.S. lobbyists responsible for dossiers on industries ranging 
from agriculture to telecommunications and on issues ranging from anti­
29From a historical perspective Jarvie (1992) writes on the commerce versus 
culture theme: "The officials and businessmen of the countries that struggled 
w ith the United States over motion pictures had a tendency to fuse these two 
matters, sometimes confusedly, sometimes deliberately. That tendency 
strengthened the conviction of American officials that all parties were 
concerned about commerce but that foreign countries sometimes talked about 
it in the deceptive and mystifying rhetoric of culture" (p. 19). Jarvie adds: 
"Time and time again...officials in Britain concocted position statements that 
spoke of a determ ination to defend British culture and ways of life, w hile 
behind the scenes discussing why businessmen of British nationality were 
entitled to a share of the considerable profits being made out of films" (ibid). 
Dyson and H um phreys (1988) write: "European cultural identity was often a 
cloak for the defence or prom otion of particular national interests. C ultural 
identity also has a sub-national dimension, w ith for instance the 
centralisation of m edia investm ent and production in London and Paris at 
the expense of regional centres" (p. 20). Collins (1993) concludes that an  
"examination of the Com m unity's actual policies and practices...suggests that 
cultural considerations only take rhetorical precedence over economic and 
industrial considerations" (p. 370).
22
dum ping to subsidies.30 To Commission negotiators, supranational 
institutions and Member State governments prim arily shape positions.31 In 
multi-sector talks, no single sectoral negotiation can be analysed as if it took 
place w ithin a vacuum  because of cross-linkages and tradeoffs with o ther 
sectors that negotiators, to varying degrees, build  into their overall 
negotiating strategies, and because of the tendency for all sectors to be 
interlinked to some degree.
In essence, a m ultilateral trade negotiation is a 'marketplace' w here 
trading countries meet to strike a deal that satisfies their individual trade 
agendas (Hoekman, 1989). Negotiators representing the trading countries 
enter the market w ith an agenda; as with any bargaining process, not all of the  
items on individual agendas can be met for any num ber of reasons, including 
a chief negotiator's need to sacrifice the interests of one industry in order to 
preserve overall gains reached for others. Twiggs (1987) com m ents: 
"Controversy in trade policymaking is expected. Decisions involve a 
reconciliation of domestic interests w ith international economic and foreign 
policy concerns...." (p. 2). Indeed, the negotiations between the United States 
and EU on audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright did not escape 
the influence of linkages and tradeoffs.
30The Wall Street Journal reported that during the final days of the Uruguay 
Round, the hotels in Geneva were full of lobbyists from  all sectors, including 
the financial services, shipping, telecoms and aircraft sectors (15 December 
1993, p. A6).
31This is not to say that corporate forces do not influence policy-making at the 
national level in the EU.
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Historical Relationship Between Hollywood and Uncle Sam
Jarvie's (1992) analysis of why American films dom inated the Canadian 
and British markets after World W ar I is unique in that it "straddles 
economic history and diplomatic history" (p. 10), and relies on prim ary 
documents such as m em oranda and letters w ritten by governm ent officials 
and film executives.32 Jarvie not only presents a history of Hollywood's 
export system and efforts by Canada and Britain to curb U.S. film imports and 
develop domestic industries between 1920 and 1950, but also sets an exam ple 
by employing docum ent analysis in effect to 'let the actors speak for 
themselves.' Jarvie's rigorous documentary approach stands in sharp contrast 
w ith Schiller's tendency to buttress his argum ents on the U.S. governm ent's 
support of Hollywood with Marxist rhetoric and quotes from major U.S. 
newspapers. Moreover, while their work is essential reading, Guback (1969) 
and Thompson (1985) rely heavily on data from trade publications to support 
their arguments. Data on global entertainm ent flows indicate trends, but 
cannot offer documentary evidence of the reasons for the trends. F rom  
Jarvie's work I have identified two themes on the U.S. governm ent/film  
industry relationship with which to examine the GATT talks. First, in  
international trade negotiations involving many industry sectors, the U.S. 
government tends to place the interests of other U.S. industrial lobbies ahead 
of the those of the Hollywood lobby. Second, influential Hollywood moguls,
32Jarvie writes: "The American film industry, exploiting the lessons learned 
in the competitive domestic market, was able to take advantage of the  
disruption of film production in belligerent countries caused by W orld W ar I. 
Production capacity in the United States was raised to the limit and exports 
cultivated assiduously. Integrated corporations oligopolistically dom inated 
supply at home and abroad. Advantage having been gained, product 
development and distribution policies were tailored to m aintain that m arket 
share wherever legally permitted; where there were legal impedim ents they 
were disputed" (1992, p. 1).
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who set the agenda for the lobby, expect their lobbyists and the U.S. 
government to approach international trade negotiations aggressively, 
despite the consequences.
Jarvie (1992) chronicles early tensions between the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA)33 and the Motion Picture 
Division of the U.S. Commerce Department. Relations between the U.S. film  
industry and governm ent were close enough for the two parties to w ork 
together to lobby against the 1927 British Films Act, yet "a bullying and 
unreasonable attitude was still abroad in the industry" (1992, pp. 346-347). 
Hays believed that Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Ambassador K ennedy 
had not worked hard enough to persuade the British to scuttle plans for the  
Films Act. However, Jarvie surmises that Hays protestations were designed
^Jarvie notes that the formation of the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America (MPPDA), Hollywood's prim ary trade association 
between 1921 and 1945 and the early version of the MPAA, resulted from a 
'slum p' in revenues and "enhanced interest in using the federal governm ent 
to assist the industry...." (1992, p. 302). The U.S. governm ent's support for 
U.S. film exports stemmed not from the industry 's revenues abroad per se but 
from the potential of the films as a prom otion vehicle for American products 
and culture (1992, p. 311) and as a tool for international relations (p. 379). The 
Office of W ar Information's Bureau of Motion Pictures had been working for 
two years w ith Hollywood, though not always amicably, to produce film s 
w ith a strict criteria based on the following question: "Will this picture help  
w in the war?" (Koppes and Black, 1987, p. 84). Rosenberg (1982) quotes a 
phrase from a 1925 Saturday Evening Post article that aptly characterises the  
U.S. governm ent's policy: "Trade follows the film" (p. 101). Rosenberg adds: 
"According to popular beliefs, American movies stimulated the dem and for 
mass-produced American goods such as cars, telephones, cameras. Inspired 
by the movies, people around the world began building Califomia-style 
homes, whether or not the architecture suited their particular climate" (1982, 
p. 101). However, Jarvie quips: "It is, in a way, remarkable testim ony to its 
capacity for self-promotion and exaggeration of its own importance that the 
movie industry managed to continue to get favorable treatm ent out of its 
government throughout the period 1920-1950" (1992, p. 312).
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to please his superiors: "a more effective approach would have been to
educate his bosses in the facts of international relations and the domestic 
politics of Britain" (1992, p. 347). Moreover, Jarvie notes the concern of the  
Commerce Department that MPPDA officials were unrealistic in their 
expectations of a 1928 League of Nations Conference on the Abolition of 
Im port and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, which became the G eneva 
Convention on Export and Im port Restrictions. According to Jarvie, D ivision 
officials believed European countries would place restrictions on film im ports 
despite the Conference, and endeavoured to "din some international political 
realism into the MPPDA leaders (who may have been reflecting the views of 
their principals)...." (1992, p. 323). Jarvie also notes disharm ony w ithin the 
MPPDA over the best foreign policy for the U.S. film industry — m anifested 
by argum ents between Hays and his London representative, Fay Allport. 
Jarvie notes that despite the perception from abroad of the U.S. film industry, 
"looked at close up at home, it was riven with internal difficulties, uncertain , 
and often on the verge of chaos" (1992, p. 371).
Jarvie (1992) uncovers evidence that the Hollywood studios were not as 
im portant to the U.S. governm ent as studio heads believed. According to 
Jarvie, Ambassador Kennedy argued that the U.S. film industry had  the 
economic strength to survive in Britain despite making concessions to 
Britain's 1938 Films Act (1992, p. 157). Here are early signs of the U.S. 
governm ent weighing the benefits of helping Hollywood w ith perhaps larger 
aims in separate trade talks w ith Britain involving m any sectors. 
Ambassador Kennedy contemplates sacrificing the interests of Hollywood 
—"but that would build up a debt that could be cashed by the United States in  
the trade talks" (ibid). Britain succeeded in excluding films from the bilateral
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negotiations. Jarvie adds: "The harsh tru th  was that the m otion picture 
business was a rather small industry.... They had a record of causing a good 
deal of irritation in international relations, while nevertheless building up an  
unshakable position of world domination" (1992, pp. 376-377).
The two themes from Jarvie's work apply to the Hollywood lobby in the  
Uruguay Round. For example, prior to the enactment of the T elevision 
Directive, one senior Hollywood executive commented that Hollywood 
lobbyists were overly aggressive towards EU efforts to impose broadcasting 
quotas (interview w ith author, 30 November 1995). Neil Turkew itz, 
executive vice president of international relations for the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA), argued that the U.S. governm ent's aggressive 
response to the Television Directive, encouraged by the U.S. film industry, set 
the tone for the debate in the Uruguay Round over the Directive and p u t the  
film industry on course for defeat (interview with author, 12 June 1997). 
Moreover, recall that the Hollywood lobby's defeat in the Uruguay R ound 
followed the cultural exclusion in the CUFTA and NAFTA, as well as the  
enactment of the Television Directive in Europe. Each defeat has placed 
greater pressure on U.S. negotiators to satisfy the U.S. film industry. The 
source of this pressure has been the fund-raising capability of Hollywood 
moguls. According to a U.S. trade official, Hollywood executives fervently 
believed that they had helped fund and elect President Clinton and therefore 
they could control him (interview with author, 1 February 1996).34
34The U.S. media and entertainm ent industry contributed $8 m illion to all 
federal campaigns during the 1992 election (Makinson and Goldstein, 1992, p. 
50). According to Makinson and Goldstein (1992), 68 percent of the $8 m illio n  
came from individual donations, while 32 percent came from political action 
committees (PACs) (ibid). The authors add that 72 percent of the 
contributions w ent to the Democratic party, while 28 percent w ent to the
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Jarvie's analysis of the discord w ithin the MPPDA could equally apply to 
the U.S. film lobby during the Uruguay Round, as the Hollywood film  
companies did not operate according to majority-rule. Interviews w ith  
Hollywood executives and U.S. trade officials suggest that the leadership and 
legal counsellors of two corporations in particular, The Walt Disney Co. and 
M CA/Universal Studios, dictated the agenda of both the Hollywood lobby 
and U.S. negotiators. As Hollywood's chief lobbyist, Jack Valenti is viewed as 
the m asterm ind of the Hollywood's lobbying efforts, and indeed, h is 
longevity as chief Hollywood lobbyist for over three decades attests to h is 
success. However, Mr. Valenti ultimately reports to the heads of the  
Hollywood studios. At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, Mr. V alenti 
came under criticism for the Hollywood lobby's loss. But Mr. Valenti did n o t 
agree with the aggressive stance advocated by the Hollywood hawks. One 
senior Hollywood executive commented: "Jack Valenti is very well read and 
understands European culture, and he knows w hat he's doing. But he was 
pushed by some of the companies, and he d idn 't stand up and say no" 
(interview with author, 30 November 1995).35 The influence and activities of
Republicans (p. 51). Moreover, the weekend before the 15 December 1993 
deadline for the Uruguay Round, then-CAA's president, Michael Ovitz, held  
a fundraiser at his office, while M arvin Davis, former 20th Century Fox 
owner, invited California's congressional delegation — Representatives 
Feinstein and Boxer — and Governor Pete W ilson to a $25,000-a-couple 
dinner. The efforts of Mr. Davis and Mr. Ovitz contributed $2 m illion to the 
Democratic Party (Premiere, 1994, April, pp. 131-139; and Dow Jones News 
Service, 9 December 1993).
35The Hollywood executive added: "The negotiations were to take place in  
Washington: they were going to take a tough line: no quotas, no subsidies, 
nothing. The pressure came primarily from people in California, w ho in  
tu rn  put pressure on the MPA and W ashington. The people in California 
d idn 't realise the anti-American sentiments that had built up  over their 
strategy."
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the 'Hollywood hawks' will be examined in greater detail throughout this 
dissertation.
Chapter O utline
In Chapter 1 I assess the political economic approach to com m unication  
research. I trace the intellectual heritage of the approach and highlight its 
problem of an incongruity between theory and empirical evidence found 
particularly in literature on the media-cultural imperialism thesis and largely 
a result of a lack of attention to units of analysis. To begin to correct this 
problem, Mosco (1996) suggests taking a microanalytical approach to the study 
of the role of the state in the media industry, em phasising Giddens' (1984) 
concept of 'agency' or the influence of individuals as social actors, to balance a 
tendency in political economy toward a macroanalysis that focuses on global 
structures and institutions. I argue that concepts of m edia globalisation suffer 
from a high degree of abstraction and suggest the need for a microanalysis of 
how individuals — not simply the personifications of globalisation such as 
Rupert M urdoch or Bill Gates, but corporate lawyers and executives — 
influence the process of media globalisation. I then take Mosco's m icro­
macro approach a step farther by showing how it fits w ithin a m o vem en t 
known as 'second structuralism ' (Palan, 1992), which advocates integrating 
units of analysis in the study of international relations.
In Chapter 2 I present a literature review on the m edia-cultural 
imperialism  thesis and focus on Herbert Schiller's scholarship. I explore 
Schiller's unconventional approach to com m unication research and 
challenge his original and revised theses. I develop a set of propositions
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based on Schiller's work with which to interrogate empirical evidence on the  
Uruguay Round negotiations between the United States and EU o n  
audiovisual services and intellectual property related to copyright. I also 
show how the media-cultural imperialism  thesis conceptually relates to 
theories of state behaviour in international relations. Specifically, I com pare 
Mosco's 'micro-macro' approach with Putnam 's (1988 [1993]) tw o-level 
analysis designed to flesh out the give-and-take of trade negotiations. I also 
present an overview of the processes of U.S. domestic trade politics and EU 
supranational politics as they relate to the Uruguay Round.
In Chapter 3 I discuss the difficulties of conducting research on sensitive  
topics and present my solutions to some of these problems. I discuss the use 
of disguises in social research and, in particular, the importance of using  
anonym ous quotes in this dissertation. I describe my inform ation sources 
and data-gathering methods. I then operationalise Schiller's propositions 
using Putnam 's two-level analysis. I conclude by discussing the lim ita tions 
on m y research.
In Chapter 4 I examine Schiller's (1969 [1992]) belief that U.S. m edia  
corporations dictate the U.S. government's foreign trade agenda (p. 3J.36 I 
examine how U.S. domestic trade politics ham pered efforts by U.S. 
negotiators to reach a bilateral accord on audiovisual services and IPRs related 
to copyright because of linkages forged by EU Member States between progress 
in those talks and progress in talks on agriculture, m aritim e transport
36 Schiller (1969 [1992]) writes that the "politico-cultural influence of the  
corporate sector domestically is all-pervasive" (p. 3). He adds that the "m edia- 
cultural landscape is a corporate playing field" (p. 8).
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services, geographic indications related to wines and anti-dum ping. 
Moreover, I examine the U.S. governm ent's choice at the end of the Round of 
either risking the entire Round by fighting for the Hollywood lobby's 
interests, or opting to let the negotiations on audiovisual services and IPRs 
related to copyright continue after the Round's conclusion and securing gains 
made in other sectors. Scholars and politicians display sensitivity to the  
products of dom inant media systems and cultures (primarily American) and 
their varying degrees of influence on dependent systems and cultures 
precisely because of the cultural nature of the trade. Yet empirical evidence 
suggests that U.S. and EU negotiators haggled over movies and telev ision  
program m es in the Uruguay Round as if cultural products had the sam e 
intrinsic value as crops and maritime transport services.
In Chapter 5 I examine Schiller's (1969 [1992]) belief that U.S. m edia  
corporations are no longer dependent on the U.S. government in rem o v in g  
global trade barriers (p. 7). I examine the U.S. governm ent/film  industry  
relationship during the CUFTA, the development of the Television Directive 
and the NAFTA, and how the U.S. film industry's defeats in these trade 
agreements and legislation led to the Hollywood lobby's high expectations of 
the U.S. government for the Uruguay Round. I examine the chemistry of the  
Hollywood lobby and highlight a 'micro power struggle' (Mosco, 1996) 
between hawks and doves. I then begin to examine the relationship betw een 
the U.S. governm ent and film industry in the Uruguay Round audiovisual 
talks, focusing on the influence of the Hollywood hawks on the U.S. 
governm ent's positions.
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In Chapter 6 I continue my analysis of the influence of the Hollywood 
hawks on the U.S. government. I discuss President Clinton's intervention on  
behalf of the U.S. film industry during the final days of the Round. I th en  
examine the chain reaction set off by the hawks in the final m om ents of the  
Round that ultimately prevented the United States and EU from  forging a 
bilateral deal on audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright. I argue 
that Hollywood lost the Uruguay Round because of the haw ks' aggressive 
approach to the talks and m isperception of their control over the C lin ton  
A dm inistration.
In Chapter 7 I examine Schiller's (1996) belief, shared by several European 
legal scholars (cf. Waregne, 1994; Dehousse and Havelange, 1994; 
Joachimowicz and Berenboom, 1994), that the French government dictated 
the outcome of the Uruguay Round's audiovisual sector talks (p. 121). I 
present an alternative scenario by suggesting that scholars have failed to 
appreciate the importance of EU protocol during the Round, the role of EU 
Member States other than France, and Commission efforts to forge a bilateral 
deal on audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright. Dehousse and 
Havelange (1994) and Joachimowicz and Berenboom (1994) have focused o n  
the activities of the French delegation, aided by the Belgian governm ent, and 
the EU's Cultural Affairs Council, in which Jacques Toubon, then-F rench 
m inister for cultural affairs, had some influence on audiovisual services. 
Their work is complemented and extended by mine, which focuses on the  
General Affairs Council. W ith the final say on EU offers in all sectors, the  
General Affairs Council had a different chemistry from that of the C ultural 
Affairs Council, one in which Alain Juppe, then-French foreign m inister, had  
little support on the issue of market access in the audiovisual sector (but
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more support on IPRs related to copyright).37 I argue that in the end the 
Hollywood hawks dictated the outcome of the GATS talks but, ironically, 
handed the French governm ent a victory. However, a majority of EU 
Member States dictated the outcome of the TRIPs talks on IPRs related to 
copyright.
37The Council of the EU, also known as the Council of Ministers, is the 
predom inant legislative body in the EU. Ministers from  EU Member States 
meet in groups according to their responsibilities. For example, Foreign 
Affairs Ministers meet in the General Affairs Council to discuss foreign affairs 
and trade matters on behalf of individual Member States.
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CHAPTER 1
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION
The political economy approach to communication research falls w ith in  
the research dom ain known as media policy studies and provides a 
theoretical fram ework for the analysis of the Uruguay Round's audiovisual 
sector negotiations. The approach is interdisciplinary in nature, w ith an  
intellectual heritage rooted in the broad frameworks of classical political 
economy (Smythe, 1984; Mosco, 1996) and critical theory (Murdock and 
Golding, 1979).38 Three principal systems of ideas govern contem porary 
debates about m edia policy in general: the global transition to an
inform ation/post-industrial society, the public sphere and m arket 
competition. The founders of the political economy approach to
38In general, the field of m edia studies is interdisciplinary. Schramm (1983) 
calls com m unication research "one of the greatest crossroads where m any 
pass but few tarry" (p. 8). Comstock (1983) argues that to define media studies 
as w hat takes place w ithin schools and departments of com m unication and 
journalism w ould "strip it of its past, its present energy, and its future" (p. 42). 
To ignore the field's interrelationships with other disciplines is to ignore the 
history and fundam ental nature of media studies. As Berelson (1959) points 
out, the first m edia scholars 'carried their disciplines w ith them .' A ll 
reputable degree program m es in media studies cut across disciplinary 
boundaries both in subject m atter and in staffing because the mass m edia 
pervade our lives on so m any different levels — psychological, social, 
political, international, etc. Yet media scholars appear to have forgotten their 
epistemological roots. Noam (1994) writes: "Despite com m unications studies 
being broad in concept, there is an absence of strong links and even som e 
hostility to some disciplines not at the center, such as technology, operations 
research, political science, law, and economics" (p. 213). Golding and Harris 
(1997) observe that the field of media studies has become insular, that m edia 
scholars have become "self-enclosed in their own ever more introspective 
dialogues" (p. 2).
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com m unication,39 Dallas Smythe and Herbert Schiller (Hardt, 1992; Mosco, 
1996) have operationalised these ideas in terms of the structure and policy of 
U.S. communication agencies and spectrum allocation (Smythe, 1960), m edia 
and cultural imperialism  (Schiller, 1969 [1992]; 1976; 1989; 1991; 1996) m edia  
and developm ent (Smythe, 1974 [1994]); and links between capitalist 
production of m edia and audience consumption (Smythe, 1981).
Mosco (1996) distinguishes between a N orth American and European 
approach to political economy of communication. According to Mosco, the  
N orth American tradition, the focus of this dissertation, examines A m erican 
media institutions and their influence throughout the world. The European 
approach, influenced primarily by Nicholas Gamham, Peter Golding, G raham  
Murdock and Arm and Mattelart, tends to focus on political economy as it 
relates to cultural studies. Gam ham  (1990) describes the interest of the
39There is no one flavour of political economy. On today's study of political 
economy Gilpin (1987) writes: "For the state, territorial boundaries are a
necessary basis of national autonomy and political unity. For the m arket, the  
elim ination of all political and other obstacles to the operation of the price 
mechanism is imperative. The tension between these two fundam entally  
different ways of ordering hum an relationships has profoundly shaped the  
course of m odem  history and constitutes the crucial problem in the study of 
political economy" (p. 11). Strange (1988 [1994]) defines international political 
economy as "the social, political and economic arrangem ents affecting the  
global systems of production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of 
values reflected therein" (p. 18). Gandy (1992), citing W hynes (1984), lists as 
four additional flavours, "1) the Austrian approach associated w ith V on  
Mises and von Hayek, which remains critical of neoclassical assum ptions 
regarding equilibrium  and rational choice; 2) the Institutionalist school, 
associated w ith Thorstein Veblen, J.R. Commons, and J.K. Galbraith, w hich  
gives due attention to the role of power in the economic system; 3) 
Contemporary or M odem  Marxist schools, which contend w ith conceptions 
of class, and capital as a coercive social relation; and 4) the m odern  
utilitarianism  of the Public Choice school, which finds a m arket of sorts in  
the process of public policy formation" (p. 23).
35
European approach as the link between "access to and control over the m eans 
of cultural production within the capitalist social form ation/' (p. 14) w hich 
"determ ines the type and range of symbolic forms circulated" (ibid). Mosco 
notes that the European emphasis is on "specific social problem s from a 
sociological or social psychological perspective" (1996, p. 98): "problem s facing 
young people, families, and communities, including the sociological concerns 
and communication needs of ethnic and racial minorities" (ibid).40
The political economy approach to the study of mass com m unication  
encompasses a Marxist tradition that examines capitalism 's cyclical 
revolutions in means of production and its influence on labour and the wage 
system (Smythe, 1984; Mosco, 1996). While N orth American and European 
political economists of com m unication pursue different research interests, 
they both share a common goal of incorporating to varying degrees either a 
Marxist critique or a critique of Marxism in their work. For example, Mosco
(1996) writes that of the num erous critiques of Marxism, one stands out as 
im portant to media studies: "Marx did not carry the social analysis of
capitalism  far enough" (p. 45). By focusing on labour's "instrum ental and 
productive nature," instead of its "expressive and constitutive qualities," 
Mosco argues that Marx's defenders fail to "demonstrate how com m unication  
and culture are material practices, how labor and language are m utually  
constitutive, and how com m unication and information are dialectical 
instances of the same social activity" (pp. 45-46). However, neo-M arxist 
political economists of com m unication such as Smythe and Schiller attem pt
40Mosco (1996) notes that "there are no clear generational parallels in the 
developm ent of a political economy tradition between Europe and N orth  
America" (p. 97).
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to understand labour's 'expressive and constitutive qualities' by offering w hat 
H ardt (1992) calls "the most radical and steadfast economic critique in the  
field" (pp. 148-149), and by demonstrating through their work "the possibility 
and the potential for Marxist criticism beyond the 1960s" (ibid).
Smythe (1977) argues that a blindspot in Marxist theory is the economic, 
rather than  ideological, function of mass communications for capital. He 
writes: "Marxists and those radical social critics who use Marxist term inology 
locate the significance of mass comm unications systems in their capacity to 
produce 'ideology' which is held to act as a sort of invisible glue that holds 
together the capitalist system" (1977, p. 1). However, Smythe (1981) th en  
examines w hat he calls the 'consciousness industry,' a Gramscian phrase 
defined in one of his earlier works as "the mass media in the m onopoly 
capitalist context" setting "the agenda which best serves the interests of the  
capitalist system" (1974) [1994], p. 253).41 Curiously, Smythe (1981) does n o t 
describe himself as Marxist but 'economistic.'42 In his own words his w ork 
has "tended to emphasize the power of capital through the policies and 
structures of capitalist communications, while slighting the resistance w hich 
people conduct to protect themselves against dom ination by capital" (1981, p. 
268).
41Smythe (1974 [1994]) adds that "in principle this agenda is dom inated by the  
process of selling commodities and producing audiences (out of people) to be 
used by capitalist industry to enhance its profitability and political security. 
This is the face of the capitalist mass media which is presented to ex-colonial 
countries, to socialist countries, and to the developed market areas of Europe" 
(ibid).
42G am ham  (1979) defines economism as "the concern for im m ediate physical 
survival and reproduction w ithin the dom inant relations of exchange" (p. 
126).
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A more productive critique of political economy and Marxism can be 
found in Gam ham 's Contribution to a Political Economy of Mass 
Communication (1979b), in which he argues that M arxism's simple economic 
determ inism  and focus on the ideology of mass m edia are not adequate 
explanations for understanding the structures of culture. To develop political 
strategies against developments w ithin the cultural sphere that are based on  
commodity production, Gam ham  suggests examining relations between the 
public and private sector, the role of the state in capitalist accumulation, the 
role of advertising in late capitalism and the like. G am ham  believes that the 
concept of ideology dom inates cultural theory and calls the  
base/superstructure relationship problematic w ithin the field. He writes: 
"The central problem with the base/superstructure metaphor...is that being a 
m etaphor of polarity, essentially binary in form, it is unable adequately to deal 
w ith  the num ber of distinctions that are necessary, in this instance betw een 
the material, the economic and the ideological" (1979b, p. 127).
Political economists of comm unication m ust begin to examine w hat 
Mosco (1996) calls "matters of emphasis" and "decisions about relative 
explicitness," which "have research consequences" (p. 134). A  closer look is 
needed at units of analysis employed in political economy research. Critical 
theorists often fall into the trap of the ecological fallacy: observing one and 
m aking inferences about another — shifting units of analysis from  
institutions to individuals (Stevenson 1983). By employing bona fide 
m ethods from the more established disciplines, particularly in ternational 
relations, in which a productive debate continues over units of analysis, 
scholars of the political economy of comm unication will begin to capture the
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complexity and scope of their topics, which, no doubt, will "have research 
consequences/
Scholars of political economy m ust also address the problem  of an  
incongruity between communication theory and empirical evidence. Put 
simply, does empirical evidence warrant the theoretical conclusions m ade? 
Stevenson (1983) warns that "theory, unless subject to rigorous and wide- 
ranging empirical test, is merely polemic" (p. 262). Livingstone (1996) 
discusses this incongruity in relation to m edia effects research and calls it a 
continuing problem. According to Livingstone, 'moral panics' over the  
hypothetical links between television and violence in vulnerable groups such 
as children have led researchers to conduct experiments, the results of w hich  
do no t necessarily replicate in naturalistic settings. The debate over the  
conclusiveness of data is "more about the epistemological lim itations of 
social science research than it is about the media in particular" (1996, p. 306). 
Historically, effects researchers moved from assum ing that m edia had direct 
influence on individuals to questioning such an assum ption th rough  
empirical m easurem ent (McQuail, 1977). By rethinking earlier assum ptions, 
effects researchers have advanced their tradition and opened new  lines of 
inquiry.43
43A limited-effects model articulated by Klapper (1960) was subsequently 
adopted and later challenged by a return to the powerful-effects m odel, 
espoused by N oelle-N eum ann (1973) and others. However, by the 1980s, 
researchers such as Morley (1980) and Hall (1980) found that audiences were 
m ore active in differentiating meaning than effects researchers had given 
them  credit for, while Liebes and Katz (1990) found that different audiences 
derive varying m eanings from programmes such as Dallas. Morley (1993) 
argues that the pendulum  has swung from a focus on the passive audience to 
the active audience. Jensen (1993) notes that "reception analysis asks not only 
w hat m edia do to audiences, or even what audiences to with m edia, bu t how  
m edia and audiences interact...." (p. 20).
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Similarly, ever since Harold Innis (1950) founded the m odern study of 
media imperialism  (Carey, 1989), media scholars have theorised that 
McLuhan's "electronically contracted world" (1964, p. 177) has led to 'cultural 
synchronization' (Hamelink, 1983), the 'hom ogenizing of television culture' 
(Lee, 1980), or the 'standardization and secularization of culture' (Katz, 1979). 
Schiller's (1969 [1992], 1989) argum ent that U.S. media corporations influence 
W estern European cultures (examined in greater detail in Chapter 2) assum es 
that cultural identity is not only measurable but also vulnerable to the values 
of external cultures broadcast on television and radio and show n on m ovie  
screens. However, Schlesinger (1987) argues that very little conceptual 
thought has gone into the notion of cultural identity.44 Holzner and 
Robertson (1980) note that the concept of identity is not a core sociological 
concept despite its frequent use by sociologists. The authors add that "identity 
has not received sustained analytic attention, in the sense of locating it in  
conceptual contexts and sharpening it to much more than connotative 
significance" (p. 2).45
^Schlesinger describes advocates of protectionism as relying on a belief 
rather than an argum ent that consum ption of foreign program m ing affects 
identities. The author calls this pseudo-argum ent 'off-the-shelf,' whose 
"terms function as signals for competing politico-economic projects rather 
than offering analytical purchase upon actual developments and their causes" 
(1987, pp. 258-259).
45Jarvie (1992) writes: "National identity, national character, national culture, 
ways of life, and outlook (anachronistically to mix terms we use today w ith  
terms used in the past) are vague and intangible entities that the social 
sciences teach us to treat gingerly. They all involve indefensibly broad 
generalizations about populations that just happen to be w ithin a national 
boundary" (p. 20).
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In an issue of Intermedia dedicated to the subject, Price (1992) describes the  
debate over the effect of TV program m es and films on cultural identity as 
involving 'dram atically contrasting v iew s/46 While Smith (1992) argues tha t 
television cannot construct and deconstruct culture,47 Schiller (1992) describes 
television as the 'm ortal enemy' of national identity. Carrie and Ehrenberg 
(1992) note that perhaps the importance of television as a social force is 
exaggerated, but the effects of media content, cultural influence and national 
identity are still im portant issues. Scholarship on m edia-cultural 
imperialism needs to enter a stage similar to that of the effects tradition in the  
1960s. New empirical evidence m ust be gathered and assum ptions m ust be 
questioned and, if necessary, revised.48
H erm an and McChesney (1997) argue that the globalisation of m edia has 
an attending set of values prom ulgated by advertising agencies that prom ote 
increased consumption, which "weakens sympathetic feelings toward others, 
and tends to diminish the spirit of community and the strength of com m unal
46Price writes: "Maybe every image, every programme, every gesture touches 
on the subject of national identity. Maybe, just maybe, national identities are 
so completely artificial that to talk about them  as affected by pictures on  
television or voices on radio just compounds confusion. And, perhaps 
national and ethnic identities are so deep-seated, so historically based, so 
burning a part of a person's psyche that it is arrogant to think that som ething 
so superficial as a stream of television images can affect them" (1992, p. 9).
47Smith (1993) comments: "The central difficulty in any project to construct a 
global identity and hence a global culture, is that collective identity, like 
imagery and culture, is always historically specific because it is based on  
shared memories and a sense of continuity between generations" (p. 180).
48Thomas (1980) correctly rem inds all scholars to examine the intrinsic 
legitimacy of any conceptual model in use in order to prevent a research bias 
from limiting the possible range of answers to a given research problem.
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ties" (p. 153). The authors do not present anthropological data to support 
their claims, and admit that their m ethods are based "in part on an appraisal 
of observable fact, in part on values, and in part on extrapolations of curren t 
trends into the future" (p. 136). Political economists of com m unication tend 
to rely on rhetoric, Marxist or otherwise, to gloss over inconsistencies and 
gaps in reasoning. They need to emphasise 'observable fact' and de- 
emphasise 'values and extrapolations.'
Miege (1989) notes that "there is very little data or analyses that convey the  
reality of imperialist domination.... Thus it is necessary to make do w ith  
estimates, incomplete data or an indirect approach to the phenom enon" (p. 
98). The influence of U.S. m edia corporations on W estern European m edia 
systems and governm ents' communications policies is difficult to m easure. 
H irst and Thompson (1996) point out that the predom inant activities (i.e. 
sales in the services and m anufacturing sectors) of the world's transnational 
corporations is still 'hom e-oriented/ meaning in the corporation's ho m e 
country and region. However, w ithin the entertainm ent sector, EU M em ber 
States provide more than half of the U.S. entertainm ent industry 's $8 billion 
in foreign earnings (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1994, p. 116). Only four 
of the world 's top ten m edia companies are U.S.-based (see Figure 2), yet the  
combined audiovisual turnover of the top two companies — Time W arner 
and The W alt Disney Co. — was $29bn in 1995, the combined audiov isual 
turnover of their next four non-U.S. rivals on the list.49
49Time W arner merged w ith Turner Broadcasting and W alt Disney m erged 
w ith Capital Cities/ABC in 1995.
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Figure 2
Top 10 W orldwide Media Companies 
Turnover 1995 
($U.S.bn)
Com pany A /V  Turnover Total Turnover
1. Time W arner 13.77 17.696
Turner Broadcasting 3.23 3.4374
2. Walt Disney Co. 6.001 12.112
Capital Cities/ABC 5.728 6.679
3. Viacom 9.172 11.688
4. Sony Corp. 8.618 47.619
5. Bertelsmann/CLT 8.331 18.438
6. TCI 6.851 6.851
7. ARD* 6.531 6.531
8. NHK* 6.043 6.043
9. Polygram 5.479 5.479
10. Seagram /Universal________4.570_____________ 5.772
Source: The Power Pack 1996, Screen International, pp. 16-18. 
•denotes public service broadcaster
Eclectic Epistemology of the Political Economy of Com munication
G am ham 's (1979a) editorial on political economy of com m unication in  
Media, Culture and Society locates the approach as an alternative to the 
dom inant neopositivist, behavioural paradigm  in U.S. m edia research and 
the British culturalist tradition that emphasises the analysis of m edia content 
and ideology. Mosco (1996) notes that the approach "brings together an 
international collection, if not a community, of scholars united not so m uch  
by a singular theoretical perspective or problematic, as by an approach to 
intellectual activity" (p. 123). Mosco defines the approach as "the study of the 
social relations, particularly the power relations, that m utually constitute the 
production, distribution, and consum ption of resources" (1996, p. 25). In the 
context of comm unication research, these resources include audiovisual 
products, books, newspapers, audiences and information as com m odities. 
(Mosco, 1988, 1996). G arnham  (1979a) describes the research interest of
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political economists of com m unication as the 'industrialization of culture': 
"m odes of cultural production and consum ption developed w ithin capitalist 
societies and determined by the specific economic organization of those 
societies" (p. 119).
As its name implies, the political economy approach to com m unication  
can be traced back to the work of the classical political economists Sm ith, 
M althus, Ricardo and Mill (Smythe, 1984; Mosco, 1996).50 Redm an (1997) 
quotes Mill's (1981-1991) definition of classical political economy as a "science 
w hich traces the laws of such of the phenom ena of society as arise from the  
combined operations of m ankind for the protection of wealth, in so far as 
those phenomena are not modified by the pursuit of any other object" (vol 4, 
p. 323). According to Mosco (1996), political economists traditionally study 
social change and historical transform ation, most notably "the great capitalist 
revolution, the upheaval that transformed societies based prim arily on  
agricultural labor into commercial, manufacturing, and, ultim ately, 
industrial societies" (p. 27).
The intellectual heritage of the political economy of com m unication also 
has been heavily influenced by critical theory (Murdock and Golding, 1979). 
The founders of critical theory — Horkheimer, Marcuse, Adorno, Lowenthal, 
Habermas and others who set up  the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research 
during the late 1930s and early 1940s — based many of their tenets on G erm an
50Classical political economy was also considered interdisciplinary. R edm an
(1997) notes that Smith, M althus and Mill "believed that no political 
economist could be useful or effective who did not have a knowledge of the 
other social sciences" (p. 355).
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idealist thought on the nature of reason, tru th  and beauty, but placed history 
at the centre of their analysis (Held, 1990). The Frankfurt School's interest in  
integrating philosophy with social analysis signified a return  to the Left 
Hegelians of the 1840s, who advocated transform ing the social order th rough  
hum an praxis by engaging in materialist, dialectical analyses or critiques of 
society (Jay, 1973).
Max Horkheimer, the director of the Frankfurt Institute, describes the  
deficiencies of social philosophy as failing to consider "unprovable 
metaphysical presuppositions" (1942 [1989], p. 30). Horkheim er (1942 [1989]) 
argues that philosophy does not consider spirits of people and elements of 
being. But he does not see a difference between philosophy and the em pirical 
sciences: "Instead, the philosophical questions them selves are dialectically 
integrated into the empirical scientific process. That is to say, the answers are 
to be found in the progress of substantive knowledge which also affects the  
form" (p. 32). Political economy also incorporates a m oral philosophical 
dim ension (Golding and Murdock, 1996; Mosco, 1996). Mosco writes that 
political economists "interrogate the range of moral stances and incorporate 
these questionings into their analyses" (1996, p. 133).51
Held (1990) writes that critical theorists "lay the foundation for an  
explanation, in an interdisciplinary research context, of questions concerning 
the conditions which make possible the reproduction and transform ation of 
society, the m eaning of culture, and the relation between the ind iv idual, 
society and nature" (p. 16). The Frankfurt School offered its own social and
51Mosco calls this a "sense of the descriptive and prescriptive" (1996, p 24).
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political theory of society that rekindled Marxist debate in the United States 
after the 1940s in response to the social-scientific, positivist view of the w orld 
that influenced American social theory in general (Hardt, 1992) and the w ork  
of the founders of communication research in particular.
Critical theory places responsibility for changing society in the hands of the  
individual (Marcuse, 1964). As a "gadfly of other systems" (Jay, 1973, p. 41), 
critical theory views "obstinacy as a genuine quality of philosophical thought" 
(Marcuse, 1937 [1989], p. 64) and is concerned w ith the "potentialities of m an  
and w ith the individual's freedom, happiness, and rights contained in all of 
its analyses" (ibid, p. 63). Critical theory's goal is to "unm ask rather th a n  
augm ent the established structure of power" (Gerbner, 1983, p. 358-359). T he 
'unm asking' of power can be seen in works such as Marcuse's (1964) One 
Dimensional Man, which rails against advanced industrial society7 s 
technological social control and suffocation of the "ideas which may 'prom ote 
the art of life'" (p. 247); and Horkheim er and A dorno 's (1944 [1973]) The  
Dialectic of Enlightenment, which exposes cultural industry as deception 
rather than enlightenm ent in its "achievement of standardization and m ass 
production" (p. 121) and its "classifying, organizing, and labeling consum ers" 
(p. 123).
Lash and Urey's (1994) assessment of today's cultural industries 
exemplifies the contemporary articulation of H orkheim er and A dorno 's 
views. According to Lash and Urry, who cite Bellah et al (1985), the  
entertainment industry 's output has become sim ilar to that of the advertising 
industry. Rather than phrasing it in term s of 'deception' versus 
'enlightenm ent,' the authors distinguish betw een 'difference' and 'n iche
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marketing': it is not a "matter of 'difference' or 'pluralized life worlds' or 
even 'neo-tribes/ but instead a m atter of niche marketing and disembedded 
lifestyle enclaves" (1994, p. 142). Similarly, G am ham  (1985) argues that new  
com puter networks, while allowing individuals to com m unicate 
economically and efficiently, will create us "in the image of the statistical 
artifacts of the m arketing industry" (p. 73). G am ham  also articulates 
Marcuse's distrust of technology and its effect on thought. He sees satellite 
technology in particular as underm ining national control of policy, while at 
the same time providing governm ent w ith fuel for economic growth and 
helping to converge communication and industrial policy. The result, he  
argues, is a dialectic of centralisation and decentralisation that affects public 
and private spheres.
Critical theorists in media studies see com m unication itself as an  
expression of power relations (Grossberg, 1987) and highlight "the vital link  
between epistemology and politics" (Slack and Allor, 1983, p. 215). Sm ythe 
(1984) argues that critical comm unication research has a developm ental 
com ponent to it, particularly in relation to the Third World. Mosco (1996) 
writes that a critical political economy of com m unication "drew from the 
socialist world the models, evidence, and inspiration for alternatives to 
market-based systems of communication" (p. 12). He cites as examples L unn 's
(1982) work on artistic and cultural m ovem ents in pre-Stalinist Russia, 
Downing's (1984) work on the dissident and samizdat media of Russia and 
Eastern Europe, Smythe's (1981) work on revolutionary and Maoist China. 
However, Mosco adds that it was the New W orld Inform ation and 
Com m unication Order (NWICO)52 that inspired m uch of the research (i.e.
52In 1976, UNESCO and the Non-Aligned M ovement — Third W orld
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Mattelart and Siegelaub, 1983; Schiller, 1976; Preston et al, 1989; UNESCO, 
1979).
Problems of the Political Economy Approach
Jay (1973) notes that at its core, critical theory has "an aversion to closed 
philosophical systems. To present it as such would therefore distort its 
essentially open-ended, probing, unfinished quality" (ibid).53 Critical 
m ethods are individualistic and protean, "expressed through a series of 
critiques of other thinkers and philosophical traditions" (Jay, 1973, p. 41). 
Political economist of comm unication also have an aversion to closed 
systems and reject "the view that all reality is reducible to one specific causal 
force" (Mosco, 1996, p. 136-37). Moreover, the founders of classical political 
economy adopted and rejected methods as they saw fit (Redman, 1997). 
W hile the founders of the Frankfurt School based their m ethodology on
colonial nations that advocated links with neither capitalist nor socialist 
powers — called for a New W orld Information and Com m unications Order 
(NWICO) and New International Economic Order (NIEO). In the early 1980s, 
proponents of Third W orld self-reliance convened several conferences and 
meetings, most notably the 1980 General Conference of UNESCO in Belgrade, 
at which the MacBride Report (1980), a list of recom m endations for the 
NWICO, was approved. A year later, forces against the NWICO and UNESCO 
pu t forth their Declaration of Talloires, which countered the NWICO w ith  
the Tree flow' doctrine (Mattelart, Delcourt and Mattelart, 1984). Thus began 
an ideological and political war between capitalist and socialist forces over 
w hat in essence was the legitimacy of m edia-cultural imperialism. By 
rejecting the free flow doctrine, UNESCO became embattled w ith the U nited 
States and, in particular, the Reagan Administration during the 1980s, leading 
to the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO in 1985.
^Sm ythe and Van Dinh (1983) describe a range of applications of critical 
theory to media studies, from "spastic polemics against the status quo 
through 'criticism / new or otherwise, of literature, dram a or art" (p. 123) to 
"sharp critical analysis of communications phenom ena in their systemic 
context" (ibid).
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aspects of German philosophy, the founders of classical political econom y 
based their approach to varying degrees on aspects of Newtonian and 
Baconian scientific techniques (Redman, 1997).54 The methodology of the  
classical political economists was a mixture of inductive and deductive 
reasoning from an assumed hypothesis (Redman, 1997). The methodology of 
the political economist of com m unication is often more inductive th an  
deductive and ranges from economic statistics and analytical tools of political 
science (Smythe, 1960) to 'spastic polemics' (Smythe and van Dinh, 1983).
Mosco (1996) argues that while political economists share them atic 
interests and an intellectual attitude that, for example, diachronic and 
synchronic methods are im portant, they differ on "matters of emphasis" and 
"decisions about relative explicitness" (p. 134). He writes that "there are 
im portant areas of difference between research that takes a value position, 
such as one organized around democratic communication, and those that 
concentrate on m apping the existing political economy of com m unication" 
(1996, p. 134). W hen empirical evidence from documents or interviews is 
difficult to obtain, political economic scholars examining com m unication 
issues make 'decisions about relative explicitness' by m aking sweeping 
generalisations based on Stevenson's (1983) ecological fallacy. Mosco writes 
that "there are a wide range of substantive perspectives within political 
economy that constitute areas of contention about what the approach should  
place in the foreground of analysis" (1996, p. 134). Mosco observes that "there
^According to Redman (1997), the classical political economists embraced a 
m ixture of inductive and deductive reasoning stemming from N ew ton 's 
confirm ation of m athem atically derived hypotheses on nature th rough  
experimental observation, and Bacon's fact collection and classification.
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are noteworthy differences between approaches that concentrate on the global 
political economy, stressing for example the power of transnational 
communication conglomerates, and those that look at how the logic of capital 
is contested w ithin the internal operations of a m edia firm, such as at the  
point of production" (1996, p. 134). Ironically, little contention exists over th e  
analytical legerdemain that equates institutions w ith individuals.
For example, Schiller (1969 [1992], 1989) argues that U.S. m edia 
corporations dom inate European cultures and media systems. He equates 
m edia presence (i.e. Hollywood's foreign investm ent and performance at th e  
box office) w ith individual and cultural influence w ithout providing social- 
psychological data to support his claim. Similarly, Smythe (1981) describes h is  
m ethods as 'critical historical materialism ' in his analysis of the role of 
audiences produced by the 'consciousness industry.' Smythe and Van D inh
(1983) observe that critical theorists adhere to an ideology that links "'critical' 
researchable problems and critical tools with interpretations that in v o lv e  
radical changes in the established order" (p. 118). Indeed, to begin to address 
the concept of m edia-cultural imperialism and broader structures of 
modernity, Srebemy-M ohammadi (1997) describes the kind of support 
Schiller and Smythe need: "detailed historical investigation of the sequences, 
relative importance and enduring impacts of the institutions, structures and  
'culture' of modernity, and its interface with older non-Wes tern  cultural 
environm ents" (p. 67). In this dissertation I provide a 'detailed historical 
investigation' of the Uruguay Round audiovisual sector talks to discover 
w hether my findings confirm or qualify their analyses.
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Schiller and Smythe are radical political economists who consider their 
Marxist views as methodology. Schiller in particular appears to be undaun ted  
by the incongruity between his theorising and his evidence, or lack of it. Yet 
he cannot be marginalised because he has conducted research on im portan t 
public policy issues, and, as well as Smythe, has inspired a new  generation of 
scholars to follow in his footsteps. From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the  
two scholars often set the agenda for media policy studies. Ideology cannot 
substitute for methodology, although critical theorists would disagree. But 
ideology need not be sacrificed in the name of scientism. The way forward is 
to im port m ethods from other established disciplines. The approach will be 
enriched by its ow n self-assessment that will lead to a new breed of policy 
researcher who combines rigorous empirical m ethods from political science, 
international relations, economics or history w ith whatever levels of 
personal ideology and prescription deemed necessary.
Mosco's Suggestions for Political Economy's Renewal
H aving traced the intellectual heritage of the political economy approach 
to com m unication research, and having highlighted some of the approach's 
problems, my next steps are to discuss some solutions to these problems and 
to operationalise them. Vincent Mosco's (1996) The Political Economy o f  
C om m unication  is the first attempt to build a systematic, integrated 
discussion of political economy in media and com m unication integrating 
theory and empirical evidence. After looking at Mosco's ideas, I present an  
assessment of the concept of globalisation as it relates to the media, and of the 
m edia-cultural im perialism  thesis, which is one of many approaches to 
globalisation and an enduring approach to the political economy of 
comm unication. I then take Mosco's ideas one step farther by introducing
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ideas and solutions from an ongoing debate over units of analysis in  
international relations before presenting my case study on the  
G A TT/U ruguay Round.
Units of Analysis in Political Economy
Mosco (1996) argues that scholarship on the political economy of 
com m unication tends to examine power in a 'macroanalysis7 consisting of 
"sum m ary data on revenues, organizational structure, employm ent, as w ell 
as submissions to government bodies such as regulatory agencies77 (p. 214). 
The work of Guback (1969,1977,1985), Rosenberg (1982) and Thom pson (1985) 
on the success of Hollywood in foreign m arkets exemplifies Mosco's 
macroanalytic approach.55 Mosco suggests that political economists should  
take a 'microanalytic7 approach, emphasising how power "operates at the  
constitutive, interactive" (1996, p. 214) level. This requires looking at "the 
ideas of agency, social relations, social process and social practice" (ibid, p. 213) 
to balance macroanalytic tendencies toward featuring "structures, typically 
business and governm ent institutions" (ibid). He offers as an example of a 
micro approach looking at how individual decision-makers in Hollywood 
influence the industry's success abroad and how macro pressures influence 
micro decisions.56 Jarvie's (1992) unrivalled book on Hollywood's export 
system (1920 to 1950) exemplifies this approach, although it is not allied to the  
political economy tradition, nor is it m entioned by Mosco (1996). Mosco 
correctly notes that balancing the micro w ith the macro requires different
55Mosco (1996) notes that Thomas Guback was a student of Dallas Smythe.
56The micro approach, as the title of this dissertation suggests, should also 
look at how decision-makers in Hollywood influence the industry 's failures 
abroad!
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research tools from those typically employed by political economists of 
com m unication.
Mosco derives his micro-macro approach57 from the work of A nthony  
Giddens (1984), whose theory of 'structuration' incorporates the concept of 
'agency' — an individual's capability to 'm ake a difference' or to exercise som e 
sort of power — into an analysis of social systems. Giddens argues that 
structure is usually understood by social analysts in terms of a patterning of 
social relations, such as the girders of a building, or an external constraint o n  
an individual's free initiative. However, Giddens views structure as a duality 
involving both constraining and enabling qualities. His 'duality of structure ' 
sees agents and structures as interdependent: "The structural properties of 
social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively 
organize" (1984, p. 25). Giddens adds that "structure has no existence 
independent of the knowledge that agents have about what they do in their 
day-to-day activity" (1984, p. 26).58
Scholars in both media and cultural studies have also commented on the 
issue of units of analysis. Golding and Murdock (1996) cite Giddens (1976) by 
suggesting that political economists m ust avoid 'the twin tem ptations' of 
instrum entalism  and structuralism .59 The authors view instrum entalism  as
57M attelart and Mattelart (1992) call this approach the "near versus the  
distant" (p. 124).
58Cohen (1989) calls Giddens' theory a set of ontological assum ptions about 
the social world and locates it between "thorough-going determ inism  and 
unqualified freedom" (p. 26).
59The classic structuralist perspective comes from W allerstein (1974), w ho 
characterises systemic forces in terms of capitalism and the 'world-system': 
"economic factors operate w ithin an arena larger than that which any
53
ways capitalists use their economic power to ensure that public information is 
consistent w ith their interests. While structuralism  tends to view structures 
as perm anent and never changing, the authors agree with Giddens' reciprocal 
approach by examining "how it comes about that structures are constituted 
through action, and reciprocally how action is constituted structurally" (1976, 
p. 161). Grossberg (1987) locates critical theory of communication betw een the  
'tw in  tem ptations' of essentialism and structuralism  or "the dialectic betw een 
deconstruction and reconstruction" (p. 91). He argues that both elem ents and 
contexts articulate each other" (1987, p. 91).60
Smythe's (1960) macroanalysis consists of examining governm ent agencies 
regulating the mass media by linking the structure and policies of the  
agencies to their social settings. Smythe incorporates a microanalysis into h is 
approach by looking at both group and individual behaviour associated w ith  
the products and services of the comm unications agencies. He also adds a 
microanalytic element by looking at the 'effects' of the agencies o n  
individuals "in terms of the policies by which they are organized and
political entity can totally control" (p. 348). Hawkes (1977) notes that 
structuralism  dom inated the field of physical sciences in the early 20th 
century but also influenced other fields, including linguistics. According to 
Hawkes, structuralism  posits that the elements in a given situation have no  
significance in themselves except in their relation to all other elem ents. 
Hawkes cites Saussure, a Swiss linguist credited as one of the founders of 
semiology, and his structural interpretation of language: "Language is a
system of inter-dependent terms in which the value of each term  results 
solely from the simultaneous presence of the others" (p. 26).
60Grossberg writes that "the privileged self-identity and assum ed self- 
sufficiency of communication...must be deconstructed in order to reveal how  
it is constituted, defined, and constructed — how its effects are determ ined — 
by its complex contextual relations" (1987, p. 92).
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operated" (1960, p. 564). Indeed, Smythe views this as the central purpose of 
the political economy of communication.
In a compendium  of essays exploring the cultural dimensions of 
globalisation, King (1991) notes that w ithin cultural studies there is a debate 
over the development of a theory of culture w ithin the context of 
globalisation. King views the globalisation of culture as a process of 
'deterritorialization' as a result of international migration. He defines culture 
both as "socially organized systems of m eaning expressed in particular 
forms," and as "the historical and sociological study of concrete cultural forms 
and practices" (1991, p. 1). King sees the debate over the globalisation of 
culture as a disagreement over units of analysis. Scholars differ over w hether 
to develop a theory of culture at an international level versus one at the level 
of nationally constituted society. The central concern on both sides of the 
debate is the link between globalisation of culture and cultural 
hom ogenisation.
Mosco's suggestion to balance the macro with the micro is an im portant 
step toward correcting the m ismatch between methodology and subject 
m atter in the political economy approach to communication. However, 
Mosco does not describe how one should operationalise the micro-macro 
analysis based on Giddens' even more abstract notion of agents and structures 
functioning interdependently. How, for example, should one exam ine 
international audiovisual negotiations involving industry, governm ent and 
individual negotiators? I attem pt to operationalise Mosco's micro-macro 
approach by m oving beyond the boundaries of media and cultural studies
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into the territory of international relations theory, where a debate continues 
on the appropriate units of analysis to use for the study of state behaviour.
M edia Studies Meets International Relations
Moravcsik (1993) explains the significance of categorising interstate 
relations by their unit of analysis: "The level of analysis tells the investigator 
where to look for the causes of state behavior by classifying com peting 
explanations (or independent variables) according to the units in which they 
are conceptualized" (p. 5). Maghroori (1982) notes that the debate am ong 
international relations scholars is on the dichotomy between the state-centred 
perspective and the globalist perspective. Waltz (1986) characterises the  
debate in terms of reductionist versus systemic theories. Waltz argues that 
reductionist theories "explain international outcomes through elements and 
combinations of elements located at national or subnational levels. That 
internal forces produce external outcomes is the claim of such theories" (1986, 
p. 47). On the other hand, systemic theories "explain how the organization of 
a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting un its 
w ithin it. Such theories tell us about the forces the units are subject to. From  
them , we can infer some things about the expected behavior and fate of the 
units" (1986, p. 60).
Moravcsik's (1993) observes that a majority of international relations 
theorists recommend giving priority to international explanations. However, 
Putnam  (1988 [1993]) argues that searching for domestic causes of 
international effects (Waltz, 1959) or international causes of domestic effects 
(Gourevitch, 1978) fails to capture the 'interaction' of domestic and 
international factors — the essence of what Putnam  calls a 'general' rather
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than p a rtia l equilibrium ' approach. Putnam  (1988 [1993]) has developed an  
approach to studying international trade negotiations that analyses a g iven  
negotiation from the eyes of chief negotiators who m ust sim ultaneously  
satisfy domestic constituents while negotiating an international agreem ent — 
w hat he calls 'double-edged diplomacy/ Chapter 3 will discuss how  I plan to 
operationalise Putnam 's approach and concepts to apply them  to the U ruguay 
R ound.
Mosco's argum ent for balancing the micro with the macro finds 
intellectual kinship among the 'second structuralists' (Palan, 1992).61 Palan 
describes the m ovem ent toward integrating units of analysis in the study of 
international relations as 'second structuralism / whose advocates "seek to 
explain the dynamics of international relationships in the context of groups 
and social classes residing in different societies.... They are prim arily  
interested in the various routes by which international relationships are 
related to the state and to the world economy" (1992, p. 27). Palan's second 
structuralists (cf. Mann, 1986; Braudel, 1979; Strange, 1988 [1994]) argue tha t 
both units of analysis are im portant in determining the actions of states — 
that the way societal groups and governments interact to develop foreign 
policy dictates the state's actions toward other states.
It is interesting to note the similarities and differences between G iddens' 
duality of structure that influenced Mosco's argum ent and P u tnam 's
61Interestingly, the debate over the globalisation of culture (King, 1991) has yet 
to move to the 'interactive' level and remains stuck in the in ternational 
versus national polarity. Perhaps an enterprising scholar m ight som eday 
apply an interactive approach to this debate.
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interactive approach based on a "general equilibrium .' Giddens sees agent 
(individual as social actor) and structure (social system) reciprocally 
influencing and reproducing each other. Putnam  sees agent (negotiator) and 
structure (domestic and international politics) interacting to create yet 
another structure in the form of an international trade agreement. Both 
approach agency as sim ultaneously enabled and constrained by structure. 
Both view the agent's latitude of freedom as dependent upon the agent's 
competence to perform  (Cohen, 1989). And both are based on the idea tha t 
rules and resources not only effect social reproduction (or trade agreements), 
bu t are also effected by the outcome of this process (ibid). Chapter 2 w ill 
further develop the links between political economy of com m unication and 
international relations using the m edia-cultural imperialism thesis.
Interestingly, Comor (1997) approaches my argum ent from the opposite 
direction. He argues that the political economy of com m unication and 
international political economy should move closer together because they 
share research interests.62 But he sees the micro level of political economy of 
com m unication investigating the audience and its relation to production and 
distribution of entertainm ent or information, rather than Mosco's 'ideas of 
agency' involving, for example, the activities of key decision-makers in  
Hollywood.63 However, Comor and Mosco share similar macro levels, w hich 
look at global developm ents in communications. Comor suggests that the
62 Recall that IPE is defined by Strange (1988 [1994]) as "the social, political and 
economic arrangem ents affecting the global systems of production, exchange 
and distribution" (p. 18).
63Comor's (1997) view of the micro is similar to Smythe's (1981) interest in  
audiences produced by the 'consciousness industry.'
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macro level falls within the research domain of IPE, but he argues that IPE 
should focus more on the mass m edia audience as the basic unit of analysis, 
rather than  on the state as the basic un it.64 Comor notes that IPE, w ithin the  
field of international relations, does not have the research tools to address 
how  global developments affect mass communication audiences.
The State's Role in  the Media Industry
As to the incongruity between theory and empirical evidence in political 
econom y of communication, Mosco (1996) suggests that scholars rev isit 
them es in the approach from underdeveloped angles. For example, Mosco 
notes that one of the central goals of the approach's North American tradition  
is to understand the relationship of governm ent or the state to the m edia 
industry. Political economists of communication tend to focus on the  
technological and economic aspects of corporate power, while underplaying 
the political aspects, which call "attention to the constitutive as well as the 
reactive role of the state" (1996, p. 200). Mosco comments: "The challenge
here has been to explain the role of the state w ithout suffering the extremes of 
view ing it as either an independent arbiter of a pluralistic field of pressures, 
or, alternatively, as the instrumental and dependent arm of capital" (1996, pp. 
91-92).65
64Liebes and Katz (1990) agree w ith Comor. The authors examine w hether the 
TV show Dallas is universally understood and find differences in modes of 
retelling an episode and collective-meaning making. They argue that the 
un it of analysis of media-cultural imperialism should be the audience itself.
65Surprisingly, Smythe does not see the need for examining theories of the 
state in relation to the mass media. Smythe (1978) describes such theories as 
being "at a level of abstraction remote from the nitty-gritty level where daily 
the institutions of monopoly capitalism use commodity m arketing and the 
mass m edia to push capitalist ideology...." (p. 122).
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Mosco argues that political economists of com m unication tend to view  
corporate power as capital's expansion through its use and im provem ent "on 
the m eans of transportation and comm unication" and its ability "to sh rink  
the tim e it takes to move goods, people and messages over spaces" (1996, p. 
173). Mosco characterises the process of capital's technological and economic 
expansion as 'spatialization,' based on the notion that capitalism controls and 
shrinks space and time (Marx, 1939 [1973]; Lefebvre, 1979; Lash and Urry, 1987, 
1994).66 Spatialization falls within the broader concept of globalisation, yet the 
term s are often used synonymously. Mosco (1996) notes that political 
economists of communication tend to view spatialization and the global 
grow th of media firms in terms of corporate concentration and ow nership. 
He adds that a central theme in political economy is that the state supports 
transnational business.
I argue that to understand the concept of m edia globalisation, scholars 
m ust examine its microanalytic aspects, or, as stated earlier, Mosco's 'ideas of 
agency,' as well as its macroanalytic aspects. However, Mosco's ow n 'ideas of 
agency' need clarification, for he really means 'ideas of power,' a critical 
interpretation of Giddens' theory. Mosco argues that structuration theory 
places too m uch emphasis on hum an agency (Thompson, 1989), w hile 
political economists tend to focus on power and a critical approach to social
66Marx (1973) writes that capitalism and its relations "annihilate space w ith  
tim e" (p. 539) or transcend spatial barriers. Lash and Urry (1994) describe 
spatialization as a "reduction in 'size' of international society through 'tim e- 
space compression' of various flows, which greatly enhances people's 
interconnectedness and their consciousness of this interconnectedness" (p. 
281).
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analysis. He correctly notes that Giddens does not offer a clear sense of w hat 
he m eans by 'social rules' or the structure in which agents operate. He also 
notes that Giddens' interest in creating a 'transhistorical' theory (Giddens, 
1981) is at odds w ith political economists' historical specificity. Mosco is 
comfortable w ith Giddens' duality of structure as long as it gives greater 
w eight to power. But while Mosco is sure that applying Giddens' duality of 
structure, and therefore the concept of agency, "deepens the substantive and 
m ethodological approach to pow er in political economy" (1996, p. 214), he is 
not clear about how power is synonymous w ith agency. As stated earlier, 
Mosco notes that political economists tend to view corporate power in term s 
of spatialization — as capital's expansion through 'the m eans of 
transportation and com m unication' and its ability to 'shrink tim e / T he 
possibility of individuals as social actors influencing the globalisation of 
m edia does not apply at this level of abstraction.
I argue that political economist of communication should  focus more on  
agency, on individuals as social actors, rather than on critical theorists' 
preoccupation w ith abstract notions of power and hegemony. Agency tends 
to be examined in terms of the personifications of globalisation — a few high- 
profile m edia/inform ation m oguls, their global corporations and their global 
exploits: Rupert M urdoch and his media empire (cf. Leapman, 1984;
Shawcross, 1992), Bill Gates and his software empire (cf. M arshall, 1994; 
Wallace, 1997) and so on. However, most interpretations of globalisation 
em phasise its abstract, macro aspects. For example, several scholars describe 
globalisation as a compression of time and space (Innis, 1950 [1972]; M cLuhan, 
1964); Robertson and Lechner, 1985; Giddens, 1990; Harvey, 1990; Robertson, 
1992; Lash and Urry, 1987, 1994) or as the structuration of the world
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(Robertson, 1993). Others see the concept as a process of cu ltural 
hom ogenisation or cultural loss (Katz, 1979; Lee, 1980; Ham elink, 1983; 
Tomlinson, 1991; Featherstone, 1993). Still others see globalisation as a result 
of the growth of transnational corporations and the spread of one or m ore 
dom inant cultures (Schiller, 1969 [1992], 1989; Smythe, 1981, 1984), w ith  
analyses of specific industries such as Hollywood and its link to M adison 
Avenue (Wasko, 1997), global news wholesalers (Boyd-Barrett, 1997), and 
global television news services (Paterson, 1997). However, Perraton et al 
(1997) argue that conceptions of globalisation are inadequate and the ir 
analysis of empirical evidence is misleading.
Ferguson (1992) sees a gap between globalisation theory and evidence: 
"Globalization conflates the norm ative and descriptive, and consequently 
carriers ideological as well as temporal, spatial, historical and geopolitical 
implications" (p. 73). She argues that globalisation has taken on a life of its 
own, that assumptions, or w hat she calls "myths/ substitute for hard  
evidence. Similarly, Albrow (1996) argues that the connotation of 
globalisation as having an inherent direction or a "process' stems from its use 
as an "isation" word. He adds: ""The lack of both a determinate end-point to 
globalization and the impossibility of arriving at a complete enum eration of 
its impact has a consequence which is equally important for analysis" (1996, p. 
91). Robertson (1993) cautions that globalisation as a research topic could 
become an "intellectual "playzone" — a site for the expression of residual 
social-theoretical interests, interpretive indulgence, or the display of world 
ideological preferences" (p. 16).
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The emphasis of globalisation literature on the macro also has a research 
consequence: conclusions tend to be sweeping generalisations because the  
concepts used for analysis — compression of time and space or cu ltural 
hom ogenisation — are also generalisations. Just as research results are 
influenced by the guiding hand of a chosen approach — w hether it be critical, 
adm inistrative or a combination — so research results are influenced by the  
level of abstraction of research concepts. An excellent example of the  
influence of theoretical approach and concept abstraction on research results 
can be seen in Schiller's (1969 [1992], 1989) assertion that in global economic 
affairs, U.S. media corporations have more authority than most governm ents 
in  the world, and no longer rely on the U.S. governm ent for support in  
rem oving trade barriers. Schiller has avoided Mosco's extremes of view ing 
the state as either an 'independent arbiter of pressures' or a 'dependent arm  of 
capital.' But he has also avoided the specificities of the relationship betw een 
the U.S. governm ent and film industry. In essence, Schiller avoids an  
analysis of agency in the success or failure of Hollywood in foreign m arkets. 
For example, w ithin Hollywood, who sets the industry 's foreign lobbying 
agenda? Film lobbyists or studio lawyers? Have Hollywood executives and 
U.S. government officials gone their separate ways, or do they collaborate o n  
certain issues? If they collaborate, how would one characterise their w orking 
relationship? Do Hollywood and government negotiators adopt sim ilar 
negotiating styles in international negotiations? Indeed, do Hollywood and 
government officials have sim ilar goals in foreign markets? These questions 
and others constitute Mosco's microanalysis of the political dim ension of 
corporate power, despite his lack of clarity on the concepts of power and 
agency. By balancing the micro w ith the macro, and by revisiting themes in  
the approach from underdeveloped angles, particularly the role of the state in
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the media industry, scholars of political economy can begin to sift through the  
assumptions of globalisation, challenge them at the 'constitutive, interactive' 
level, and emerge with a clearer sense of the concept and its implications. In  
the next chapter I present an analysis of the media-cultural imperialism thesis 
and develop a series of propositions with which to interrogate my U ruguay 
Round case study.
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CHAPTER 2 
PARTI
THE MEDIA-CULTURAL IMPERIALISM THESIS
In the previous chapter I discussed the problem of an incongruity betw een 
theory and empirical in the political economy approach to com m unication. 
Mosco (1996) suggests that scholars revisit themes in the approach from  
underdeveloped angles, particularly the political aspects of corporate power. 
By taking a second look at one of the central themes in the approach, the  
relationship of governm ent or the state to the media industry, scholars w ill 
begin to realise that there is an undue reliance on rhetoric, Marxist or 
otherwise, to gloss over inconsistencies and gaps in reasoning. It is not clear 
w hy media scholars have tolerated this situation considering the im portance 
of the m edia as a research topic. Perhaps the intellectual heritage of the  
political economy of communication has draw n methodological boundaries 
for scholars. Perhaps scholars have gravitated toward the more radical zones 
of these boundaries. Or perhaps the problem lies w ith the level of abstraction 
of research concepts. Scholars of political economy of com m unication should  
convene to discuss these matters. Nevertheless, the solution is clear. 
Inconsistencies m ust be exposed and gaps m ust be filled. In this chapter I 
examine Schiller's media-cultural imperialism  thesis and develop a set of 
propositions.
Thesis of An 'Unconventional Scholar'
Schiller was not the first scholar to conduct work on im perialism  and 
comm unications. Carey (1989) argues that Harold Innis (1950 [1972], 1951) 
pioneered the m odem  study of media imperialism. Innis' Empire and
65
Communication and The Bias of Communication examine the growth of 
com m unications from the late 1700s to the 1900s. Innis defines empire as 
"efficiency of communication" (1950 [1972], p. 9), which, he argues, flourishes 
"under conditions in which civilization reflects the influence of more th an  
one m edium  and in which the bias of one medium toward decentralization is 
offset by the bias of another m edium  toward centralization" (p. 7). Innis 
defines the l>ias' of a m edium  as its influence on a given civilisation's 
cultural development. For example, he argues that the Tuas' of paper and 
literacy emphasised the monopoly of knowledge, while the bias of 
broadcasting, w ith its wide accessibility, broke the monopoly. The growth of 
empire occurs w hen the introduction of a new m edium  removes the bias of 
the existing m edium .67 Carey (1989) describes the cycle as a "continuous 
process of decentralization and recentralization that moved forward in a 
dialectical way as small hinterland communities attem pted to o u tru n  
m etropolitan influence, only to be absorbed back into it later" (p. 152).
Unlike Schiller, Innis pursued his research in an interdisciplinary 
m anner. Innis was a geographer, historian, economist and political scientist 
(Carey, 1989). Carey (1989) also notes that Innis followed his own model of 
scholarly investigation that relied on empirical evidence from the actual 
record of the time under study, on his belief that no universal theory could 
account for the protean relations between imperial states, and on his ow n 
critical approach to research, which emphasised a critique "in light of
67Unlike the approach to globalisation that stresses space/tim e compression, 
Innis' approach to space and time emphasises the development of civilisation 
as a cycle of advancements in communications and their 'bias' towards either 
political or religious organisation.
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hum ane and civilized values" (p. 150). Carey describes Innis as being m ore 
subtle than most contemporary scholars of media imperialism: "He knew
som ething of the tensions, contradictions, and accommodations that existed 
between trading and communications partners" (1989, p. 151). The Uruguay 
Round offers a glimpse at the 'tensions, contradictions, and accom m odations' 
between the United States and Europe, and among Members of the European 
Union. But can Schiller's thesis account for such detail? Evidence gathered 
for this dissertation suggests it cannot.
Becker, Hedebro and Paldan's (1986) tribute to Schiller describes him  as an  
"unconventional scholar" noted for his "insistance (sic) on discussing and  
analyzing the use of power" (p. viii). The authors add that "it is his insistence 
on asking questions one 'should not' that makes his work so im portant for 
the communications sciences" (ibid). Schiller's preoccupation w ith corporate 
and governm ental power as it relates to media and culture locates h im  
w ithin the political economy approach to communication. His radical view s 
advocating the reshaping or reinventing of institutions to meet the needs of 
society (Smythe and Van Dinh, 1983) stem from his critical approach to 
research. Schiller adheres to a Marxist interpretation of com m unications, 
w hich Smythe (1974) [1994] defines as "the mass media in the m onopoly 
capitalist context" setting "the agenda which best serves the interests of the  
capitalist system" (p. 253).68 However, Becker et al (1986) note that Schiller's
68Smythe (1974 [1994]) adds that "in principle this agenda is dom inated by the  
process of selling commodities and producing audiences (out of people) to be 
used by capitalist industry to enhance its profitability and political security. 
This is the face of the capitalist mass media which is presented to ex-colonial 
countries, to socialist countries, and to the developed market areas of Europe" 
(ibid).
67
work does not enjoy universal appeal — that it has "often been of greater 
importance outside the United States than at home" (p. viii). Scholars from  
developing countries consider Schiller's work im portant because of h is 
defence of cultural identity, national sovereignty, equal access to the m ass 
m edia and other principles of NWICO. Perhaps another reason for the  
endurance of Schiller's work is that its popularity among scholars advocating 
the principles of NWICO is directly correlated w ith their perceived lack of 
progress on many of these issues.
Indeed, Schiller has his critics, not least, as Becker et al (1986) point out, the  
American scientific establishment, who consider him  an 'outcast' because h e  
tends to conduct research into areas he 'should not.' Schiller's first m edia- 
cultural imperialism thesis linked the spread of U.S. cultural values via U.S. 
advertising in the Third W orld to the growth of the U.S. electronics industry 
controlled by the U.S. armed forces. He argued that between 1945 and 1965 the  
Pentagon needed a strong U.S. electronics industry to m aintain an edge in  
warfare, and that the growth of the U.S. electronics industry m eant the  
growth of one of its corporate constituents, inform ation broadcasting, w hich 
spread U.S. values throughout the Third World. Becker et al describe 
Schiller's penchant for "bringing to light im portant relationships and novel 
correlations" (p. viii). But the authors do not discuss the hazy nature of 
Schiller's reasoning and his leap of faith between U.S. foreign policy in Korea 
and Southeast Asia and the concern among developm ent researchers over 
the Third W orld's economic and technological dependence on developed 
nations.
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According to Stevenson (1988), "dependency theory viewed the world as a 
single system and found 'imperial centers/ notably the United States, w hich  
controlled the flow of goods, services, and capital between themselves and 
nations on the periphery of the system" (p. 6). Indeed, as Schiller argued, U.S. 
advertising agencies were found to dom inate Latin America's broadcasting 
system, even to the point of influencing program m e selection (Wells, 1972). 
Schiller's ideas stim ulated research on global information, telev ision  
program m ing and technology flows, which found a 'one-way' flow from the 
developed to the developing world (Varis, 1973, 1985; N ordenstreng and 
Varis, 1974; Lealand, 1984). But his link between the U.S. m ilitary's control of 
U.S. governm ent communications and Third World dependency is difficult 
to substantiate. This is typical of Schiller's work, for often a kernel of tru th  
lies h idden in his rhetoric. Schiller often does not substantiate his claims, 
choosing instead to gloss over weak aspects of his 'novel correlations' w ith  
quotes from articles in major U.S. newspapers or w ith gross generalisations, 
often bordering on hyperbole. Schiller's first media-cultural im perialism  
thesis form ulated in the late 1960s more likely can be explained as a crude 
attem pt to combine his protest of the Vietnam War with his equal distaste of 
American cultural influence in Latin America.
Ithiel de Sola Pool provides an antithesis to what G am ham  (1984) calls 
Schiller's politically pessimistic and economically and technologically 
deterministic ideas. Pool (1977) takes an optimistic view of cultural exchange 
and argues that cultural influence is a cyclical and enriching process.69 Pool
69Smith (1992) comments: "Cultures are not patchwork parodies of selected 
motifs, nor are they unrelated motifs throw n together for some visual effect. 
Cultures are expressive wholes, spatially particularised and historically 
embedded" (p. 12).
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argues that all cultures adopt foreign elements from other cultures. 
According to diffusion theory (cf. Deutsch, 1956), foreign elements are 
modified to fit the ways of the adopting culture, requiring, in the short-term  
of the cycle, direct dependence on the link w ith  the dom inant culture, 
followed by w hat Pool calls a "patriation of the new activity and a relative 
growth of domestic interactions" (p. 142)70 Pool's cultural diffusion thesis is 
consistent w ith his overall views on media technology and freedom of speech 
discussed in Technologies of Freedom published in 1983. In Freedom, Pool 
examines the cyclical challenge of preserving freedom and ind iv iduality  
through new media technologies w ithin a constantly adapting and 
controlling U.S. public regulatory system. Pool's optim ism  stems from h is 
unflagging belief in the First Am endm ent as a counterforce to governm ent 
regulation, a m edia 'checks and balances' system that differs from Schiller's 
conspiratorial view of government and media working together to dom inate  
the world.71
70An example of cultural diffusion can be found in British television  
production, as programmes, once distinguished by the cachet of a particular 
director or writer, have shifted to a more anonym ous series-m ethod of 
production associated w ith U.S. television (Collins, 1986). Collins (1986) 
comments that this shift "is customarily deplored as a particularly insid ious 
form of cultural imperialism" (p. 71). However, Collins argues that Britain 's 
adoption of U.S. series production techniques can be viewed historically in a 
positive light, similar to Britain's 'patriation' of the "electrical engineering 
m anufacturing techniques of Halske and Siemens, Pascalian m athem atics or 
the astronomical theories of Copernicus and Galileo" (p. 71).
71However, Pool's (1983) argum ent suffers somewhat because he assumes tha t 
the rest of the world holds the U.S. Constitution and its ideals in high esteem, 
and that the 'safeguards' of freedom in the United States exist in o ther 
countries to counter technological innovation. Though perhaps 
unintentional, Pool's beliefs ironically impose an American-centric view on  
the w orld and might be construed as a form of cultural imperialism.
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Sklair (1993) offers his own thesis located between cultural im perialism  
and dependency theory. Sklair's "culture-ideology of consumerism thesis" 
(1993, p. 34) states that instead of W estern or Japanese culture as the  
dom inating force, it is the "culture and ideology of consum erism  tha t 
dom inates the poorer communities as it does most of the world" (ibid). 
Sklair argues that "as long as Third or what was Second W orld  
com m unication planners do not challenge the culture of consum erism  th en  
their activities will be tolerated by the dom inant economic, political and  
cultural elites"(ibid).72 As with Pool, Sklair notes that his consum erism  
thesis accounts for the "ways in which most 'traditional7 cultural forms and 
practices have changed over time and continue to do so" (ibid).
A nother critic of Schiller's first thesis is Lee (1980), who argues that a 
nation 's internal strategies dictate the extent to which external pressures 
penetrate its sovereignty. Lee compares Canadian and Taiwanese m easures 
against foreign m edia imports and their influence and concludes that a 
nation's commercial m edia system can thrive w ithout dependence on foreign 
imports and cultural damage if market regulation is complem ented by 
ongoing efforts to fortify cultural identity. Lee's focus on a receiving country's 
counterm easures to external influences is consistent w ith Boyd-Barrett's 
(1977) approach to media-cultural imperialism, which incorporates the 
sending and receiving countries' rationales in the influence process and
72Sklair (1993) does not predict the destruction of indigenous culture, bu t that 
"some local forms will be destroyed, but others can and will survive and 
prosper as long as they serve the interest of capitalism" (p. 34). However, he  
notes that local forms will "inevitably be transformed, particularly in the 
direction of commercialisation" (ibid).
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applies to both developed and developing countries. Boyd-Barrett argues that 
a sending country exports its influence "as a deliberate commercial or political 
strategy, or simply disseminates this influence unintentionally or w ithou t 
deliberation in a more general process of political, social or economic 
influence" (p. 119).73 He adds that the receiving country "either adopts this 
influence as a commercial or political strategy, or simply absorbs th is 
influence unreflectively as a result of contact" (ibid).
Boyd-Barrett formulates his version of imperialism not in terms of 
Schiller's one-way influence of a dom inant culture, but as the lack of 
reciprocal influence between countries' media systems — w hen "the 
ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one country 
are singly or together subject to substantial external pressures from the m edia 
interests of any other country or countries w ithout proportionate 
reciprocation of influence by the country so affected" (p. 117).74 Yet reciprocity 
m ust also be examined in terms of the proportionality of the overall cu ltural 
and economic effects of one country's influence on another, in addition to a 
narrow er focus on the degree of m utual influence on the m edia systems in  
question. Boyd-Barrett's focus on the sending and receiving countries'
73The unintentional aspect of Boyd-Barrett's rationale relates to T om linson 's 
(1991) definition of globalisation. Tomlinson (1991) characterises 
globalisation as "the spread of modernity," a process "not of cu ltural 
imposition, bu t of cultural loss" (p. 173). Unlike media-cultural im perialism , 
the spread of m odernity has an unintentional aspect to it. Tomlinson writes 
that "the idea of imperialism contains, at least, the notion of a purposeful 
project: the intended  spread of a social system from one centre of power 
across the globe" (1991, p. 175).
74Here is Cohen's (1973) definition of imperialism  based on an asym m etrical 
influence of pow er applied to the media-cultural imperialism thesis.
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com m unications policy, particularly the receiving country's rationale, is 
im portant because Schiller views receiving countries as victims of one-way 
flows from the industrialised world.75 Fejes (1981) calls for an exam ination of 
forces at local and national level that assist and react against m edia 
im perialism  forces. Chapman (1987) asserts that the com m unications policy 
w ithin the importing country determines the susceptibility of that country to 
dom inant suppliers.76 Sepstrup (1990) argues that "the ideological and 
economic motives of the exporting country m ay be im portant determ inants 
of transnationalization, but it is also necessary to study economic and cultural 
(and perhaps ideological) reasons of the im porting country for a fuller 
understanding of transnationalization" (p. 86).
Schiller's Revised Thesis and Propositions
In the late 1980s, Schiller began to revise his thesis to align w ith h is 
emerging structuralist views and his perception of the pow er of U.S. m edia 
corporations. Schiller's revision is thematically consistent w ith his first 
version in that he retains his criticism of global capitalism. But his view of 
the relationship between U.S. media corporations and the U.S. governm ent 
has changed — the authority of the former in global economic affairs, h e  
argues, now  outweighs that of the latter. Another consistent aspect to
75However, it is not entirely clear whether Boyd-Barrett sees the m edia system 
(entertainm ent conglomerates) or the sending country as the prim ary 
influence on other countries and their m edia systems. M oreover, un like  
Schiller, Boyd-Barrett doesn't describe how the sending country and its m edia 
system w ork together to influence others.
76M attelart (1976) offers a Marxist perspective on this point: "C ultural
im perialism  cannot be sum m ed up as the volum e of im ported products or 
cultural commodities. The U.S.A. produces the models, bu t the national 
bourgeoisies may perfectly well nationalize these models" (p. 161).
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Schiller's revision is the inconsistency evident in his argument. Schiller 
(1969 [1992], 1989) believes the decline of public service broadcasting and the  
privatisation of national telecommunications systems in W estern Europe are 
a direct result of pressure imposed by the U.S. Business Roundtable of 
Industrialists and supported by the U.S. government. Moreover, Schiller sees 
a connection between pressure from the U.S. Business Roundtable and an  
increase in the influence of U.S. cultural values on W estern European 
cultures. Once again Schiller presents a 'novel correlation' that requires the  
reader to bridge gaps in his reasoning.
U.S. M edia Corporations and U.S. Foreign Trade Agenda
Based on Schiller's central argument, two propositions can be developed. 
The first of these propositions is that U.S. media corporations dictate the U.S. 
governm ent's foreign trade agenda. Schiller (1969 [1992]) believes U.S. m edia 
corporations have a 'hammerlock' on the U.S. domestic political system (p. 3). 
As w ith his first thesis, a kernel of truth lies in his argument. Schwab (1994) 
com m ents that the 1980s "saw the emergence of some previously less active 
constituencies with a stake in an open trading system. These included service 
sector exporters and intellectual property (DPR) holders seeking expanded 
disciplines in global trading rules...." (p. 55).77 Feketekuty (1988) traces the  
inclusion of the services sector in the GATT to the Trade Act of 1974 (PL
^Schwab adds: "In the early 1980s, these interests helped persuade the 
Reagan adm inistration to place services high on its agenda for new global 
trade talks. For the most part, however, these firms rem ained far less 
influential than their industrial counterparts w ith respect to Congress. Part of 
this was attributable to the perception that service sector jobs were lower 
paying than their m anufacturing counterparts; part was simply due to the 
great diversity of trade-related interests represented within the sector" (1994, 
p. 56).
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93-618, 93rd Congress, 88 STAT 1978-2076), in which Congress authorises U.S. 
negotiators preparing for the Tokyo Round of the GATT (1973-79) to w ork 
toward elim inating barriers to trade in services. According to Feketekuty, 
Tokyo Round participants failed to reach a consensus on including services 
but did set a precedent for future negotiations. In 1988, Congress passed the  
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (PL 100-418, 100th Congress, 102 
STAT 1107-1574), thereby writing into law provisions on objectives for fu ture  
services negotiations.78
On intellectual property protection, Reinbothe and Howard (1991) argue 
that a perceived need by developed countries for a m ultilateral trade 
agreement on intellectual property stemmed from the W orld Intellectual 
Property Organization's (WIPO)79 inability to enforce the regulatory regime of 
its conventions, a chronic north-south confrontation among WIPO m em bers 
over an academic versus a pragmatic approach to intellectual property, and 
WIPO negotiations hindered by its own group coordination and vo ting  
procedures (p. 157). Besides serving as a precedent-setting forum for services
78According to the 1988 Act: (A) The principal negotiating objectives of the  
United States regarding trade in services are—(i) to reduce or to e lim inate 
barriers to, or other distortions of, international trade in services, including 
barriers that deny national treatment and restrictions on establishment and 
operation in such markets; and (ii) to develop internationally agreed rules, 
including dispute settlement procedures [that] are consistent w ith the  
commercial policies of the United States.... (102 STAT 1123).
79Reinbothe and Howard (1991) call WIPO the 'specialised' agency of the U N , 
adm inistering the m ain international intellectual property conventions, the  
two most im portant being the 1886 Berne Convention and its subsequent 
revisions and renewals, and the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property and its revisions. The others are the Universal Copyright 
Convention, the 1961 Rome Convention, the 1971 Phonograms C onvention, 
the WIPO Convention and the 1974 Satellites Convention.
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negotiations, the Tokyo Round became the first GATT negotiations to address 
intellectual property in the context of NTBs (Getlan, 1995).80 Weiss (1990) 
notes that the U.S. international trade deficit spurred U.S. trade policy-makers 
to focus on ways of narrowing the deficit through intellectual property 
protection.81
However, Schiller (1989) does not m ention that more than one Business 
Roundtable exists and that U.S. m edia corporations are not the only 
corporations urging W estern European governments to deregulate 
broadcasting and telecom m unications.82 For example, in February 1995 the 
Business Roundtable of Industrialists m et in Brussels at a G-7 M inisterial 
conference83 to call for governm ent action on building the Global
80In 1993, U.S. core copyright industries contributed an estimated $238.6 
billion to the U.S. economy or 3.74 percent of GDP, up from $226.5 billion in  
1992 (in real 1993 dollars) or about 3.66 percent of GDP (Siwek and Furchtgott- 
Roth, 1995, p. 5). According to the consulting firm Economists, Inc., "the core 
copyright industries contribute more to the U.S. economy than any single 
m anufacturing sector including aircraft and aircraft parts, prim ary m etals, 
fabricated metals, electronic equipment, industrial machinery, food and 
kindred products and chemicals and allied products." (ibid)
81Weiss (1990) adds: "Pressure for a tighter regime on IPRs was based on the 
twin perception that the erosion of the competitive position of U.S. 
technology leadership in certain sectors, in particular pharm aceuticals, 
chemicals, com puter software and semiconductors, is due to copying in  
foreign countries and to the unfair practices of certain countries, including 
inadequate protection of intellectual property" (p. 49).
82Dicken (1992) writes that "although United States TNCs no longer dom inate 
the w orld economy as much as they did in the 1950s and early 1960s they 
remain, as a group, the largest single element in the world's TNC population" 
(p. 67). However, Dicken notes that West German and Japanese transnational 
investment has grown most rapidly overall.
83The G-7 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, the U nited 
Kingdom and the United States.
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Inform ation Society (Report from the Business Roundtable of Industrialists, 
Brussels, 24-26 February 1995; hereinafter Roundtable Report).84 A m ajority 
of the 37 companies at the conference were European-based; indeed, the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists convened and attended the Brussels 
conference.85 The G-7 Trade Ministers agreed to the core principles of the 
Roundtable, which include removing barriers to trade in  
telecom munications, inform ation technology and content (Roundtable 
Report, p. 10), and striving to "accelerate and create conditions for the full 
liberalisation of telecommunications infrastructures and services in all 
countries as soon as possible" (p. 11). In June 1995, at the G-7 Sum m it in  
Halifax, Nova Scotia, heads of state approved of the results of the Brussels 
conference and encouraged a series of pilot projects to prom ote innovation  
and the spread of new technologies (Roundtable Report, p. 33).86 A nother
^According to the W hite Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employm ent (Commission of the European Communities, 1993), the 
Information Society is defined as a society "in which the services provided by 
inform ation and communications technologies (ICTS) underpin  h u m a n  
activities." (p. 105). The Roundtable Report lists the following set of 
principles of the Information Society: "promoting dynamic com petition,
encouraging private investm ent, defining an adaptable regulatory 
framework, providing open access to networks, and recognising the necessity 
of world-wide co-operation w ith particular attention to less developed 
countries" (p. 9).
85The European Roundtable of Industrialists includes the BBC, Bertelsm ann, 
British Telecom, Canal Plus, Daimler Benz, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, 
France Telecom, ICL, Le Group Videotron, Matra Hachette, Nokia, Olivetti, 
Pearson, Pirelli, RAI, Siemens, Societe Generale de Belgique, Teleglobe and 
Telefonica de Espana. The rem aining members of the Business Roundtable 
of Industrialists in Brussels include AT&T, Apple Computer, Bell Canada 
International, Mitsubishi Electric, NACSIS, NEC, Nippon Steel, NTT, Nynex, 
Sega Enterprises, Silicon Graphics, STET, Texas Instrum ents, the W alt Disney 
Co., Time W arner and Tokyo M arine (Roundtable Report, p. 16).
86However, at the Brussels conference, directors of Canal Plus, France 
Telecom, Matra Hachette and Telefonica cautioned governm ent officials over
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goal of the Roundtable, a WTO agreem ent on m arket access for basic 
telecommunications, was reached in February 1997 after negotiations were 
extended beyond the Uruguay Round. Furtherm ore, in Novem ber 1995, 
business leaders representing all industry sectors from the United States and 
Europe convened in Sevilla, Spain, to discuss the developm ent of a trans- 
Atlantic marketplace. The Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue urged political 
leaders to review "excessive regulation" and "differences betw een EU and 
U.S. regulatory systems" (Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, 11 N ovem ber 
1995, p. 2). Despite Schiller's preoccupation with pressure from U.S. m edia 
corporations and the U.S. government on EU governments, the reality is that 
pressure towards dism antling global trade barriers also comes from  
corporations based within the EU.
Like Schiller, Mattelart (1979) defines media-cultural im perialism  as the 
spread of capitalism — the "ideological offensive of the ruling classes" (p. 2). 
However, unlike Schiller, M attelart examines the activities of European 
m ultinationals in the electronics industry, such as Philips and Siemens. 
Also, Mattelart, Delcourt and Mattelart (1984) offer a different perspective on  
Schiller's thesis. According to G am ham  (1984), Mattelart et al (1984) agree 
w ith Schiller's view of the declining role of the state amid the increased
rem oving trade barriers related to content w ithout first devising new  
solutions to protect cultural and linguistic diversity (Roundtable Report, p. 
20). Moreover, reservations about the cultural implications of the objectives 
of the Brussels conference were expressed by President Jacques Chirac. In a 
letter to the Chairm an of the G-7 Roundtable, President Chirac com m ents: 
"May I add that the Information Society cannot be considered to be a progress 
for m ankind if as a result it manages to impose a dom inant language or a 
standardised culture. Therefore France will endeavour to retain the diversity 
of languages and culture which is the source of hum an enrichm ent" 
(Roundtable Report, p. 36).
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power of m ultinational corporations.87 However, G am ham  argues that the 
French Socialists' desire to develop an export system for French television 
program m es could place France in the untenable position of adopting the 
U.S. model of m edia-cultural imperialism, particularly if the strategy focuses 
on creating a 'Latin Audiovisual space.'88 However, Garnham  notes that for 
the authors, the U.S. model of international TV production is not so m uch a 
cancerous growth but an example to be employed cautiously 'towards 
progressive directions'.
But several scholars argue that focusing on the size and influence of U.S. 
m edia corporations and their perceived threat to national cultures misses the 
point. Collins, Garnham  and Locksley, (1988) challenge the im perialism  
paradigm  by studying the concept of comparative advantage, which sim ply 
means if one country specialises in movie-making, while another specialises 
in growing and processing coffee beans, each country should continue to do 
w hat it does best. The authors describe the global trade in program m ing as a 
"complex ensemble of political, cultural and economic forces" (1988, p. 57) 
and view the contrary aims of broadcasters and politicians as an ideological 
tug-of-war. On one hand, broadcasters aim for  increased audience share to 
fuel economies of scale, benefit from the low marginal cost of production, and 
compete w ith new  channels; on the other hand, political and cultural forces
87However, M attelart and Mattelart (1992) comment: "In m any cases, the
analyses of the strategies of these corporations seem more to reflect the 
paranoia of the observer, inspired by a conspiracy theory, than the reality of 
power" (p. 124).
88M attelart's interpretation of media-cultural imperialism  exemplifies Carey's
(1989) description of Innis' more subtle understanding of the 'tensions, 
contradictions, and accommodations' between countries than that of his 
contem poraries.
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take aim at increased audience share in the name of preserving national 
language and culture.89 Yoon and Feigenbaum (1997) similarly argue that the 
im perialism  paradigm  and the concept of globalisation as they apply to mass 
m edia are inappropriate. The authors argue that national cultures can best be 
preserved through private sector strategies that encourage transnational 
alliances w ith U.S. media corporations. Instead of viewing U.S. 
entertainm ent know-how as a threat (as Schiller does) the authors cite 
examples of French and Korean media entrepreneurs seeking to benchm ark 
w ith Hollywood studios to learn m arketing and m anagem ent skills and the 
secrets to attracting mass audiences.90
89Similarly, Burgelman and Pauwels (1992) describe this tug-of-war — a result 
of the industrialisation of the EU's audiovisual sector — as a fight between on  
one hand the economic forces of transnational integration joined w ith  
supranational political decision-making, and on the other hand, growing 
regionalism and nationalism in W estern European countries. Drijvers (1992) 
views the tug-of-war in terms of an economic paradigm  based on uniform ity  
and a cultural paradigm  based on diversity. According to the author, 
m ultinational media conglomerates view the EU as a m arket in  w hich 
uniform ity means maximum economies of scale and therefore decision­
making at the supranational level offers the most power to enforce directives. 
At the same time, the author views the EU as a forum for diverse ideas in  
which respect for indigenous culture is param ount and therefore 
local/regional decision-making takes precedence. Drijvers adds: "The
economic aspects of media policy demand a uniform and large-scale approach 
prom oting mergers and concentration, while the realization of cultural 
aspirations requires respect for diversity, best guaranteed...through substantial 
autonom y and support for small-scale media initiatives" (p. 197).
^H ow ever, Yoon and Feigenbaum (1997), like Schiller, do not present social 
psychological evidence to support their claims. Yoon and Feigenbaum argue 
that transnational alliances "need not pose a threat to national culture." 
Perhaps not, but highlighting the economic benefits of an alliance between a 
Korean m edia company and DreamWorks SKG does not necessarily m ean 
Korean cultural identity has been preserved in the process.
80
Furtherm ore, the extent to which U.S. corporations influence W estern  
European cultures is unclear and difficult to research. Schiller (1989) sees a 
correlation between the deregulation of broadcasting and 
telecom m unications and cultural decline in W estern Europe. Typical of 
Schiller's rhetoric, he makes a giant leap in reasoning without citing evidence 
from  a single social-psychological or anthropological study.91 Schiller suffers 
from  w hat Tomlinson (1991) calls 'herm eneutic naivety': "Either [effects] are 
simply assumed and allowed to function in the discourse as a self-evident 
concom itant of the sheer presence of alien cultural goods, or else they are 
inferred using fairly crude interpretative assum ptions" (p. 34). Schiller (1989) 
cites quotes and statistics from U.S. newspapers and current affairs m agazines 
that suggest to him  a strong correlation between an increase in  
comm ercialisation and channel proliferation in W estern Europe and U.S. 
cultural influence. True, the num ber of commercial television services in  
Europe has dramatically increased in the last decade,92 but Strover (1995)
91Liebes and Katz (1990) examine whether the TV show Dallas is universally  
understood and find differences in modes of retelling an episode and 
collective-meaning making. The authors argue that the unit of analysis of 
m edia-cultural im perialism  should be the audience itself. According to the 
authors, a program m e is imperialistic if "(1) that there is a message 
incorporated in the program  that is designed to profit American interests 
overseas, (2) that the message is decoded by the receiver in the way it was 
encoded by the sender, and (3) that it is accepted uncritically by the view ers 
and allowed to seep into their culture." (1990, p. 4). Audience research adds a 
vital social-psychological perspective to the m edia-cultural im perialism  
thesis, the contributors to which tend to be m edia policy analysts. Sepstrup
(1990) laments that the discussion of global flows tends to be political in  
nature, preventing scholars from examining the issue at a scientific level.
92Hodgson (1992) comments: "Ten years ago, there were only four com m ercial 
television services in the whole of Europe; now there are 58" (p. vii). 
Mougeotte (1994) notes: "1991 marked the turning point, w hen private
television ratings exceeded 50% of average viewing audiences in Europe. 
Since then, private television has continued to grow by approximately 1
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notes that despite fears that an increased dem and in program m ing w ould 
lead to cheap American programming, "in fact the financing and creation of 
m edia content w ithin Europe has escalated" (p. 4). Schiller also ignores 
research that suggests audiences prefer domestic productions over the ir 
foreign counterparts (c.f. Godard, 1993; Lealand, 1984; Sepstrup, 1990; Tracey, 
1985; Cantor and Cantor, 1986; Rogers and Antola, 1985). Strover (1995) adds 
that "Am erican imports, once a mainstay of prime time within several 
European countries, have been somewhat displaced by locally produced fare" 
(p. 4). A lthough uncertainty prevails as to how m uch non-E uropean 
program m ing will be needed to fill the schedules of Europe's digital terrestrial 
and satellite broadcasters, research on audience preferences cited above 
suggests that padding schedules w ith U.S. sitcoms and movies would not be a 
w ise decision.
Schiller also ignores success stories such as Europe's music industry, 
choosing instead to highlight the dominance of the U.S. film and telev ision  
industries in W estern Europe. Indeed, since 1968, the average box office take 
of European films has gone from 60 percent to 20 percent, while U.S. film s 
have captured 80 percent of the m arket (see Figure 3).93 However, according
percentage point per annum  and the division of viewers between State and 
private television is now 55% to 45%" (p. 24).
93In a report on the status of Europe's film industry prepared by the T h ink  
Tank of European media experts for DG-X, U.S. governm ent support for the 
Hollywood studios is cited as one reason for the decline in Europe's film  
industry, bu t other reasons are cited as well, including the structure of the 
industry: "The audiovisual policy in Europe was, and still is, structured on a 
national and regional basis.... Europe has abandoned the markets and the 
dem ands of the European transnational audiences which the non-E uropean 
industry has been able to occupy almost w ithout competition from the 
European industry" (Vasconcelos et al, 1994, p. 18).
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to Philippe Kern, director of European affairs for Polygram, out of the five 
global phonogram  corporations (Polygram, EMI, Bertelsmann, Sony and 
Time W arner), three are European. Still, Schiller is not alone in his 
oversight. Kern notes that the European music industry casts a large shadow 
over its film industry, though Eurocrats tend to focus on the film and 
television industries as victims of U.S. domination: "Politicians forget about 
the fact that Europe is strong on the music side, and there is no reason to be 
specifically protective if you consider the entertainm ent industry as a w hole 
in Europe (interview with author, 29 November 1995).94
Figure 3
Average Box office Take of European Films
Film s 1968 1980 1990
European 60% 50% 20%
US_________ 35%________45%_______ 80%
Source: Vasconcelos, A. et al (1994) Think Tank Report to DG-X, pp. 17-18.
94W hen confronted w ith the success of Brazil's television industry, Schiller
(1991) retorts that the industry incorporates U.S. formats and know-how and 
therefore still displays signs of domination. However, M attelart and 
M attelart (1990) question the strength of the U.S. model in relation to the 
success and influence of the Brazilian broadcasting industry throughout Latin 
America. The authors argue that historically the globed strength of the U.S. 
television industry 'overdeterm ined' the perception of all other telev ision  
industries: "In the wake of this domination, it was long thought that anyone 
seeking to make profits in the television industry had to reproduce the 
American model.... No longer hegemonic, U.S. television nevertheless 
remains dom inant" (p. 3). Furtherm ore, Straubhaar (1991) notes that even  
the notion of dependency itself has been questioned in light of the growing 
intra-Latin American export of 'telenovelas' (a form of soap opera). The 
author argues that Brazil in particular exemplifies a shift away from the 
simple dependency approach toward what the author calls an 'assymetrical 
interdependency.' Straubhaar adds: "Although the United States still
dominates world media sales and flows, national and regional cultural 
industries are consolidating a relatively more independent position in the 
world television market" (p. 56).
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Relations Between U.S. M edia Corporations and U.S. Governm ent
Schiller (1969 [1992]) believes U.S. media corporations are no longer 
dependent on the U.S. governm ent in removing global trade barriers. 
Schiller asserts that "the com m anding role that these corporations play in  
global economic affairs elevates them, with few exceptions, above the 
authority  of most governm ents in the world" (1969 [1992]) p. 7). Schiller 
(1989) writes: "The essential point is that an entire broadcast, inform ational, 
and cultural system, privately owned and managed, often helped by 
governm ent policy but m ainly dependent on transnational advertising on  
behalf of corporate sponsors (or corporate users in the case of electronic data 
flows), is being set in place" (pp. 128-129). However, Schiller provides few 
details on the help the U.S. governm ent 'often' provides U.S. m edia 
corporations in foreign markets, and even fewer details on how  U.S. m edia 
corporations remove trade barriers on their own.
Historically, Hollywood has enjoyed support from the U.S. governm ent 
particularly in bilateral trade agreements with European countries. For 
example, the U.S. State Departm ent intervened on behalf of Hollywood in the  
1946 Blum-Bymes Agreement between the United States and France, which, 
according to Guback (1969), stipulated no import quotas, but imposed a sdreen 
quota w hich reserved four weeks during each quarter year for the exhibition 
of French films or about 31 percent of screen time. Guback notes that this 
agreem ent resulted in a decline in French production so severe that the 
agreem ent had to be modified, bringing back the import and screen quotas. In 
1947, Britain imposed a 75 percent ad valorem tax, the 'Dalton du ty / on film  
im ports as a "redistributive m easure intended to prevent foreign film
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companies from retaining all the earnings of their films" (1992, p. 217). Jarvie
(1992) notes that the U.S. State Department worked on behalf of Hollywood in  
Britain to remove the duty placed on film imports, to negotiate for British 
concessions in the 1948 Films Act, and to include films in the GATT 
negotiations in Geneva. Guback (1969) notes that the United States signed 
sim ilar bilateral agreements w ith Britain, France and Italy through to the 
early 1960s, though protectionist measures eased as U.S. production declined.
The U.S. governm ent has also negotiated on Hollywood's behalf in  
m ultilateral talks. During the negotiations for the Havana Charter to the ITO 
in the late 1940s, several European countries, including Britain, France and 
the Netherlands, viewed films as cultural items separate from o ther 
commodities, and declared that films should be excluded from the agreem ent 
(Jarvie, 1992). According to Jarvie (1992), the State Departm ent astutely 
handled the delicate negotiations by conceding the cultural argum ent to the  
Europeans to bring the debate to a close with minimal concessions made. T he 
1948 GATT incorporates Article XIX of the Havana Charter in Article IV o n  
'exposed cinematograph film s/ which allow signatories to establish screen 
quotas with certain restrictions (Filipek, 1992). In the early 1960s, the U.S. led 
a debate among European countries on whether new language should be 
added to the GATT to address restrictions by several countries on te lev ision  
program m es (ibid). However, not until the Uruguay Round did this debate 
attract world attention.
According to Cathy Field, associate general counsel for U.S. IPR 
negotiators, the U.S. governm ent still intervenes on behalf of the film  
industry on a bilateral and m ultilateral basis (interview w ith author, 11 June
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1997).95 Indeed, Ms. Field commented that the U.S. film industry prefers to 
negotiate directly w ith governm ents and only turns to the U.S. governm ent 
w hen it cannot get what it wants alone. However, in major trade 
negotiations such as the CUFTA, NAFTA and GATT, the U.S. film industry 
(indeed all U.S. industries) m ust rely on the U.S. governm ent to negotiate o n  
its behalf. Furthermore, according to Bonnie Richardson, the MPAA's vice 
president for trade and federal affairs in W ashington, DC, and a form er 
negotiator at the USTR, besides negotiating on behalf of the U.S. film  
industry, the U.S. governm ent also exchanges inform ation on foreign 
m arkets w ith the MPA (interview w ith author, 23 February 1996). How ever, 
that the U.S. governm ent exchanges inform ation with, and negotiates on  
behalf of, the U.S. film industry does not m ean this relationship is always 
productive and close.96
95The U.S. government and film industry also have a relationship in the U.S. 
domestic m arket that is outside the scope of this dissertation. Here the  
relationship is one-sided, w ith film industry lobbyists tending to dictate the  
outcome of domestic policy issues. If Schiller's (1969 [1992]) assertion that U.S. 
media corporations have a 'hamm erlock' on the U.S. domestic political 
system is limited only to the domestic market, then it has some merit. Rep. 
M arty Russo describes the MPAA as one of the "top five" lobbying groups (3 
August 1989, part 6, p. 1). For example, the Wall Street Journal reported that 
film lobbyists successfully quashed a tax provision proposed by Rep. Dan 
Rostenkowski, then-chairm an of the House Ways and Means Com m ittee, 
through its connections in the Democratic Party (Wall Street Journal, 24 
February 1992, p. B7). The Journal noted: "Tlie provision would have
overturned a 21-year-old treasury ruling that was intentionally generous to 
the politically plugged-in movie industry even w hen it was devised back in  
the Nixon adm inistration" (ibid). It is interesting to note that the W alt 
Disney Co. and Richard Bates, its lobbyist, are cited as the prim ary forces 
behind the removal of the tax provision.
96Rosenberg (1982) and Jarvie (1992) trace the beginning of the U.S. 
governm ent/film  industry relationship overseas back to the 1920s, first w ith  
the U.S. Dept, of Commerce's Specialties Division of the Bureau of Foreign 
and Domestic Commerce (BF&DC), later known as the Motion Picture 
Division, and then w ith the State Departm ent as the U.S. governm ent
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French Influence on Uruguay Round Audiovisual Negotiations
Schiller (1996) believes the French governm ent dictated the outcome of 
the U ruguay Round audiovisual sector talks. Schiller notes that of all 
W estern European countries, France has been the most resistant to U.S. 
cultural influence; he cites as an example the "inability of United States 
negotiators to prevail over French objections in the December 1993 GATT...." 
(1996, p. 121). Schiller is not alone in his perception of the French 
governm ent's influence particularly on the audiovisual services negotiations. 
W aregne (1994), Dehousse and Havelange (1994) and Joachimowicz and 
Berenboom (1994) argue that the French Ministers and trade delegates 
successfully executed a diplomatic and public opinion campaign to p reven t 
U.S. negotiators from gaining concessions from the EU on audiovisual 
services and IPRs related to copyright.
France tends to be protective not only of its own culture and cultural 
industries but also of the EU's supranational audiovisual policy. Yet very 
little is know n about how France influences Europe's national and
institutionalised the gathering of economic intelligence on the treatm ent of 
U.S. films in the domestic and international markets. An early test of the 
U.S. governm ent/film  industry relationship came w ith the trade war 
between the U.S. and Britain, Hollywood's largest foreign m arket during the 
period 1920-1959, over Great Britain's Cinematograph Films Act of 1927 and 
subsequent renewals in 1938 and 1948. The 1927 Act placed increm ental 
quotas on British films and on the percentage of films released by distributors 
w ithin a ten-year period. According to Jarvie (1992) relations between the 
M otion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) and the State 
Departm ent were close enough during the late 1930s that Ambassador Joseph 
Kennedy, aware that Britain had been m onitoring U.S. cable traffic, suggested 
that Will Hays, the MPPDA's director, send his telegrams using the State 
D epartm ent's confidential code.
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supranational policies toward foreign program m ing and films — a curious 
void in scholarship considering the animosity between the U.S. film industry  
and the French government. Of all the Member States, France has been the  
vanguard of market intervention and cultural protection in European 
audiovisual policy. Forbes (1987) writes: "In the Fifth Republic, cu ltu ral
policy has continued to have a significant international and geopolitical 
dimension.... France was bidding to become the cultural leader of the  
continent and attempting to establish a cultural order as a counterweight to 
an  economic order" (pp. 143-144). Porter (1991) traces the Berne C onven tion  
back to 1885, w hen French and German authors and publishers associations 
attem pted to establish a union to protect their works (p. 2). Seabury (1929) and 
Thom pson (1985) describe France's organisation of the 1926 and 1928 League 
of N ation 's International Film Congresses, in which the status of Europe's 
audiovisual sector was debated and the Film Europe' m ovem ent prom oted. 
Over sixty years later, Paris was the host city for the European A udiov isual 
Conference to discuss once again the status of Europe's audiovisual sector and 
to launch Audiovisual Eureka, a program m e to stimulate Europe's film and 
television industries similar to the Technology Eureka program m e designed 
to boost research and developm ent into new technologies. According to 
M iyet (1990), French President Francois Mitterrand first introduced the idea of 
A udiovisual Eureka at a June 1988 meeting of the Council of the EU in  
H anover.
However, Schiller does not account for the fact that EU Member States 
have different levels of receptivity towards America's free-trade principles. 
As Boyd-Barrett's (1977) interpretation of media im perialism  suggests, the 
policies of receiving countries m ust be examined to determ ine the extend of
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reciprocal influence. Schiller's revised thesis still has as its im plied 
norm ative value the autonomous country, bu t instead of a dom inant country 
im pinging on a weaker country's sovereignty, Schiller views the sovereignty 
of all countries (including America's) at risk from U.S. media corporations. 
However, scholars differ on the extent to which individual countries h ave  
lost their influence in world affairs. For example, Strange (1996) argues that 
non-state authorities, such as mafias and the Big Six accounting firms, control 
states: "Where states were once the masters of markets, now it's the m arkets 
which, on m any critical issues, are the masters over the governm ents of 
states" (p. 4). But Camoy (1993) argues that the welfare of transnational 
corporations is tied to countries, and that national policies still determ ine 
how  a country attracts foreign corporations, invests in local training and 
R&D, and protects corporations from foreign competition in its home market.
A nother aspect to this debate is the role of supranational institutions — 
such as the Council of the EU, the United Nations (UN), the European 
Broadcasting Union (EBU) and the GATT-WTO — each collectively 
responsible for aspects of the social and economic welfare of ind iv idua l 
countries. According to Maghroori (1982), supranational institutions h ave  
begun to take precedence over their constituent countries primarily because 
technological developm ents, such as satellite television or nuclear weapons, 
have weakened the role of individual countries as protectors.97 However, in  
the EU, the Council's collective responsibility does not preclude direct
97Lash and Urry (1994) argue that media globalisation, the developm ent of 
transnational practices and flows, has rendered national governm ents ' 
control of cross-border flows of inform ation and entertainm ent ineffective, 
and increased both the need of states to collaborate internationally in areas of 
trade and finance and regional governance.
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involvement by individual countries, and often, as w ith the developm ent of 
the Television Directive, Member States will disagree on the appropriate 
level of in terven tion .98 According to Collins (1993), the Directive's quota 
restrictions resulted from "political bargaining between the 
culturalists/interventionists and the single-market supporters...." (p. 374). 
Here Carey's (1989) 'tensions, contradictions, and accommodations' among EU 
trading partners emerge.
Having developed a set of propositions w ith which to interrogate the  
Uruguay Round audiovisual negotiations, the overarching question still 
remains: Does Schiller's (1969 [1992], 1989) media-cultural imperialism  thesis 
stand as a model of mass communication research or just another example of 
M organthau and Thompson's (1985) comment that "today 'im perialism ' and 
'im perialistic' are indiscriminately applied to any foreign policy, regardless of 
its actual character, to which the user happens to be opposed" (p. 58)? 
Schiller's central argum ent is that U.S. media corporations dominate W estern  
European cultures and media systems. If Schiller's thesis is correct then the  
Hollywood lobby should have forced U.S. negotiators to secure a bilateral 
audiovisual services deal and an IPRs deal on copyright satisfactory even to 
the hawkish element of the lobby. Moreover, if Schiller, Dehousse and 
Havelange, Joachimowicz and Berenboom and Waregne are correct in their 
post-Round assessments, then the French governm ent should have played a
98According to Jonathan Scheele, who was chief services negotiator for the 
Commission from 1990 to the end of 1992, the issue of competency has 
implications in the practice of trade negotiations between the European 
Union and third countries: "If you've got an issue that involves both the  
Com munity and the Member States, then you have to be careful not to ru n  
up against a major problem in one Member State, which would prevent it 
from ratifying the agreement" (interview with author, 17 April 1997).
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decisive role in blocking efforts by U.S. negotiators to satisfy the Hollywood 
lobby. Based on empirical evidence gathered for this dissertation, a new  
perspective is needed on the relationship between the U.S. film industry and 
the U.S. governm ent in international multi-sector negotiations, and on the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round audiovisual sector talks.
To test Schiller's propositions on the role of the state in the m edia 
industry, I heed Mosco's advice to balance microanalysis w ith  macroanalysis. 
Juxtaposing aspects of Schiller's thesis w ith empirical evidence from the 
Uruguay Round will begin to address the incongruity between theory and 
data in political economy of communication. To begin to correct the 
mismatch between methodology and subject m atter in the approach, I 
incorporate theory and methods from international relations to flesh out the 
'tensions, contractions, and accommodations' between Hollywood and the 
U.S. government. In Part II of this chapter I examine the debate in  
international relations over units of analysis and discuss how  it relates to 
Mosco's micro-macro approach.
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PART II
MOSCO'S MICRO-MACRO APPROACH AND 
PUTNAM'S TWO-LEVEL ANALYSIS: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY CONCEPTS
Mosco (1996) argues that scholarship on the political economy of 
com m unication does not balance a macroanalysis of 'structures' w ith a 
microanalysis incorporating Giddens' (1984) notion of agency. Mosco also 
acknowledges that political economists of com m unication do not have the  
research tools for such an analysis. However, scholars in in ternational 
relations have developed methods based on the micro-macro approach, 
although a debate continues on which side of the approach to emphasise: 
domestic or international determinants of state behaviour (Moravcsik, 1993). 
In Part I I I  show how  Schiller's thesis on the role of the state in the m edia 
industry relates to theories of state behaviour in international relations. To 
flesh out the 'tensions, contradictions, and accommodations' during the  
Uruguay Round between Hollywood and the U.S. governm ent, am ong 
Member States of the European Union, and between the United States and 
European Union, I turn  to scholarship on trade theory and trade negotiations, 
particularly the work of Robert Putnam.
D eterm inants of State Behaviour: Domestic, International or a Combination?
For Schiller's original media-cultural imperialism  thesis, the unit of 
analysis was the state and its power to influence other states. Schiller argued 
that the state-driven 'm ilitary-industrial complex' nurtured  the U.S. 
broadcasting and advertising industries and functioned as an engine that 
drove the flow of U.S. cultural values throughout the Third World. Here I
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broaden my analysis w ithin the field of media studies to accommodate m y  
case study on the Uruguay Round audiovisual talks by introducing the state- 
centred approach to international relations (Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1976; 
Lake, 1988), defined by Moravcsik (1993) as an approach that locates " the  
sources of foreign policy behavior within the adm inistrative and decision­
making apparatus of the executive branch of the state" (p. 6). IPE researchers 
have their own version of a state-centred perspective, which Frieden and  
Lake (1995) call the domestic statist perspective: the "goals and actions of th e  
governm ent w ithin the national political system, for which foreign trade can 
represent ways to help them stay in power" (p. 9).
According to Maghroori (1982), the state-centred approach views the study 
of world politics as the study of interstate relations. This approach 
emphasises m ilitary security as an important rationale for state actions taken  
in a world w ithout interdependence (note Schiller's emphasis on the  
Pentagon and its ties to the U.S. electronics industry). The author adds th a t 
the state-centred approach has its roots in the 'realist' approach to 
international relations prevalent during the inter-war period. Realists 
viewed the pursuit of national power and, through the forging of alliances, 
the imbalance of power among alliances as driving forces.99 On the opposite 
side of the state-centrists lie the globalists who see the declining role of the  
state w ithin an interdependent world in which international organisations, 
i.e. the GATT-WTO and EBU, begin to take precedence over the pow er of
"Keohane (1986) defines classic realism as follows: first, the state is the m ost 
important factor in world politics; second, states act unitarily and rationally in  
calculating action; and third, states act to accumulate power.
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individual states, primarily, as m entioned earlier, because technological 
developments have weakened the state's role as a protector (ibid).
Schiller's revised thesis shifts his unit of analysis from a state-centred
/
process to a society-centred process (Ikenberry et al, 1988) that M oravcsik
(1993) defines as being influenced by "domestic societal groups th rough  
legislatures, interest groups, elections, and public opinion" (p. 6). IPE 
researchers have their own version of a society-centred perspective w ith in  
the domestic sphere, which Frieden and Lake (1995) call the domestic societal 
perspective: "pressures [are] brought to bear on policy by socioeconomic 
groups, some desirous of trade liberalisation and others interested in  
protection from im ports" (p. 9). Both the state-centred and society-centred 
perspectives fall w ithin the category of domestic determ inants of 
international outcomes. According to Schiller's society-centred perspective, 
lobbyists representing U.S. media corporations dictate foreign trade policy to 
the U.S. government. U.S. negotiators, in turn , force European governm ents 
to deregulate their national audiovisual sectors and to reduce trade barriers. 
In the U.S. audiovisual sector, these groups include the Hollywood lobby in  
the Uruguay Round and, more broadly, the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPA).100 However, domestic determinants only represent 
part of the dynamics of a multi-sector trade negotiation. Putnam  (1988 [1993]) 
offers a significant quote from Robert Strauss, who served as STR101 from 1977
100Members of the UPA include the Association of American Publishers, 
American Film Marketing Association, Business Software Alliance, 
Com puter and Business Equipment M anufacturers Association, Inform ation  
Technology Association of America, Motion Picture Association of America, 
National Music Publishers Association and Recording Industry Association of 
America.
101Congress created the Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR) in
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to 1979 during the GATT-Tokyo Round: "I spent as m uch time negotiating 
w ith domestic constituents (both industry and labor) and members of the U.S. 
Congress as I did negotiating with our foreign trading partners" (Strauss, 1987, 
p. vii).
In Chapter 1 I noted Moravcsik's (1993) observation that a majority of 
international relations theorists recommend giving priority to in ternational 
explanations. However, Putnam  (1988 [1993]) argues that such a one-sided 
approach fails to capture the 'interaction' of domestic and in ternational 
factors. Recall that the state-centred and domestic-statist approaches see 
pow er em anating from governm ent decision-makers, while the society- 
centred or domestic-societal approaches see power in the hands of dom estic 
social groups, including corporate lobbyists, and their influence on legislators. 
However, second structuralists argue that both units of analysis are im portan t 
in determ ining the actions of states (Palan, 1992). Moravcsik (1993) writes: 
"Thus the question facing international relations theorists today is n o t 
whether to combine domestic and international explanations into a theory of 
'double-edged' diplomacy, but how best to do so." (p. 9).
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; the STR was initially responsible for 
negotiating all trade agreements under the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962. Congress elevated the Office to a Cabinet-level agency 
w ithin the Executive Office of the President in the Trade Act of 1974. In 1980, 
the Office became known as the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
and was given a wider trade policy-making role, which included 
responsibility as America's chief trade negotiator w ith the rank of 
Ambassador. Three individuals served as chief U.S. negotiator during the 
Uruguay Round: Clayton Yeutter (1985 to 1989), Carla A. Hills (1989 to Jan. 
1993) and Michael Kantor (Jan. 1993 to 1996).
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Robert Putnam (1988 [1993]) examines a given negotiation from the eyes of 
chief negotiators who m ust sim ultaneously satisfy domestic constituents 
while negotiating an international agreement — w hat he calls 'double-edged 
diplom acy/ Putnam characterises international negotiations — w hether they 
be on trade, security, hum an rights, etc. — as an interactive process invo lv ing  
two levels: the bargaining between negotiators (level I) and the separate
discussions each delegation has with constituents in its domestic m arket on  
the ratification of the agreement (level II). Putnam 's level II discussions w ith  
domestic constituents refer to domestic determ inants of foreign trade policy 
addressed earlier. At this point it would be instructive to outline the  
fundam ental legislative and political characteristics of U.S. domestic and EU 
supranational trade policymaking. W hat follows is by no means an  
exhaustive treatise on the topic, but an overview to provide a context for the 
dynamics of the Uruguay Round.
U.S. Domestic Trade Politics
W hat is meant by U.S. domestic trade politics? Feketekuty (1988) writes: 
"Trade officials have to be sensitive to the impact of trade policy m easures o n  
both the economic interests of different industries and the achievem ent of 
policy goals in other areas of domestic and foreign policy" (p. 150). This 
m eans that prior to and during the Uruguay Round, U.S. negotiators in the 
Office of the USTR had to worry about satisfying the interests of two 
im portant domestic players: Congress and its corporate constituents.
Delagran (1992) describes Congress' power to influence trade negotiations:
The need for congressional approval of a negotiated trade 
agreement gives the Congress significant leverage w ith  
the executive on particular issues of interest. It also gives 
U.S. negotiators a generally stronger hand in resisting
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concessions to trading partners that m ay be of concern to 
the Congress, and in extracting benefits from trading
partners to ensure congressional acceptance of a final
package (pp. 16-17).
The Clinton A dm inistration had to win congressional approval of the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations in December 1993. During the 
final moments of the Uruguay Round, a U.S. official phrased it this way: "Do 
we have more than 218 [House members] and more than 51 [Senators]? 
That's the nam e of the game" (L.A. Times, 1993, D l, 4). Moreover, Schwab's
(1994) description of the executive branch's battle to secure enough votes in
Congress for the passage of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Com petitiveness Act 
could equally apply to the Clinton Adm inistration's hurdles to assure the  
ratification of the Round's im plem entation agreement in December 1994: 
"Executive branch negotiators would still need to satisfy enough  
constituencies (with im proved access abroad or trade remedy measures at 
home) a n d /o r  avoid the w rath of enough import-sensitive interests (by 
lim iting reductions in U.S. barriers) to prevent a critical mass of interests 
from coalescing to defeat the entire bill" (p. 42).
Besides being cognisant of congressional interests during the Round, U.S. 
negotiators also had to work w ithin the Sector Advisory Committee (SAC) 
system, allowing industry groups representing corporate America a voice in  
the negotiations.102 Moreover, U.S. negotiators had to be aware of
102The SAC system resulted from the Trade Act of 1974. Also known as the  
Industry Consultations Programme, the SAC consists of three levels of 
committees. Principal among the 38 committees are the President's A dvisory 
Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), to which the  
President appoints 45 members for two-year terms; seven policy advisory 
committees, including the Services Policy Advisory Committee (SPAC) and 
the Industry Policy Advisory Committee (IPAC), whose m embers are
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commitments m ade by the executive branch to Congress and, indirectly, to 
certain powerful elements of Corporate America even before the start of the  
Uruguay Round, in return for congressional concessions in battles over 
legislation, including 'fast-track' authority to enter into non-tariff trade 
agreements. According to Santos (1995), "trade bills subjected to the no rm al 
legislative process are classic magnets for special interest am endm ents" (p. 
75). W ithout the Trade Act of 1974's 'fast-track' authority, which limits debate 
and precludes amendments, trade agreements would have to be renegotiated: 
"American trading partners would be reluctant to strike trade deals w ith U.S. 
negotiators, recognizing that such deals would almost certainly unravel at the  
hands of Congress" (ibid). However, Santos notes that the quid pro quo for 
'fast-track' authority is that the executive branch m ust consult w ith  the trade 
subcommittees of the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate 
Finance Committee. "[Their] pre-em inent taxing and spending role gives 
these committees enorm ous clout w ithin Congress in writing trade laws and 
setting trade policy" (1995, p. 74). Furthermore, Congress has the power to 
grant 'fast-track' authority for a limited period of time. Hence, the executive
appointed solely by the USTR or together with other Cabinet officers; and 30 
technical, sectoral, and functional advisory committees, including the 
Industry Sector Advisory Committee on Services for Trade Policy M atters 
(ISAC 13), whose members are jointly appointed by the USTR and the 
Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture (1994 Trade Policy Agenda and 1993 
Annual Report of the President, pp. 114-115). W inham  (1980) notes that by 
soliciting the advice of corporate America, the USTR "gave the SACs a stake 
in the evolving MTN agreements, and made compliance in the u ltim ate  
result more probable" (p. 388). However, the Trade Act of 1974 instituted a 
bureaucratic buffer between the SAC and the USTR to "'screen out' extrem e 
demands and balance interests among diverse constituency groups" (1980, p. 
389). The buffer consists of USTR specialists assigned to various sectors w ith  
an understanding of the SACs' key issues. Based on research for this 
dissertation, Hollywood ended up a loser in the 'screening out' and 
'balancing' process.
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branch m ust apply for further extensions, thereby making it even m ore 
accountable to Congress. Delagran (1992) writes: "These 'pre-approval'
procedures enabled the Ways and Means and Finance committees to extract 
concessions from the president as a condition for letting negotiations 
proceed" (p. 17).
Robert Strauss describes these 'pre-approval' procedures as 'pre-cooking' a 
bill (p. 383). In her legislative history of the 1988 Trade Act, Schwab (1994) 
notes that "w ithout the enactment of new authority for the president to 
engage in trade negotiations, the adm inistration-endorsed launch of the  
GATT Uruguay Round initiative in September 1986 was doomed to failure" 
(p. 81). Even the European Commission's chief negotiator for the U ruguay 
Round, Ambassador Hugo Paemen, knew the importance of fast-track 
authorisation. "W ithout the fast track, the U.S. governm ent is not a valid  
negotiating partner. But to obtain the fast track, it may be compelled by 
Congress to press for terms which are so tough that the negotiation ceases to 
be of any interest to the other country" (Paemen and Bensch, 1995, pp. 
192-193).
EU Supranational Trade Politics
The EU has its own 'domestic' trade politics.103 While USTR officials 
m ust take into account the objectives of Corporate America and Congress,
103For the purposes of this study, EU 'domestic' trade politics refers to the  
interplay between EU Member States and EU supranational institutions such 
as the Commission and Council. Technically, Putnam 's two-level analysis 
should be a three-level analysis to account for the influence of domestic trade 
politics within individual Member States. However, I will refer to im portan t 
trade politics w ithin key EU Member States w hen appropriate.
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European trade officials serve the interests of the Member States,104 each w ith  
its own domestic politics associated with ratifying a given trade treaty. Trade 
officials in DG-I, the Commission's directorate responsible for external 
economic relations and commercial policy, serve as negotiators for the  
Member States pursuant to Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome (OJ C 224, 31 
August 1992, p. 44).105 While the U.S. Constitution enumerates the trade- 
related powers of the executive branch and Congress,106 the Treaty of R om e 
determines the 'competency' or jurisdiction of the Commission and M em ber 
States in matters of trade.107 Articles 113 and 228 of the Treaty of Rome give
104According to Frans Andriessen, Europe's chief political negotiator from  
1988 to January 1993, the main difference between the USTR and C om m ission 
negotiators is that the former must confront industrial representatives 
directly, while the latter m ust confront ministers in the Council of the EU, 
who, in turn, face industry representatives. Mr. Andriessen commented tha t 
he felt under more pressure from ministers in the Council than from  
European lobbyists (interview with author, 13 January 1997).
105Article 113(3) reads: "Where agreements with one or more States or
international organizations need to be negotiated, the Commission shall 
make recom m endations to the Council, which shall authorize the  
Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall 
conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special com m ittee 
appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and w ithin the  
framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it" (ibid).
106Gorlin (1990) writes: "The Constitution clearly gives Congress the
authority, in Article I, section 8, 'to regulate Commerce with foreign N ations.' 
The relationship between this congressional authority and the president's 
general executive power, under Article II, section 1, and the C onstitution 's 
charge that he 'take care that the Laws be faithfully executed' (Article II, 
section 3) has been well established in the 200-year history of the Republic" (p. 
54).
107Article 228 of the Treaty reads: "Where this Treaty provides for the
conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more States or 
international organizations, the Commission shall make recom m endations 
to the Council, which shall authorize the Commission to open the necessary 
negotiations...." (OJ C 224, 31 August 1992, p. 77). Article 228(2) adds: "Subject
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ultim ate power to the Council of the EU, the EU's m ain decision-m aking 
institu tion composed of ministers from each Member State, to approve 
agreements on behalf of Member States.
Earlier I noted that domestic determ inants only represent part of the 
dynamics of a multi-sector trade negotiation. Another reason to include 
international determ inants is the fact that the Council of the EU, in W altz's 
(1986) words, acts as a "constraining and disposing force on the interacting 
units w ithin it" (p. 60). Karl Falkenberg, chief services negotiator for the 
European Commission from early 1993 to the conclusion of the R ound, 
makes a significant point that during the Uruguay Round EU Member States 
designated a clear decision-making role to the General Affairs Council, 
m embers of which consist of foreign affairs ministers from EU M em ber 
States. Other Councils, such as a Cultural Affairs Council consisting of 
cultural affairs ministers, or an Agriculture Council, consisting of agriculture 
m inisters, could only offer opinions to the General Affairs Council 
(interview with author, 18 April 1997). Even the results of a Council of 
Ministers meeting, attended by European heads of state, could only be 
interpreted as suggestions or opinions on issues related to the trade 
negotiations.
Pursuant to Article 113, committees of ambassadors and other civil 
servants representing the Member States — collectively know n as the '113 
Committee' — operate w ithin the Council to form trade policy w ith the 
Commission. Committees are divided by dossiers: there is a 113 Com m ittee
to the powers vested in the Commission in this field, the agreements shall be 
concluded by the Council...." (ibid).
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responsible for textiles, one for steel, etc.108 According to Mr. Trevor Heaton, 
former head of the Trade Policy Unit of the Council's General Secretariat 
during the Round (effectively the coordinator of the 113 Committee), the 113 
Committee has two functions: first, as a consultative committee to give
guidance to the Commission in its conduct of the Com m unity's trade 
relations w ith third countries; and second — w hen the Commission comes 
forward w ith a proposal for negotiating authority to negotiate agreem ents, 
w hether in the multilateral area such as the WTO, or a civil av iation  
agreem ent with the United States — as a classic working party of the Council 
in that it is the first level of examination of a Commission proposal. The 
second level of examination in a trade negotiation is the Committee of 
Perm anent Representatives (COREPER), consisting of the ambassadors of EU 
Member States who prepare on a weekly basis in Brussels the w ork of the 
Council (interview with author, 11 April 1997).109
Mr. Falkenberg notes that during the Round all negotiations were 
conducted by the Commission, in consultation w ith the various 113 
Committees and under Foreign Affairs Council guidelines. This, in essence,
108The 113 Committees' role is similar to that of the U.S. SAC system in that 
both have legal mandates to advise governm ent decision-makers on trade 
policy matters.
109According to Mr. Heaton, the 113 Committee meets at two levels: the Full 
Members level and the Deputies level. The Full Members level, consisting of 
a group of senior civil servants in capitals of Member States, directors-general 
of trade questions who deal w ith general questions across a broad sweep of 
Com m unity trade policy, meet once a month. The Deputies level m eets 
every other Friday (except in the m onth when the Full Members meet) to 
discuss technical questions and make recommendations based on requests for 
a WTO dispute panel or problems in exporting EU products. Questions of a 
political nature are moved upw ard to the Full Members level (interview w ith  
author, 11 April 1997).
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is the structure under which the EU negotiates in trade negotiations. 
According to Mr. Heaton, at the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the 113 
Committee formed an ad hoc committee to deal w ith all services 
negotiations.110 This meant that DG-I negotiated on behalf of the M em ber 
States on dossiers such as maritim e transport, audiovisual and financial 
services, but had to have the backing of the Member States for all offers in the  
services from the 113 Services Committee and the General Affairs Council. 
Mr. Heaton noted that "the Commission was in constant contact with the 113 
Services Committee on audiovisual issues, so that any move it made had to 
be cleared first by the Committee, particularly w ith the French members, for 
w hom  audiovisual was, and is, a very sensitive issue" (interview w ith  
author, 11 April 1997). This led to conflict between the French delegation and 
others in the 113 Services Committee and at the ambassadorial level in  
COREPER.111
110Mr. Heaton noted that the 113 Services Committee was very active during  
the Round, meeting in both Brussels and Geneva at short notice, depending 
on the circumstances. "A lot of the 113 Services people would go dow n to 
Geneva and we would have 113 Services meetings, or coordination of the 113 
Services Committee on the spot, so that the Commission could come back as 
the Geneva negotiations evolved on a day-to-day basis, or even and hour-to- 
hour basis, and say, 'look /th is is the way it's going; we feel it should go this 
way; do you agree?"' (interview with author, 11 April 1997).
m Mr. Scheele added that rows would often break involving France over the 
issue of competency. He remembers one occasion when he cancelled a 
negotiating session w ith the United States on audiovisual issues because the 
French were 'playing rough.' "I was essentially playing hardball w ith the 
French. We were conducting some of our internal argum ents in public" 
(interview with author, 17 April 1997). Mr. Heaton commented: "The
French were extremely suspicious that Leon Brittan, seen in Paris som etim es 
as a kind of 'TransAtlanticist,' would sell the French line down the river. The 
French were constantly coming back to the 113 Services Committee and 
saying, 'W hat do you mean by this?"' (interview with author, 11 April 1997).
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By embracing the interdisciplinary nature of media studies, scholars of the 
political economy of communication can begin to synchronise their "matters 
of emphasis' and 'decisions about relative explicitness/ thereby correcting the 
mismatch between methodology and research topics, discussed in Chapter 1, 
that often occurs w hen political economists examine im portant media policy 
issues. In the next chapter I discuss how I employ Putnam 's two-level 
analysis to interrogate the Uruguay Round audiovisual talks with Schiller's 
propositions in Chapters 4 to 7.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS: TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SENSITIVITY FACTOR
There is a paucity of scholarship on conducting research on sensitive 
topics. Indeed, textbooks on research m ethods rarely broach the subject 
(Brewer, 1990). A sensitive topic affects almost every stage of the research 
process, from data generation to publication (Brewer, 1990; Sieber and Stanley, 
1988), and can lead to data distortion and self-censorship (Barnes, 1979). 
Sensitive research can affect not only the researcher — i.e. on a personal level 
including the researcher's own security (Plummer, 1983; Brewer, 1990; Lee 
and Renzetti, 1990) — but also the participants in the study (Sieber and 
Stanley, 1988) and the population represented by the sam ple under 
investigation (Lee and Renzetti, 1990). Lee and Renzetti (1990) quote Sieber 
and Stanley's (1988) definition of socially sensitive research as "studies in  
which there are potential consequences or implications, either directly for the 
participants in the research or for the class of individuals represented by the 
research" (p. 49). Lee and Renzetti note that the sensitivity of research 
"seemingly inheres less in the topic itself and more in the relationship 
between that topic and the social context w ithin which the research is 
conducted" (1990, p. 512). The authors offer several categories of sensitive 
research, the most appropriate one for the study of trade negotiations being 
research that "impinges on the vested interests of powerful persons or the 
exercise of coercion or domination" (ibid).
Despite the sensitive nature of the Uruguay Round audiovisual 
negotiations, most of the major actors involved in the talks were willing to 
participate in this study; however, many chose to do so under a strict
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condition of anonymity. Hence, unlike Jarvie's approach, this dissertation 
truly relies on the actors them selves to tell the story as they saw it, w ith  data 
from trade publications, studies on Hollywood and Europe's film industries, 
congressional testimony, European and U.S. position papers, unpublished 
papers and published books and articles on the audiovisual sector talks 
serving as background material. Rare documents that were obtained from the 
USTR, such as President Clinton's phone notes for calls to European leaders 
and Ambassador Kantor's follow-up letter sent to Chancellor Kohl, add a v ital 
docum entary element to the analysis of the events leading toward the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
Scholars differ on the issue of disguising respondents (Lee, 1993). Barnes 
(1979) notes that disguise techniques, particularly pseudonyms, have long 
been used in social research. He argues that disguises "merely d im in ish  
rather than distort the data" (1979, p. 139). However, Lee (1993) points ou t 
that scholars who are against using disguises tend to be concerned about the 
ability of others to critically assess and even replicate studies. He adds that 
w hen researchers enter the write-up phase, they m ust "walk a tightrope; 
careful neither to conceal too much, nor to disclose too little" (1993, p. 206). 
Participants in this study were primarily concerned w ith their own privacy, 
defined as the control of boundaries between themselves and others (Sieber 
and Stanley, 1988; Boruch and Cecil, 1979), rather than the confidentiality of 
data, defined as the control and access to data (ibid). Those who wished to 
rem ain anonym ous dictated the level of anonymity they required: Som e
were comfortable w ith being generically referred to as 'trade officials,' w hile 
others asked that they simply be called 'a source.'
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It is unusual to include anonymous quotes in a doctoral dissertation, as 
m ost historians, policy analysts and legal scholars tend to rely on prim ary 
documents and attributed quotes as the fodder of their work. How ever, 
official documents on trade negotiations never tell the whole story — sim ply 
the official one. Personal documents of key participants in the negotiations 
are extremely difficult to obtain. It is common practice for researchers to 
conduct interviews w ith key officials to add the 'unofficial' — that is 
authoritative but unattributable — element to the story. Furtherm ore, the  
anonym ous aspect of the quotes in no way signifies that the in form ation  
gathered is inaccurate or fabricated. Hence, besides strengthening ties betw een 
media studies and international relations, the m ethodology for th is 
dissertation also establishes stronger ties between investigative jou rnalism  
and academic research. The relationship between supervisor and Ph.D. 
student in many ways reflects that of editor and reporter. To guarantee 
against possible accusations of fabricated data, and to enhance the auditability 
of this study, I provided a copy of the transcripts from interviews conducted 
for this dissertation to my supervisor and upgrade committee. I also 
provided a list of all respondents and their phone num bers to each exam iner 
on a basis of confidentiality.
Inform ation Sources
I conducted thirty-five face-to-face and telephone interviews over a three- 
year period (1994-1997) w ith U.S. and European governm ent officials w ho 
either participated in the audiovisual sector talks or knew officials who did 
so, and w ith Hollywood and European executives who either advised their 
respective governm ents during the negotiations or knew executives w ho 
served as advisors. Four sources were interviewed twice. The European
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governm ent officials and executives interviewed speak English as a second 
language and come from a variety of European countries. I took great care 
not to gather inform ation solely from N orth American sources. Som e 
European sources provided English translations of unpublished papers 
presented on the audiovisual sector talks. United International Pictures (UIP)
— the U.S. distribution company for MGM, Param ount and M CA /U niversal
— provided translations of French newspaper articles offering an im portant 
perspective on the French campaign against the United States in the 
audiovisual sector.
I sent introductory letters requesting an interview  to m ost of the 
participants. In some cases, a letter was unnecessary because a participant 
would suggest that I telephone an individual and say that I had been referred. 
In the letters I described the nature of my research and m y status as a doctoral 
candidate at The LSE. I also offered a condition of anonymity as a safeguard of 
privacy, and outlined the kinds of questions I wished to ask. Responses to my 
letters and calls usually came within two weeks and arrangem ents for 
interviews were then made. However, interviews at the ambassadorial level 
took several months to arrange. None of the participants requested w hat Lee 
(1993) calls 'conditional access' or access granted on the condition that 
restrictions be imposed on methodology, that a portion of writing be vetted 
prior to access, or that the final report be examined, modified or even  
censored. However, a few participants made in patently clear that if I 
breached my agreement on anonymity, I would be prosecuted.112
112At least one source requested anonymity, bu t then allowed certain 
comments to be directly quoted, or after a year sent follow-up e-mail messages 
w ithout stipulating that the material sent should be kept anonymous. As any 
journalist will tell you, conditions of anonymity do not apply to subsequent
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I conducted unstructured interviews consisting of open-ended questions 
to cast as wide a net as possible, thereby gaining an understanding of the 
issues, the players and the give-and-take of the negotiations.113 In a sense, 
most of the interviews could be categorised as "exploratory7 or designed to 
develop ideas and research hypotheses (Oppenheim, 1992). I conducted a 
majority of the interviews by telephone because of the cost of travel to the 
States and the Continent and, more importantly, because of the frequent 
cancellations and reschedulings that most policy researchers m ust inevitably 
deal with, de Leeuw and van der Zouwen (1988) examine the quality of data 
gathered from telephone and face-to-face interviews and note that "only 
small differences were found between telephone and face-to-face interviews" 
(p. 296). The authors also note that "these differences have become sm aller 
over time" (ibid).114
interviews or correspondences unless the interviewee or writer specifically 
requests that the information given should not be attributed.
113Fontana and Frey (1994) note that unstructured interviews are "used in an 
attem pt to understand the complex behavior of members of society w ithout 
imposing any a priori categorization that may limit the field of inquiry" (p. 
366). Sudman and Bradbum (1982) note that open-ended questioning "allows 
and encourages respondents to give their opinions fully and with as m uch  
nuance as they are capable of. It also allows respondents to make distinctions 
that are not usually possible with the precoded formats and to express 
them selves in language that is comfortable for them  and congenial to their 
views" (p. 150).
114 However, telephone and face-to-face interview methods are not 
interchangeable. Market research agencies prefer to send interviewers to the 
homes of prospective respondents when surveys require asking highly 
sensitive, personal questions on such topics as personal hygiene and 
sexuality.
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Once patterns could be discerned to responses, I began to form com posite 
statements on a given topic and to test the statements by conducting follow- 
up interviews and seeking new respondents.115 One m ust be cautious about 
the inform ation one takes from sources who are participants in ongoing 
negotiations, for the tru th  can sometimes be w hatever the participant m akes 
of it. But by crafting composite statements and testing them with respondents 
on both sides of the Atlantic, I began to reach a comfort level on m y 
understanding of the audiovisual sector talks. Remarkably, both sides w ere 
in agreement on the mistakes the other side had  made during the R ound. 
While each source placed a different am ount of emphasis on the im portance 
of certain actions and outcomes — a natural result of each person's differing 
vantage point and responsibilities during the Round — patterns nevertheless 
emerged from the interviews.116
115Investigative journalists, particularly Bob W oodward and Carl Bernstein, 
know all too well that sources on sensitive issues tend not to d ivulge 
inform ation unless they believe the interviewer already knows about the  
information. By informing m y respondents that I was about to read th em  
statements based on responses taken from other participants in the  
negotiations, and then asking them to comment on these statements, I shifted 
the relationship between interviewer and interviewee to one of student and  
instructor. This technique often reduced the tension that tended to pervade 
the first 10 to 15 minutes of interviews.
116According to Scott (1990) evidence of an event should be assessed according 
to four criteria: authenticity (is the evidence genuine?), credibility (is the  
evidence free from error and distortion?), representativeness (is the evidence 
typical?) and meaning (is the evidence clear and comprehensible?). After 
dozens of interviews about the same topic, a researcher begins to discern 
patterns and to discount 'eccentric' information by 'recycling' it among key 
sources. This method boosts the levels of the four criteria w hen dealing w ith  
a sensitive topic, and can often lead to a serendipitous m om ent in which the  
eccentric inform ation is either discounted or clarified by others and new  
information is learned.
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Putnam 's Double-Edged Diplomacy: The Interactive Approach
Putnam  (1988 [1993]) views international negotiations — w hether they be 
on trade, security, hum an rights, etc. — as an interactive process he calls 
'double-edged diplomacy' involving two levels: the bargaining between
negotiators (level I) and the separate discussions each delegation has w ith  
constituents in its domestic market on the ratification of the agreement (level 
II).117 To each negotiator, domestic and international moves are interrelated; 
hence, the double-edged nature of the process. Putnam  describes his 'two- 
level' game as follows:
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their 
interests by pressuring the governm ent to adopt favorable 
policies, and politicians seek power by constructing 
coalitions among those groups. At the in ternational 
level, national governm ents seek to maximize their ow n 
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minim izing the 
adverse consequences of foreign developments. (1988 
[1993], p. 434).
The object of the game for the chief negotiators is to find the 'w in  set' or the 
package that will receive a majority of support from their constituents. 
Putnam  comments that occasionally, "clever players will spot a move on one 
board that will trigger realignments on other boards, enabling them  to 
achieve otherwise unattainable objectives" (Putnam, 1988, p. 437).118 M yhre
117Putnam  notes that "this sequential decomposition into a negotiation phase 
and a ratification phase is useful for purposes of exposition, although it is n o t 
descriptively accurate. In practice, expectational effects will be quite 
important. There are likely to be prior consultations and bargaining at Level 
II to ham m er out an initial position for the Level I negotiations. Conversely, 
the need for Level II ratification is .certain to affect the Level I bargaining" 
(1988 [1993], p. 438).
118 Putnam 's game analogy is similar to the poker analogy the distinguished 
scholar at The LSE used to describe trade negotiations.
I l l
(1983) notes that m any theories of negotiation are too abstract to apply to 
empirical cases: "An empirical example is probably best analysed by use of an  
empirically derived theoretical model. In the field of negotiations, there are 
very few of these.../' (p. 13). Besides its accordance with Mosco's m icro-m acro 
approach and the second structuralist movement, what makes P u tnam 's 
approach so ironically conducive to use in a multi-issue negotiation is that it 
has not yet been elevated to the realm of theory, which means at this tim e 
there are no analytic solutions complicating the two-level framework.119 As a 
result, the simplicity of the two-level approach allows the researcher to 
capture the complexity of a multi-issue negotiation, complete w ith its 
domestic and international elements, w ithout deconstructing the  
negotiations into a series of moves and countermoves and an assessment of 
their predictability. Put another way, Putnam 's theory adapts itself to the  
negotiation under study, rather than the opposite.
Applying Putnam 's technique requires separating the elements of the  
negotiations (issues, players, positions, etc.) into domestic determinants of the  
outcome of the audiovisual negotiations, which refer to a chief negotiator's 
discussions w ith domestic constituents (level II), and in ternational
119Putnam  notes that m etaphors are not theories but the start of theories, and 
that a "formal analysis of any game requires well-defined rules, choices, 
payoffs, players, and information.... Deriving analytic solutions for tw o-level 
games will be a difficult challenge" (1988 [1993], p. 437). Moravcsik (1993) 
notes that even the more extensive application of Putnam 's m etaphor to 
eleven case studies (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993) served only as a series 
of 'plausibility probes' to add to the development of the double-edged 
diplomacy approach. In this dissertation I engage in a plausibility probe and 
lay the foundation for applying Putnam 's approach to the study of fu ture  
audiovisual sector talks in multi-issue negotiations.
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determinants, which refer to the chief negotiator's bargaining with the chief 
negotiator from another country (level I). I operationalise level II 
'discussions' as both actual com m unication between negotiator and domestic 
constituent, as well as the political influence  of the domestic constituent on  
the government represented by the negotiator. Political influence as it relates 
to the U.S. governm ent is defined as political fund-raising activity and 
overall clout in Congress and the executive branch. Political influence as it 
relates to an EU Member State is defined as political clout in the C om m ission 
and Council of the EU. The terms 'chief negotiator' in a level I analysis is 
broadened to include negotiators working on the chief negotiator's behalf.120 I 
use Putnam 's approach to test Schiller's three propositions and Jarvie's two 
themes in historical U.S. governm ent/film  industry relations throughout m y 
analysis. It should be noted that each proposition by itself is too limited to 
bring to light the key details of the audiovisual sector talks. However, as m y 
analysis moves from Schiller's first proposition to his second and third, I 
approach the talks from different angles and, in the process, add greater detail 
as I progress.
120In multi-sector talks, each country assigns teams of negotiators who report 
to the chief negotiator and who have a particular expertise to handle one or 
more dossiers. Don Phillips, chief U.S. negotiator on aeronautics issues 
during the Round, commented: "As we came into the final stage, as w ith
every other issue, there was a way of proceeding which basically invo lved  
Ambassador Kantor and Sir Leon Brittan meeting w ith one or two other key 
aids and reviewing all of the issues and trying to move them  together.... 
Sometimes w hat they would do is bring in two or three of the key negotiators 
on each side responsible for everything, then they'd bring in one or two 
people who worked on a particular issue and shuttle them out after that was 
discussed. But in other cases, they just worked on an issue them selves" 
(interview with author, 9 April 1997).
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Proposition 1: U.S. Media Corporations Dictate the U.S. G o v ern m en ts
Foreign Trade Agenda
In Chapter 4 1 apply a level II analysis to examine how U.S. domestic trade 
politics ham pered efforts by U.S. negotiators to reach a bilateral accord in the  
audiovisual sector talks because of linkages forged by EU Member States 
between progress in those talks and progress in talks on agriculture, m aritim e 
transport services, geographic indications related to wines and anti-dumping.
I then apply a level I analysis to look at the U.S. governm ent's choice at 
the end of the Round of either risking the entire Round by fighting for the  
Hollywood lobby's interests, or opting to let the audiovisual sector talks 
continue after the Round's conclusion and securing gains made in o ther 
sectors.
Proposition 2: U.S. Media Corporations Are No Longer Dependent on the  
U.S. Governm ent in Removing Global Trade Barriers
In Chapter 5 I apply a level II analysis to examine the U.S. 
governm ent/film  industry relationship during the CUFTA, the developm ent 
of the Television Directive and the NAFTA, and how the U.S. film industry 's 
defeats in these trade agreements and legislation lead to the Hollywood 
lobby's high expectations of the U.S. governm ent for the Uruguay Round. I 
then examine the relationship between the U.S. governm ent and film  
industry in the Uruguay Round, focusing on the influence of the Hollywood 
hawks on the USTR's positions on audiovisual services and IPRs related to 
copyright.
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In Chapter 6 I apply a level I analysis to examine efforts by the haw kish  
element of the Hollywood lobby to circumvent the authority of U.S. 
negotiators by bargaining directly with the French delegation. I examine the 
perception of the Hollywood lobby that the U.S. governm ent in the final 
moments of the Round had abandoned it to secure gains in other sectors, and 
compare this perception with actual U.S. governm ent efforts to satisfy the  
lobby and with mistakes made by the hawks that in the end prevented a 
bilateral accord on audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright.
Proposition 3: U.S. Negotiators Could Not Overcome French O pposition in  
the Uruguay Round Audiovisual Sector Talks
In Chapter 7, Part I, I first apply a level II analysis of the trade politics 
during the Round involving the European Commission, Council of the EU 
and individual Member States that led to the EU's positions on aud iov isual 
services and IPRs related to copyright. I examine the French diplom atic and 
public opinion campaign to secure the cultural exception. I also examine the 
European Commission's campaign to secure the cultural specificity. In Part II 
I apply a level I analysis to the battle over Sir Leon Brittan's negotiating 
m andate.
Limitations on Research
This dissertation will not present an exact sequence and substance of all 
sector negotiations during the Round; it focuses on the negotiations on  
audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright and those sectors that were 
linked to the talks by the EU and the United States. Sectors linked to the 
audiovisual sector talks were selected based on inform ation from interview s 
with participants involved in or close to the negotiations. Furtherm ore, each
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of the 'linked7 sectors could be the subject of a dissertation and will not be 
analysed in the same depth as the audiovisual sector talks. However, even  
the analysis of the audiovisual sector talks, while based on new inform ation  
that sheds light on the topic, will not cover every meeting and every 
negotiation involving the EU and America simply because the exact num ber 
of such meetings will remain unknow n until one day all memos, letters, 
negotiating instruments, etc., are released to the public. W hat will be covered 
are the key events in the audiovisual sector talks and their chronology.
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CHAPTER 4 
— LEVEL II ANALYSIS —
COMMUNICATION AS A COMMODITY IN 
THE URUGUAY ROUND
One of the central goals of the N orth American tradition of political 
economy of communication is to understand the relationship of governm ent 
or the state to the media industry (Mosco, 1996). Mosco (1996) argues that 
political economists tend to focus on the technological and economic aspects 
of corporate power, while underplaying the political aspects. If the political 
aspects are addressed, thematically the state is seen as supporting 
transnational business. Furthermore, Mosco suggests that the  
commodification of communication is a productive 'entry point' in to  
rethinking political economy. Mosco defines commodification as "the  
process of transform ing use values into exchange values, and the m anifo ld  
ways this process is extended into the social field of comm unication products, 
of audiences, and of labor..." (1996, p. 139). He observes that political 
economists of communication tend to "foreground corporate and state 
structures and institutions" (1996, p. 145) in the analysis of com m odification. 
W hen the commodity itself is examined, Mosco notes that political econom y 
focuses on m edia content and audiences (i.e. Smythe, 1977; Meehan, 1984; 
Schiller, 1989; Gamham, 1990). I argue that by examining the political aspects 
of the commodification of communication, a new perspective emerges on the  
'support' the U.S. government thematically offers U.S. media corporations.
Mosco comments that "com m unication is taken to be a special and 
particularly powerful commodity because, in addition to its ability to produce
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surplus value (thereby behaving like all other commodities), it contains 
symbols and images whose meaning helps to shape consciousness" (1996, p. 
147).121 However, media scholars need to take a closer look at how the state 
views the comm unication commodity. Despite the 'particularly pow erful' 
nature of the commodity, the U.S. governm ent treats it like all o ther  
commodities in trade negotiations involving m any industry sectors. Schiller 
(1969 [1992]) believes U.S. media corporations dictate the U.S. governm ent's  
foreign trade agenda. He steadfastly believes the com m unication com m odity 
is of param ount importance to the U.S. governm ent. If Schiller is correct, 
than the U.S. governm ent should have satisfied the Hollywood lobby at the 
expense of other U.S. industries during the Uruguay Round, such as 
agriculture and maritime transport services.122 However, empirical evidence 
suggests that U.S. negotiators in the Uruguay Round considered the  
Hollywood lobby's interests a priority, bu t considered the interests of o ther 
U.S. industries a higher priority.
H ollyw ood's Political Influence in Geneva: The EU Linkage Factor
U.S. domestic trade politics hampered efforts by U.S. negotiators to reach a 
bilateral accord in the audiovisual sector talks because of linkages forged by 
EU M ember States between progress in negotiations on audiovisual services 
and IPRs related to copyright and progress on issues other than aud iov isual 
and copyright. For example, U.S. domestic politics involving Congress and
121Braman (1990) writes: "The suggestion that international in fo rm ation
flows can and should be treated in exactly the same way as trade in tables and 
chairs offends many as the ultim ate stage in a com m oditization process that 
has been resisted all along the way...." (pp. 371-72).
122Maritime transport services include international shipping per se, auxiliary 
services such as handling, storage and warehousing; and port facilities.
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the U.S. m aritim e transport services industry forced U.S. negotiators to 
protect the domestic maritim e transport sector from liberalisation, which, in  
turn, h indered efforts to satisfy the Hollywood lobby because EU M em ber 
States to varying degrees had forged linkages early in the Round between 
progress in the audiovisual sector talks and progress in the m aritim e 
transport talks.123 According to the U.S. Advisory Committee on Trade Policy 
and Negotiations (ACTPN), "during the negotiations, the U.S. G overnm ent 
repeatedly stated that its objective was to exclude m aritime services from any 
substantive agreement" (1994, p. 56). Schwab (1994) writes that the battle over 
a Senate rules change in the late 1980s to eliminate fast-track procedures and 
over fast-track extensions in 1991 and 1993 "carried with them  their ow n price 
tags" (p. 224). In a footnote Schwab comments: "Such efforts by the m aritim e 
industry, and threats by the textile lobby, had the effect of persuading the 
adm inistration to take the former industry off the negotiating table in the 
U ruguay Round and to m oderate its negotiating stance w ith respect to the 
latter" (1994, p. 224).
123According to Mr. A m aud Bordes, a services specialist for DG-1, the EU 
pushed for a three-pillar approach to liberalisation in the m aritim e sector, 
thereby ensuring com m itm ents w ould translate into effective, transparent 
behaviour, w ithout having non-tariff trade barriers nullifying progress 
(interview w ith author, 22 March 1996). According to Mr. Bordes, on Pillar 
One (international m aritim e transport) the EU wanted EU shipping 
companies to be able to set up  their own subsidiaries in foreign m arkets, 
particularly the US market. On Pillar Two (auxiliary services) the EU w anted 
its shipping companies to be able to invest in foreign m arkets to vertically 
integrate the interm odal services of its Tiner' shipping, which is scheduled 
container shipping, to better control the quality of products shipped abroad. 
On Pillar Three (access to and use of port facilities) the EU did not w ant to 
open foreign m arkets to supply its own services, such as pilotage, berthing, 
and refuelling; here the EU w anted a guarantee that as a consum er of these 
services, it w ould not be discrim inated against. The EU believes that their 
vessels take more time to find a birth, clear customs, etc., in foreign, 
particularly U.S., ports, while national vessels are processed swiftly.
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Karl Falkenberg confirmed that "maritime was explicitly linked to 
audiovisual."124 He articulated the argum ent adopted by EU Member States 
w ith strong maritime interests such as Greece and Denmark and encouraged 
by France: "We said, where is the logic, where is the coherence in saying 
Europe has to open audiovisual services to allow Hollywood to flood the  
market, bu t the U.S. are not willing to open their maritime m arket?"125 From  
the U.S. perspective, the French government encouraged this linkage as a 
tactical move, despite having its own interests to protect in m aritim e 
services.126 Perhaps the French governm ent observed U.S. m aritim e politics 
and concluded the USTR w ould not be able to make concessions in the
124W aregne (1994) notes that during a 113 Committee meeting, one 
unspecified country proposed to offer the audiovisual sector for the m aritim e 
transport services sector. W aregne writes: "Cette tendance a la globalisation 
des dossiers se retrouve dans les autres domaines du cycle de l'U ruguay" 
(1994, p. 25). ["This tendency of the globalisation of the dossiers can be found  
again in other sectors of the Uruguay Round."]
125Of particular concern to the EU was Section 27 of the M erchant Marine Act 
of 1920, also known as the Jones Act, which states in part: "That n o
merchandise shall be transported by water, or by land and water, on penalty of 
forfeiture thereof, between points in the United States, including Districts, 
Territories, and possessions thereof embraced w ithin the coastwise laws, 
either directly or via a foreign port, or for any part of the transportation, in  
any other vessel than a vessel built in and documented under the laws of the  
United States, or vessels to which the privilege of engaging in the coastwise 
trade is extended by...this Act...." (Chapter 250, 66th Congress, p. 999).
126Mr. Scheele commented: "The French were a bit defensive about the ir
strategic cargoes, which they wanted to take a reservation on. The French 
believed that all strategic cargoes like petroleum and gas were supposed to be 
carried under French flag. The Commission said this was illegal u n d e r 
Community law so why should the Community pu t it into a reservation. 
Moreover, such a move w ould go against Europe's interest in liberalising the  
sector. In fact, the French w anted to hang onto their bulk cargo and were 
always a bit reluctant to really play the liberal maritime card."
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sector.127 To give themselves a more defensible position in audiovisual, they 
encouraged the link w ith maritime transport services.128
A second obstacle to satisfying the Hollywood lobby was agricultural 
reform. One of the U.S. government's objectives for the Uruguay Round was 
to curb agricultural subsidies and to cover rules for trade in agriculture under 
the GATT regime.129 Paarlberg (1997) notes that "high priority was 
consistently given to agriculture in the Uruguay Round, despite the troubles 
this caused for other sectors" (p. 3). According to Destler (1995), the central 
problem of the Uruguay Round was the agricultural sector: "This was the 
major area of economic activity least constrained by GATT rules, and the 
United States stood to gain (for many products) if markets were opened and 
subsidies reduced" (p. 134). Paemen and Bensch (1995) note that even in the
127The Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (1994) notes 
that the American m aritim e industry "sought the explicit exclusion of 
m aritime matters (port or auxiliary services or ocean shipping) from any 
GATS. During the negotiations, the US Government repeatedly stated that its 
objective was to exclude m aritim e services from any substantive agreem ent" 
(p. 56).
128The European Commission's (1995b) guide on the Uruguay Round services 
agreement notes that although the liner trade — ocean transport of 
intermediate and finished goods — only consists of 20 percent of global trade, 
international competition for its control is stronger than bulk trade — the 
transport of oil, liquid gas, coal, ores, chemicals, etc. — which constitutes the 
rem aining 80 percent of world trade. The European Commission adds that 
liner trade involves containers and state-owned port facilities and services. 
Only a handful of privately owned ports are open to general trade.
129According to the Industry Policy Advisory Committee (IPAC), U.S. 
negotiating objectives in the agricultural sector were "to eliminate over 10 
years all export subsidies, all tariff and non-tariff barriers, and all domestic 
subsidies, and to institute uniform  and non-discrim inatory food health  
regulations" (1994, p. iv). However, IPAC notes that not all of these objectives 
were achieved.
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early 1980s the U.S. had been engaging in 'pre-negotiation negotiations' w ith  
m inisters of GATT contracting countries in an attem pt to start a new GATT 
round, and that these negotiations centred on the agricultural sector and 
French opposition to agricultural reform.
According to Frans Andriessen, EU trade commissioner and chief political 
negotiator from 1988 to January 1993, when the United States and EU signed 
the Blair House agreem ent130 in November 1992, Member States w ith strong 
interests in agriculture directed their frustration over the agreem ent by 
backing the French governm ent against the United States on audiovisual 
issues (interview with author, 13 January 1997). Trevor Heaton, head of the 
trade policy unit of the Council's General Secretariat during the Round, 
observed: "The French felt that if they were not going to get a good deal on  
agriculture, they were quite willing to block, even from a Com m unity point 
of view, the whole Round. From 1992 to 1993 the whole Round was on hold 
because of the agriculture question" (interview with author, 11 April 1997).131
130Paarlberg (1997) writes: "Not until November 1992, almost two years after 
the failed 1990 Brussels ministerial, did the U.S. and the EU finally reach a 
sufficient agreement on agricultural reforms (the 'Blair House' agreement) to 
allow the rest of the Uruguay Round to escape paralysis and m ove forward. 
And even at this point, French objections over the agricultural question (a 
charge that the EU Commission had exceeded its negotiating authority) were 
enough to force another full year of delay. Not until the term s of the original 
Blair House agreement were substantially weakened, in December 1993, was a 
final agricultural agreement reached, allowing the rest of the Uruguay R ound 
to be brought, at last, to completion" (pp. 30-31).
131Epstein's (1997) insightful analysis of the French governm ent's departure 
from its traditional dirigiste model in the Round's agriculture negotiations 
suggests that the problems associated with the agriculture sector had a great 
deal to do with the French domestic scene. Epstein argues that the French 
governm ent during the 1991-1992 timeframe took a protectionist stance on 
agriculture issues out of political necessity because of the Socialists' lack of 
popularity in the polls and because of concerns over the threat of violence by
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Mr. Andriessen commented that at the time of the Blair House agreem ent 
(November 1992), "there were several countries backing France, but n o t 
saying it too openly: Italy, Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Portugal, all th e
M editerranean countries because Blair House was not favourable to the  
M editerranean agricultural industries" (interview w ith author, 13 January 
1997). It is interesting to note that David Hollister, Mr. Heaton's deputy 
during the Round, recalls a clear line between Member States in the 113 
Services Committee that had originally supported the Television Directive 
(France, Spain, Italy, Portugal) — w hat Mr. Heaton calls 'Club M ed' — and  
those that took a more liberal view towards the audiovisual sector (Britain, 
Germany, Denmark, Holland). Although he was succeeded by Sir Leon 
Brittan in January 1993, Mr. Andriessen continued to observe the agriculture 
talks and noted a significant correlation between EU Member States that h ad  
been unhappy w ith the Blair House agreement and those that had supported 
French objections (to varying degrees) to covering the audiovisual sector 
under GATT-WTO rules and disciplines.
French farmers. In fact, Epstein notes that "the governm ent's choices w ere 
constrained, if not dictated, by the political impossibility of agreeing to a 
compromise. At the same time, the government was subjected to a series of 
domestic and international pressures, which resulted in a clash betw een 
protectionist views and the advantages of a free market, and placed 
lim itations on the governm ent's ability and desire to shape trade policy as it 
had for the previous four decades" (italics added for emphasis) (1997, p. 94). 
Epstein adds that the new Balladur governm ent's ability to break free from  
these constraints was weakened by a limited room to m anoeuvre o n  
economic policy. Perhaps unwittingly, Epstein confirms Putnam 's tw o-level 
approach to negotiations.
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A third obstacle to satisfying the Hollywood lobby was the U.S. position in  
the TRIPs talks on geographic indications related to w ines.132 According to 
Ms. Field, U.S. negotiators examined the possibility of proscribing the  
domestic use of certain common indications im portant to wine-producing EU 
Member States as a way of evening the trade balance in relation to U.S. 
exports of films, sound recordings and software to the EU and perhaps 
gaining some concessions from Commission negotiators on Member States' 
audiovisual levies.133 According to Dr. Jacques Gorlin, a lobbyist specialising 
in intellectual property issues for Time W arner, IBM and several 
pharmaceutical companies, Mr. Peter Karl, the Commission's lead negotiator 
for IPRs issues, at one point in the IPRs negotiations offered to m ake 
concessions on the issue of national treatm ent of levies on blank tapes in
132Article 22(1) of the TRIPs states: "Geographical indications are, for the  
purpose of this Agreement, indications which identify a good as originating 
in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a 
given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially 
attributable to its geographical origin" (GATT, 1994b, p. 375). Article 24 
requires Members to enter into negotiations to increase protection of 
indications related to wines and spirits, as this issue — particularly im portan t 
to the United States, France, Germany and Italy — was not resolved during  
the Round. This issue has a thirty-year history involving several bilateral 
agreements between the United States and Europe. For example, the USTR's 
1993 annual report on worldwide trade barriers notes that in return for U.S. 
recognition of three French distilled spirits (Cognac, Armagnac and 
Calvados), France recognises Bourbon (found in USTR, 1994, p. 79).
133According to Ms. Field, U.S. Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) 
regulations include an unprotected list of 16 wines and spirits (champagne, 
chablis, etc.) that are considered 'semi-generic.' Semi-generic means it is 
obvious to the consumer that a bottle of California champagne does n o t 
originate from France. Ms. Field noted that the EU was not questioning the 
level of protection granted to protected wines and spirits under the ATF, 
which is a division of the U.S. Treasury. However, the EU wanted several of 
the semi-generics, particularly champagne, moved into the protected category 
(interview with author, 11 June 1997).
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return for concessions on the use of appellations associated with w ines.134 Dr. 
Gorlin noted that although France was not the only wine-making country 
pushing for U.S. protection of the list of semi-generic names, France took the 
lead on this issue (interview with author, 28 March 1997). Ironically, France 
had forged a linkage between two sectors it felt highly protective of: 
viticulture and audiovisual. France's approach to the audiovisual sector talks 
will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 7. However, Ms. Field notes that 
the California wine-producing industry was opposed to such a m ove because 
of the investm ent required to rename and remarket its products and 
therefore the attem pted tradeoff never materialised.135
134Dr. Gorlin commented: "The Europeans said to us, if you w ant us to give 
in on some of our cultural issues, you've got to recognise and give us 
som ething on an issue that is critical to us, which is appellations of origin. 
Europe said that we want to be able to come into the U.S. and stop you from  
using some of our appellations for U.S. produced wine, like champagne, and 
they got nowhere on this. So what happened was that the French d idn 't get 
much on geographical indications and that was one reason why they w eren 't 
going to budge on national treatment of subsidies" (interview with author, 28 
March 1997).
135Ms. Field noted that other wine-producing countries, such as Canada, 
Australia, Chile and Argentina were also opposed to EU efforts to increase 
protection of their wines and spirits as well. She commented that the EU was 
only able to secure language in the TRIPs that requires WTO Members to 
"provide the legal means for interested parties" to prevent the use of a 
geographical indication identifying wines and spirits for wines and spirits 
"not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in  
question" (Article 23(1), GATT, 1994b, p. 376). This requires fu ture 
negotiations in the Council of the EU "concerning the establishm ent of a 
m ultilateral system of notification and registration of geographical 
indications for wines eligible for protection in those Members participating in  
the system" (Article 23(4), ibid) (interview w ith author, 11 June 1997).
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A fourth obstacle was the U.S. governm ent's objective not to radically 
change U.S. domestic anti-dum ping136 legislation in the Round. The 
Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations (1994) notes that an ti­
dum ping law "has become the primary U.S. law that domestic industries 
invoke to protect themselves from unfairly traded imports" (1994, p. 86). The 
committee lists among U.S. objectives for the Round to "m aintain the 
functional and methodological effectiveness of the U.S. anti-dum ping law by 
resisting changes to the anti-dum ping code which m ight require the 
weakening U.S. law (sic)" (1994, p. 87). According to a reliable source, w ho 
spoke on condition of complete anonymity, the feeling among U.S. 
negotiators was that Congress would not enact the Round's im plem en ta tion  
legislation if it had to change domestic anti-dum ping laws. "Ultim ately, 
Europe's willingness to agree to some of the U.S. m easures on anti-dum ping 
m ight have been part of the equation that was considered in W ashington to 
say, 'Ok, this is an acceptable deal even though we don 't satisfy Hollywood." 
(interview with author, 16 April 1997). The U.S. and EU forged an anti­
dum ping agreement two days before the end of the Round.137
The U.S. Government's Dilemma: Satisfy Hollywood or Save the Round? 
(Level I Analysis)
A fifth obstacle to a U.S./EU audiovisual accord appeared in the final 
hours of the Round, when U.S. and Commission negotiators engaged in w hat
136Dumping is a term applied to an unfair trading practice in w hich goods are 
sold abroad below cost or below the domestic price of the goods.
137According to the Financial Times, "anti-dum ping laws affected no m ore 
than 0.5 per cent of US imports between 1980 and 1993, and in m ost years the 
level was far lower. Only about 44 per cent of the cases filed resulted in the 
imposition of anti-dumping duties" (6 May 1998, p. 4).
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Ambassador Hugo Paemen, head of the Com mission's negotiating team , 
called 'horse-trading' involving four unresolved sectors: maritim e transport 
services, financial services,138 aeronautics139 and audiovisual services 
(interview w ith author, 25 April 1997). Putnam  (1988 [1993]) notes that the 
chief negotiator m ust make tradeoffs across different issues in a m ulti-issue 
negotiation, or each constituency will 'fix' the international negotiation 
position, m aking the package non-ratifiable. On traders in a m ultila teral 
negotiation Hoekm an (1989) comments: "a great deal of care is taken to
establish an agenda that includes some topics or issues of interest for each of 
the parties that are willing to trade" (p. 695). Hoekm an adds that linkages
138Key (1996) notes that the United States and EU both wanted com m itm ents 
to the liberalisation of the financial services sector, particularly from  
emerging m arket countries, but that they differed on the approach. Key 
comments: "The European Union's priority was putting in place a
m ultilateral agreem ent under the newly created WTO w ith binding 
com m itm ents subject to dispute settlement, even if some of the 
com m itm ents to liberalization were weak. The United States was unw illing  
to allow emerging m arket countries to become so-called free riders" (1996, p. 
178). Key defines a free rider as follows: "A country that does not offer strong 
com m itm ents to open its ow n financial services m arket can become a free 
rider; that is, w ithout opening its own market, its financial firms benefit from  
the openness to which other countries have committed" (ibid).
139One of the key issues in the aeronautics negotiations invo lved  
m ultilateralising a bilateral agreement between the United States and EU on  
governm ent support for the civil aircraft industry. According to Don Phillips, 
chief U.S. negotiator on aeronautics issues, the bilateral agreement, reached in  
July 1992, limited the am ount of subsidies the U.S. governm ent and EU 
countries could provide to Boeing and Airbus respectively. Mr. Phillips 
noted that during the Uruguay Round a prim ary sticking point on the 
bilateral agreem ent was the EU's assertion that the United States had been 
circum venting the agreem ent by providing indirect support to the U.S. 
aircraft industry through R&D programmes of NASA and the Departm ent of 
Defense.
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across issues tend to occur at the end of a m ultilateral trade negotiation and 
tradeoffs tend to be m ade under time constraints by senior political officials.140
Ambassador Paemen described the 'horse trading' as "trying to squeeze 
each other and trying to get as much out of it as we could on our side." He 
added that "at different moments, one side brought in this issue, the o ther 
side brought in that issue, and we were playing games in order to try to get the  
best package" (interview with author, 25 April 1997). It is difficult to 
determine exactly how  the horse-trading affected negotiations on aud iov isual 
services and IPRs issues because, as Hoekman (1989) argues, decisions o n  
tradeoffs at the end of a multilateral negotiation tend to be taken w ithout a 
great deal of analysis. However, the horse-trading, along with the other four 
obstacles discussed above, seems to have affected the audiovisual sector talks 
by delaying Commission negotiators from making an offer until w ith in  
hours of the Round's 15 December 1993 deadline, leaving U.S. negotiators 
w ith a choice of either salvaging gains in other key sectors and concluding the  
Round w ithout satisfying the Hollywood lobby; or fighting for a better offer 
on behalf of the Hollywood lobby and risking the entire Round. The USTR 
chose the former. The first theme developed from Jarvie's (1992) w ork — 
that in international trade negotiations involving m any industry sectors, the
140Hoekman (1989) writes: "Historically, GATT Contracting Parties have
tended to constrain themselves to trade-offs within issue-areas, owing to the ir 
practice of establishing separate negotiating 'groups' for each issue. As a 
result, any attem pts to link across issues have generally been m ade only at the  
end of a negotiation, since it is only then that positions on issues are 
completely m apped out and the need for linkage becomes clear. H ow ever, 
trade-offs at this point tend to be made at a high political level, u n d er 
substantial time pressure, and with little (if any) analytic input. In addition, 
linkage at this point tends to focus more on achieving a balance of gains and 
concessions (reciprocity) than on increasing potential joint gains" (p. 696).
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U.S. governm ent tends to place the interests of other U.S. industrial lobbies 
ahead of the those of the Hollywood lobby — appears to be substantiated by 
the actions of the U.S. government at the conclusion of the Round.
According to a senior Hollywood executive, Jack Valenti realised that the 
U.S. m otion picture industry was relatively insignificant. "W e're really only 
based in one or two states141 and we don 't generate that many votes in  
Congress, at least compared to the maritim e industry" (interview w ith  
author, 29 Novem ber 1995).142 Indeed, the executive believes the U.S.
141In July 1989, Mr. Valenti announced that the MPAA would move from its 
headquarters in New York City to Los Angeles (Los Angeles Times, 23 July 
1992, p. FI). "We are confronting a realistic fact of life," said Mr. Valenti. 
"The entire movie industry is now located in Los Angeles" (ibid). However, 
the num ber of films shot in the state of New York has risen steadily since 
1995. According to the New York State Governor's Office for Motion Picture 
and Television Development, the num ber of films shot in the state increased 
53 percent between 1995 and 1997. In 1997, 277 films were shot, up from 229 in  
1995 and 258 in 1996 (State of New York, 1998, p. 1). Moreover, in June and 
July 1998, plans to build two high-tech film and TV production studios in  
New York City were announced: a $120 m illion complex in M anhattan
(Hudson River Studios, 1998), and a $160 m illion complex in Brooklyn (New 
York Studios, 1998). New York City currently has 300,000 square feet of usable 
soundstages; the two new complexes will add roughly 1.1 m illion square feet. 
However, Hollywood has 3.6 m illion square feet of soundstages (New York 
Studios, 1998, p. 1).
142According to M akinson and Goldstein (1992), the U.S. maritim e transport 
industry contributed $5.1 million to federal election campaigns in 1992, $2 
million of which came from shipping companies and $3.1 m illion came from  
sea transport unions (p. 83). At the same time, the authors estimate that the 
U.S. m edia and entertainm ent industry contributed $8 m illion to federal 
election campaigns (1992, p. 50). However, the top 25 U.S. ports are located in  
16 states and Puerto Rico (U.S. Industry and Trade Outlook '98 1998, p. 43.9). 
While core copyright industries contributed $226.5 billion in 1992 (in real 1993 
dollars) to the U.S. economy (Siwek and Furchtgott-Roth, 1995, p. 9), in the 
same year the maritim e transport industry contributed $10.4 billion (in real 
1992 dollars) (U.S. Industry and Trade Outlook '98, 1998, p. 43.2). M oreover, 
the leadership of the Senate Finance Committee of the 103rd Congress hailed 
from states containing one of the top 25 U.S. ports. Daniel Patrick M oynihan,
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governm ent faced a similar dilemma in the Canadian-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreem ent and N orth American Free Trade Agreement, which led to h igh  
expectations among Hollywood executives for the Uruguay Round. The 
executive commented: "We got throw n over on the Canadian Free Trade
Agreement, where the U.S. governm ent thought we w eren't big enough to 
sink the agreement; then we got thrown over on NAFTA, and now the 
GATT."143 Bonnie Richardson commented: "How did the CUFTA and
NAFTA build expectations in Hollywood for the Uruguay Round? H aving 
been tossed overboard at the last minute in both the CUFTA and the NAFTA 
negotiations, the filmed entertainm ent community was CERTAIN the U.S. 
governm ent would not mistreat it again (e-mail message, 29 January 1997). 
Perhaps U.S. m edia corporations are not as important to the U.S. governm ent 
as Schiller argues.144
a Democrat from New York, chaired the Committee, while Bob Packwood, 
the ranking Republican, came from Oregon. On the House Ways and M eans 
Committee, a majority of the Democrats and half of the Republicans hailed 
from states w ith one or more of the top 25 ports.
143This intriguing claim should be pursued further by an enterprising m edia 
scholar. A lthough evidence supporting the executive's claim is difficult to 
find, this does not mean the claim has no validity. Indeed, Feketekuty (1988) 
notes that the maritime transport sector in the CUFTA was excluded from the 
final agreem ent because of determined opposition by the U.S. shipping 
industry to keep the Jones Act in force. He comments: "After resisting
Canadian pressures, U.S. negotiators proposed a compromise, exem pting 
Canada from future extensions of the Jones Act to new areas. Even that 
proved m ore than the industry could accept, and it succeeded in m obilizing 
congressional opposition, forcing the adm inistration to withdraw  its 
compromise proposal" (1988, p. 187). On the NAFTA, W ilkinson (1993) notes 
that U.S. m aritim e interests were able to ensure that Great Lakes and ocean 
shipping were excluded from liberalisation.
144Ironically, the U.S. agriculture industry understands Hollywood's 
frustration over the Round. The Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and 
Negotiations (1994) notes: "For the first time, agriculture was not dropped 
from the [GATT] negotiations at the last m inute to get better deals in o ther
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CHAPTER 5 
—LEVEL II ANALYSIS—
BUILD UP TO THE URUGUAY ROUND:
CUFTA, NAFTA AND THE TELEVISION DIRECTIVE
Mosco suggests that political economists take a 'microanalytic' approach to 
the study of power in the communication industry, focusing on ind iv iduals 
as social actors, to balance macroanalytic tendencies toward exam ining 
business and governm ent structures. He grounds his micro-macro approach 
in Giddens' (1984) theory of structuration and the microanalytic concept of 
'agency.' By examining what he calls the "social relations of com m unications 
practices" (1996, p. 216), Mosco argues that "out of the tensions and clashes 
w ithin various structuration processes, the media come to be organized in  
their full m ainstream , oppositional, and alternative forms" (ibid). He notes 
that even w hen political economists take a microanalytic approach to the 
com m unication industry, "these decisions tend to be norm alized as the 
objective assessments of the bottom line, which is, in effect, a m easure of a 
balance of macro-pressures" (1996, p. 214). Mosco adds that "objective 
assessments are also glosses on a set of micro-power struggles that can grow 
out of the narrow interests of specific executives or board members" (ibid). To 
understand the relationship between the Hollywood lobby and the U.S. 
governm ent during the Uruguay Round, one m ust focus on the 
consequences of a micro power struggle among Hollywood lobbyists to 
balance the macro-pressures facing the USTR, which were discussed in the 
previous chapter. Indeed, 'out of the tensions and clashes' between the
areas" (1994, p. 43).
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Hollywood lobby and the U.S. government, the U.S. agenda for and approach 
to the audiovisual sector talks 'came to be organized/
Bilateral and Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Despite Valenti's (1968) characterisation of the MPA as the 'little State 
D epartm en t/145 the association still needs U.S. government intervention on a 
bilateral and m ultilateral basis. A reliable source, who requested com plete 
anonymity, notes that it is much easier for the U.S. governm ent to develop a 
good relationship w ith individual Member States when the issues being 
negotiated are national issues, rather than EU-wide issues such as the quota 
provisions of the Television Directive (interview with author, 19 January 
1996). Guback (1969) makes a strikingly similar point about Hollywood 
lobbyists: "A lthough the American companies may be influential w h en
individual European countries generate policy for their own film industries, 
their influence on a supra-national level is not as great and they can only 
assume the role of powerful, interested observers" (p. 97). The U.S. 
governm ent also exchanges inform ation on foreign markets w ith the MPA. 
Bonnie Richardson, the MPAA's vice president for trade and federal affairs in  
W ashington, DC, commented on the Uruguay Round: "At a working level, 
the U.S. governm ent regularly conferred on worldwide barriers and on  
m arket access. A nd at a higher level, consultations were regular betw een 
Mickey Kantor and Jack Valenti" (interview with author, 23 February 1996).
145Valenti (1968) writes: "If we describe our operations as a 'little State
D epartm ent/ that is exactly w hat it is. Each day, somewhere in the world, 
negotiations, discussions, talks are going on in behalf (sic) of the industry. T o 
my knowledge, the motion picture industry is the only U.S. enterprise that 
negotiates on its own with foreign governments (p. 22).
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But did these consultations mean the relationship between the U.S. film  
industry and government was productive and close?
Schiller (1969 [1992]) argues that U.S. media corporations are no longer 
dependent on the U.S. governm ent in removing global trade barriers. If 
Schiller is correct, then the Hollywood lobby alone should have negotiated a 
bilateral accord on audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright in the  
U ruguay Round that satisfied its interests. However, in negotiations for trade 
agreem ents such as the CUFTA, NAFTA and GATT, all U.S. industries rely 
on the U.S. governm ent to negotiate a deal for them. Schiller m u st 
understand the nuances of U.S./EU trade negotiations before m aking blanket 
statements. First, there are trade negotiations, which can involve one or 
m ore industry sectors, at a national or bilateral level. At this level, the U.S. 
film industry can (1) act as the little  State Department' and operate on its 
own, (2) solicit help from the U.S. government, or (3) allow the U.S. 
governm ent to 'self-initiate' action against a country. Second, there are 
negotiations toward major international trade agreements involving m any 
industry sectors on a multilateral or supranational level, in w hich  
governm ent personnel are the official negotiators and, as Guback (1969) 
points out, Hollywood executives 'can only assume the role of pow erful, 
interested observers.'146 W hen the U.S. governm ent negotiates on a 
supranational level toward trade agreements w ith the EU involving m any  
industry sectors, the U.S. film industry has to rely on its political influence 
weighed against the influence of more powerful U.S. industries, such as
146However, during the final moments of the Uruguay Round, the m ore 
aggressive members of the Hollywood lobby negotiated directly w ith the 
French delegation!
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agriculture and m aritim e transport services. W hen this happens, the U.S. 
film industry tends not to get w hat it wants. However, w hat is not clear is 
w hether the U.S. governm ent is not doing enough to remove barriers to 
Hollywood products, or, because the U.S. governm ent serves as the voice of 
the Hollywood lobby — and that voice tends to be loud and threatening — 
w hether obstacles to agreements are erected by the lobby itself.
Empirical evidence suggests that particularly aggressive members of the  
Hollywood lobby entered the Round with an 'all or nothing ' attitude. This 
attitude hampered efforts by U.S. negotiators to strike a deal on aud iov isual 
services and IPRs related to copyright with the EU. In this chapter I h igh ligh t 
some of the key aspects of the governm ent/film  industry relationship to 
reveal that it is often counterproductive and fraught w ith m isunderstanding  
— a far cry from the theme in political economy that the state is seen as 
'supporting ' transnational m edia corporations (Mosco, 1996).
Hollywood's High Expectations for the Uruguay Round
To understand the U.S. governm ent/film  industry relationship du ring  
the Uruguay Round, several U.S. officials and Hollywood executives 
suggested that I look back at the relationship during the CUFTA and NA FTA 
and the development of the Television Directive in Europe.
On 1 January 1989, three months before the Council of Ministers reached a 
common position on the Television Directive, the CUFTA took effect. 
During the negotiations, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney vowed to 
protect Canada's cultural industries from trade liberalisation. According to a 
senior U.S. trade official who negotiated on audiovisual issues during the
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CUFTA's talks, the Canadians made it clear from the start that the cultural 
exclusion was non-negotiable, a contentious m anoeuvre that the official 
believes helped push  the treaty through Canada's political system (interview  
with author, 2 February 1996).147 According to the official, Mr. Valenti still 
remembers the phone call from Mr. Howard Baker, at the time chairm an of 
the U.S. Economic Cabinet Council under the Bush Administration, who told 
him  that the U.S. governm ent could not persuade the Canadians to include 
their cultural industries in the agreement.148
Bhagwati's (1989) analysis of the rationale of U.S. exporters for opening 
foreign markets in the 1980s has particular relevance to Mr. V alenti's
147Article 2005 of the CUFTA exempts most cultural industries from the 
treaty's provisions (CUFTA, 1988, p. 396), while Article 2012 defines cultural 
industries as an enterprise engaged in any of the following activities:
•the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or 
newspapers in p rin t or machine readable form but not including the sole 
activity of printing or typesetting any of the foregoing,
•the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of film or video recordings, 
•the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video m usic 
recordings,
•the publication, distribution or sale of music in print of machine readable 
form, or
•radio com m unication in which the transmissions are intended for direct 
reception by the general public, and all radio, television and cable television 
broadcasting undertakings and all satellite program ing and broadcast netw ork 
services (CUFTA, 1988, p. 295).
148However, the CUFTA includes a provision for cable retransm ission rights 
which benefits Hollywood. Prior to the CUFTA, Canadian cable and satellite 
broadcasters could sim ultaneously retransm it copyright work to ind iv idual 
homes w ithout infringing copyright because the work was not considered a 
'public perform ance' or 'radio communication' of the work under Canadian 
law. The CUFTA prohibits this practice, forcing Canadian cable systems to pay 
royalties for retransm ission, U.S. copyright holders being the prim ary 
beneficiaries.
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argum ent against Canada's protectionism. Bhagwati writes: "If [companies] 
sell in other markets, as most do, they can also ease the pressure of 
competition on themselves by asking for, not higher im port barriers against 
others, bu t lower import barriers by others" (italics added for emphasis) (1989, 
p. 452). He notes that this strategy is an alternative to the 'old-fashioned' 
dem and for im port protection, which spreads protectionism in o ther 
countries. This strategy also has the advantage of fitting w ithin an 'un fa ir 
competition framework,' the rationale for which is that if your country 's 
protection is greater than ours, then your system is unfair (ibid). An exam ple 
of this kind of rhetoric can be found in Valenti's (1988) argum ents against 
Canada's planned restrictions, on foreign distributors: "We w ant no
protection from, tariffs on, or barriers to Canadian movies or any o ther 
country's creative works. There are no restrictions of any kind to the free 
m ovem ent of foreign creative material in the United States" (p. 21).
W hen details of the draft NAFTA between the U.S., Canada and Mexico 
were released in early September 1992, the Canadians had once again refused 
to negotiate on their cultural industries by preserving the CUFTA's cu ltu ral 
exclusion. From the MPA's perspective, the NAFTA's draft language issued a 
'soiling precedent' for the Uruguay Round negotiations (Burshstein, 1993). 
Mr. Emery Simon, a former deputy U.S. Trade Representative, com m ents 
that the cultural exclusion in the CUFTA served as a precedent for the  
NAFTA for two reasons. First, several Canadian ministers felt they had  
pledged to the Canadian people not to negotiate on cultural industries and 
therefore found themselves 'boxed-in' by the CUFTA. Second, and m ore  
apropos to the Uruguay Round negotiations on IPRs related to copyright, 
Simon argues that the "the Quebecois did not want to pay money to the
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United States for private copying levies. So they wanted to m aintain the 
possibility of having a discriminatory private copying system .../' (Panel 
Discussion on GATT and NAFTA, 1993, p. 287).149 During the Uruguay 
Round's IPRs negotiations on copyright, U.S. negotiators argued that EU 
Member States were applying levies on blank tapes in a discrim inatory 
m anner, as most of the films on European screens and in European video 
shops are U.S.-made, yet U.S. rightsholders (producers) do not get their share 
of the royalties under European law.150 Indeed, Ambassador Bernard Miyet, 
France's 'roving' ambassador on audiovisual issues during the R ound151,
149However, while the draft language acted as a 'soiling precedent' for the 
U ruguay Round, it could not apply to future signatories to the NAFTA, as the 
exclusion only applies to Canada (Burshtein, 1993). Also, Cadsby and 
W oodside (1993) note that the NAFTA was more than just an expansion of 
the CUFTA because it introduced protection of EPRs. Bikoff and W ilson 
(1994) explain that Article 1703(1) of the NAFTA requires m em ber countries 
to abide by the principle of national treatm ent — to extend to signatories 
"treatm ent that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection 
and enforcem ent of all intellectual property rights" (p. 29). However, the 
cultural exclusion exempts Canada from having to apply the national 
treatm ent principle to issues related to cultural industries. The authors add 
that "Canada is perm itted to discriminate against US cultural industries by 
denying national treatm ent or by failing to extend the NAFTA m in im u m  
level of IPR protection" (1994, p. 30).
150According to a Commission official close to the audiovisual sector talks 
during the Uruguay Round, the United States is correct in its assertions that 
these levies are discriminatory. Indeed, the official noted that France, Spain 
and Portugal make 'indiscreet' deals w ith each other to cover up the extent of 
their levy activity (interview with author, 28 November 1995).
151The French borrowed a lobbying technique from the United States w hen it 
hired Ambassador Miyet in August 1993 to push for the cultural exception, 
though the extent to which the French were aware of this is unclear. From  
1926 to 1937, the U.S. Department of Commerce employed a "roving 
European representative" responsible for m otion pictures, George R. Canty, 
based in Europe to assess protectionist measures and to report to perm anen t 
field officers (Jarvie, 1992, pp. 315, 377). From 1933 to 1957, the MPPDA 
m aintained its own perm anent representative abroad, Fay Allport — "a kind
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noted that he frequently referred to the cultural exclusion in the CUFTA and 
NAFTA to justify excluding the audiovisual sector from the GATS (interview  
with author, 23 April 1996).
Late Reaction to the Television Directive
Besides the precedent-setting cultural exclusions in the CUFTA and 
NAFTA, the U.S. film industry and government also had to contend w ith  the 
EU's Television Directive, a central issue in the Uruguay Round. The 
developm ent of the Directive offers a revealing case study on the U.S. film  
lobby in Europe and on the relationship between the lobby and governm ent 
during the Round. The United States vociferously opposed the Directive, 
pointing to the absence of any reference to the European work's cultural 
content in Article VI,152 which defines a 'European program m e.'153 Indeed,
of roving ambassador from the U.S. motion picture industry...." (Jarvie, 1992, 
pp. 318-339).
152Article VI defines a European programme in two ways (both m ust apply): 
by origin or work and by producer's establishment and control of the work. 
First, a European programme is defined as a work originating from an EU 
Member State, from a European third state party to the Convention on  
Transfrontier Television (28 I.L.M. 857 (1989) or from another European th ird  
country. Second, the work m ust be made by one or more producers 
established in one or more of the aforementioned states, and supervised and 
controlled by one or more producers established in one or more of the states. 
If the work is a co-production, the European co-producer's contribution m ust 
be 'preponderant' and the co-production m ust not be controlled by entities 
outside the states.
153The question of the origin of audiovisual works has remained an enigm a 
to policy-makers. Falkenberg (1994) asks the following: "Is the origin defined 
by the nationality for the residence of the producer, or of the financial 
resources required? Is it defined by the director, responsible for the artistic, 
cultural content? Should it be defined by the origin of the actors, the sound 
team or the film team?" (1994, p. 2). Falkenberg adds that "there is no  
generally accepted rule..." (ibid). As to the appropriateness of addressing this 
issue in the latter part of the Uruguay Round, Falkenberg comments: "The
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only Article IV makes an indirect reference to cultural material, stating that 
the 'm ajority proportion' reserved for European works relates to a 
"broadcaster's international, educational, cultural and en terta inm ent 
responsibilities to its viewing public...." (OJ L 298, 17 October 1989, p. 26). 
Article IV merely implies that European works are culturally oriented 
w ithout specifically stipulating that the works be culturally oriented. This 
om ission is seized upon by J. Michael Farren, U.S. undersecretary of 
commerce for international trade in 1989, who argues that the Directive is 
purely an economic measure created to protect Europe's industry from  
competition, evident from the definition of 'European works': "Virtually all 
of the definitional criteria relate to where production workers reside, w here 
production monies are spent, and where production control resides — not to 
w hether the program m ing concerns European subjects or culture" (House of 
Representatives, 1989b, p. 23).154
final m onth of an international negotiation are [sic] how ever not the right 
time for such subtle discussion" (ibid).
154Albrecht (1991) echoes this point: "Accordingly, a m ovie based on a
European script, made with European actors and technicians in Europe w ould  
not be considered a European work if it was financed and production 
controlled by a non-European company. In contrast, an episode of Dallas 
filmed on a set outside Paris, with a US script, US actors, and other US talent, 
w ould be considered an EC production under the EC's Directive, if production 
was controlled by an EC company" (p. 7). The Committee on Ways and 
Means of the U.S. Congress also expressed its 'extreme displeasure and 
objections' to the Directive: "The Committee rejects argum ents by the
directive's supporters that the [quota] provision is necessary to protect the 
integrity of European culture, or to regulate objectionable content (such as 
violence) in TV programming, since the restriction does not apply to the 
cultural content of TV programs, but rather the country of origin of their 
production. Moreover, the measure does not apply comparable restrictions to 
European-made programs" (House of Representatives, 1989a, p. 4).
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On barriers to film in im portant markets Valenti (1968) writes that 
"constant vigilance is the price necessary to avoid or counteract new schemes 
as they are hatched to replace discredited ones" (p. 24). Yet, according to 
several U.S. entertainm ent executives, the U.S. film industry did no t 
appreciate the implications of the Television Directive until it was too late.155 
Several factors contributed to this failure, including the anachronistic view s 
of television and film held by the leadership of the MPA's London office, and 
the location of the MPA's European office in London, not Brussels, far from  
the offices of Commissioners and members of the European Parliament, and 
far from the political centre of what U.S. industry en masse feared w ould 
become 'fortress Europe.'
According to a senior Hollywood executive, during the late 1980s the MPA 
leadership in the London office hailed from a generation of film executives 
w ho believed film-making was more prestigious than producing television 
program m es and videos (interview with author, 29 November 1995), despite
155From the point of view of the U.S. film and TV industry, the nucleus of the 
Television Directive consists of Articles IV, V and VII. Article IV requires 
broadcasters 'w here practicable,' *by appropriate means' and 'progressively' to 
reserve a 'm ajority proportion' of their transmission time for European 
works (OJ L 298, 17 October 1989, p. 26). This article excludes news, sports 
events, games, advertising and teletext services from the stipulation on  
transm ission time. Article V gives a broadcaster — 'where practicable and by 
appropriate m eans' as well as 'progressively' — the choice of reserving at least 
10 percent of their transm ission time or their program m ing budget for 
European works created by producers independent of broadcasters (p. 27). 
Article VII establishes time-scales for broadcasting cinematographic works: 
unless otherwise agreed, the Directive mandates a two-year delay between the 
first showing of the work in cinemas of one of the Member States and its 
appearance on television, and half that time with film co-productions 
involving the broadcaster (p. 27). From the U.S. perspective, the restrictions 
transform ed the Directive from a market-liberalising instrum ent into a n o n ­
tariff trade barrier listed in the USTR's 1994 National Trade Estimates Report.
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video sales outstripping box-office receipts.156 One possible explanation 
requires a brief history of the film /TV relationship. According to Crandall 
(1975), the emergence of television in the 1950s challenged the major U.S. 
film studios as a competitor to film exhibitors, a customer for film  
distributors, and, briefly until 1972, a producer and distributor of feature films. 
In response, Hollywood began producing "telefilms' for television, as well as 
releasing its post-1948 films to the netw orks.157 Jowett (1976) notes: 
"Television had helped to destroy the old film industry, but it had also helped 
to create a new one" (1976, p. 434). Jowett explains that the old m ass 
production studio system had either disappeared or converted to television 
production; "in its place there emerged a new philosophy of film -m aking 
which had  its roots more in the boardrooms of the large New York 
corporations than on the sound stages of the studios" (1976, p. 434). How ever, 
this not to say that Hollywood had ceased producing 'blockbusters' or even  
successful low-budget films by independent producers. Jowett argues that the 
problem  lay in Hollywood's inability to gauge its audience (1976, p. 435). He 
writes:
Part of the problem was a failure by the old guard in  
Hollywood to recognize that movie-making was n o  
longer 'show business' — the "business' of churning o u t 
'shows' for a mass audience. Television had clearly taken  
over this function.... In the minds of their customers, the  
movies were now quite clearly differentiated from  
television, and audiences expected something more th a n
156According to MPAA figures, in 1996 video sales reached $16.5 billion, w hile 
box-office receipts for the same year totalled $5.9 billion (U.S. Industry and 
Trade Outlook '98,1998, p. 32.2).
157M attelart (1973) calls it a strategy shift of "film production towards the 
language of television" (p. 23).
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the old Hollywood formulae, and even more explicit 
visual thrills (1976, pp. 435-36).
Furthermore, according to the senior Hollywood executive, the London 
office had little to worry about in terms of European audiovisual policy before 
the Television Directive. For example, there had been quotas on the 
screening of theatrical film in various European countries, but they had no t 
been strictly enforced because theatre owners needed a steady supply of 
imports to rem ain in business. The London office did not realise that the 
Television Directive would create pan-European quotas, and the Europeans 
would try to enforce them. Valenti (1968) writes: "Film im port quotas have  
been eliminated in m ost countries" (p. 24). However, the London office had 
apparently been receiving signals from its member companies that the 
Directive might curtail sales of U.S. TV programmes. While the London 
office seemed to be in the dark as the legislation gestated, the MPA's m em ber 
companies were already under pressure from European program m e buyers 
(Albrecht, 1991). Albrecht (1991) writes: "It was well known throughout 1989 
that the Commission was seriously contemplating such action. In fact, a 
substantially final version of the Directive had been circulated and discussed 
with various [European] industry groups" (p. 10). Albrecht also notes that 
buyers had been well aware of the Directive's proposed provisions and had 
been dem anding lower prices from member companies throughout 1989. 
However, in defence of the London office, a former U.S. trade official notes 
that the language of the Directive was relatively vague until the French 
succeeded in adding quota stipulations (interview with author, (30 N ovem ber 
1995).
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A second difficulty facing the U.S. film industry in Europe was its 
proximity to the political process in Brussels. The MPA m aintained an office 
in London but not in Brussels. In fact, none of the U.S. studios m ain tained  
offices in Brussels. However, most of the major U.S. corporations w ith  
interests in Europe did not have a Brussels address listed in their a n n u a l 
reports until the prospect of "fortress Europe' persuaded them to establish one. 
An article in the Harvard Business Review  sums up the concerns of U.S. 
industry: "Non-European companies m ust begin to act now, and they m u st 
act w ith  continuing vigilance. The vision that Europeans hold for Europe is 
conflicted, so the form the single m arket will take is uncertain and the precise 
outlines of the future European business environm ent are still dim " (Magee, 
1989, p. 79).158 The Brussels office of the MPA opened in September 1993 — 
three m onths before the end of the Uruguay Round.
Historical Im portance of Foreign M arkets
The U.S. film industry has good reason to be defensive about protectionist 
m easures in foreign markets, particularly W estern Europe. Valenti (1968) 
comments: "Before World War II, earnings of American film com panies
abroad represented a small percentage of total revenues. Today foreign 
earnings represent about 53% of total m otion picture rental income. O ur 
industry now  generates a larger proportion of its revenue overseas than  any
158Magee (1989) continues: "If the outcome is anywhere near as radical as 
some Europeans hope, the American eagle and the so-called Asian dragons 
are about to m eet a kind of European wolf pack (ibid)." In another Harvard  
Business Review  article, European businesses are described as "establishing a 
m om entum  of their own" (Friberg, 1989, p. 86), the trends of most concern 
being mergers and acquisitions across the Continent, acceleration of cross- 
border combinations, and companies "pushing aggressively to rationalize 
their operations and lock in the decisive advantages of continentw ide 
operating scale" (ibid).
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other large American industry" (p. 21).159 Guback (1969) concurs that m ost 
Am erican industries rank export trade low on their priority list. However, 
the U.S. film industry ranks it at the top: "W ithout the foreign m arket the 
Am erican film industry as we know it today would collapse" (1969, p. 91). 
W estern Europe is America's largest foreign market for film sales. From the 
1940s to the 1960s, film exports accounted for about half of the m ajors' 
revenue; before World W ar II, exports represented a th ird  of revenue 
(Guback, 1979). In their book designed to brief U.S. negotiators on various 
aspects of Hollywood and international regulatory organisations, W ildm an  
and Siwek (1988) agree that "foreign sales are critical to the health  of the U.S. 
film industry" (1988, p. 35). Finding that in some years export revenues and 
rentals have provided the industry w ith as m uch as half of its total incom e, 
the authors admit: "Regulations and events that affect the trade of films 
betw een the United States and other nations are therefore of vital interest to 
the success of the American motion picture industry" (1988, p. 35).160
159A Washington Post article quotes Mr. Valenti as saying he spends about 65 
percent of his time on foreign problems (8 July 1981, p. 78).
160Europe is the world's largest and fastest growing m arket for television 
program m es (MPEAA, 1993). In 1991, 77 percent of U.S. exports of TV 
program m es w ent to Europe, almost 60 percent to the EU (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1993, pp. 120-121). In 1991, MPEAA m em ber 
company TV sales to the EU contributed to 55 percent of their total foreign 
earned revenue (MPEAA, 1993, p. 12). Moreover, the average production cost 
of a U.S. film in 1993 had increased to nearly $30 million from $23.5 m illion  
in 1989 (United International Pictures, 1994, p. 10). According to Jeffrey 
Logsdon, an industry analyst w ith Seidler Amdec, a typical U.S. film earns 
about half of its total box-office receipts overseas; that figure rises to 60 percent 
for some major films (USA Today, 14 December 1993, p. IB). The MPA 
estimates that the U.S. film /TV /hom e video industry posted revenues of $18 
billion in 1992. In 1984, U.S. sales of audiovisual products to Europe 
am ounted to $330 million; in 1992, the figure was $4 billion (Griffiths, 8 
December 1993, on Reuters Business Brief).
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The MPEAA (1993) sum m arises the fears of the U.S. film industry: first, 
the broadcast quota would cut deeply into the export of American television 
program s to the EC;161 and second, European countries not members of the EC 
w ould adopt broadcast quotas under the influence of the EC's example (p. 
8).162 As to the effect of quotas on film and TV exports, W ildm an and Siwek
161Of particular concern to the U.S. film industry is declining U.S. 
program m ing sales to the EU because of U.S. broadcasters' uncertainty over 
their future ability to resell programmes w ith quota restrictions in force 
(Albrecht, 1991). European industry groups, including program m e buyers, 
had been well aware of the Directive's proposed provisions, one indication 
being European buyers' dem ands for lower prices from m ember com panies 
throughout 1989 (ibid). The MPEAA argues that the European buyers' 
uncertainty led to a decrease in sales even before the Television Directive 
w ent into effect in 1991: sales to France, the UK and Italy declined by an 
estimated 51.8 percent, 10.7 percent and 7.2 percent respectively in 1989 
compared w ith 1988 figures (Albrecht, 1991, p. 11). Compared w ith 1990, sales 
in  1991 decreased by more than 50 percent in France and Italy, over 40 percent 
in  Spain, over 30 percent in Germany, and more than 60 percent in the UK 
(MPEAA, 1993, p. 8). The MPEAA estimates that to these five countries, sales 
by m em ber companies dropped an average of 46 percent (ibid). For the first 
nine m onths of 1992, the trend continued, w ith revenue losses from m issed 
sales to these five countries estimated at $45 million (p. 9). However, the 
MPEAA notes that "these num bers are somewhat distorted by a com bination 
of industry mega-deals and unusual market factors that occurred in 1990" 
(ibid).
162Indeed, the MPEAA (1993) and Albrecht (1991) cite legislation in Eastern 
and W estern Europe that suggests the U.S. film industry 's concerns m ight be 
warranted. First, the Council of Europe's Convention on Transfrontier 
Broadcasting, signed in March 1989, had 20 signatories by 1992, including all of 
the EU Member States (MPEAA, 1993, p. 11). The Convention contains 
similar quota stipulations to those of the Television Directive. But according 
to Mr. David Webster, "the directive is much more powerful because the law 
of the common com m unities becomes part of the national law" (House of 
Representatives, 26 July 1989e, p. 61). Second, two articles in the Treaty on 
European Union signed in 1992 have particular relevance to the audiovisual 
sector: Article 128 on culture, and Article 130 on industry. Article 128 states: 
"The Com m unity shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the 
m em ber states, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at 
the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore" (Official
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(1988) describe a 'dow nw ard spiral': barriers to Hollywood's exports reduce 
their potential export earnings, which reduce the num ber of films and 
programmes produced and the size of budgets. Anticipated reduced revenues 
result in cutbacks in production and budgets, which causes a decline in  
audiences and further reductions in output and budgets (p. 124). V alenti 
(1968) adds: "No producer today, except in rare instances, can expect to re­
coup his costs in the domestic market alone. This is a new fact of life in ou r 
business" (p. 21).163
According to the consultancy London Economics, the EU's policy of 
harm onising TV m arket regulations and im plem enting quota restrictions
Journal of the EC, 31 August 1992, p. 47). Article 130 states: "The C om m unity  
and the m ember states shall ensure that the conditions necessary for the 
competitiveness of the comm unity's industry exists (p. 49). Third, on May 2, 
1992, six out of seven of the Member States of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) signed a treaty w ith the EU Member States to create the 
European Economic Area (EEA). According to the MPEAA, the EEA Treaty 
incorporates the EU's Single Market programme into the EFTA, the quid pro 
quo being a commitment by EFTA countries to adopt the Single M arket's legal 
framework, including the Directive (1993, pp. 10-11). Fourth, the EU's 
protectionism has spread to Eastern Europe as well, where Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and Poland have begun to use the EU's Single Market legal 
framework as a model (House of Representatives, 9 June 1992a, p. 21, cited in  
MPEAA, 1993). However, according to David Lowe, secretary for the 
Federation Against Copyright Theft UK (FACT), the U.S. studios have been 
reluctant to enter the East European market because of video piracy problem s 
(interview with author, 2 October 1995).
163Nevertheless, Mr. David Webster, Senior Scholar at the A nnenberg 
W ashington Program and former Director of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, notes that the United States underestim ates the fears of 
European leaders over the am ount of U.S. program m ing flowing into the 
Continent: "This is not so m uch a trade issue as a cultural issue — and a 
cultural issue, if inflamed, soon becomes a political issue (House of 
Representatives, 1989e, p. 65). Webster adds that "if you accept that there are 
going to be quotas of some kind, you have then to judge w hat quotas are 
politically possible, that is, for Europe, not for the United States" (ibid).
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has three m ain goals: "nurturing an infant industry, protecting social and 
cultural values, and reducing European unem ploym ent by substituting 
im ported program m es w ith European-made programmes" (London 
Economics, 1994, p. 24).164 London Economics argues that quotas will n o t 
help these aim s.165 The usual purpose of trade quotas is to stim ulate 
domestic production in the face of cheap imports by substituting imports w ith  
domestic products. However, television program m es differ from other 
im ports in that their 'substitutability' varies according to the taste of 
consumers, as do production costs. Also, TV quotas are directed at specific 
kinds of program m ing w ith 'oeuvres' or cultural content, not at 
program m ing on news, sports events, games.166 As a consequence, applying 
quotas to television markets can have unforeseen consequences.167
164The harm onisation of EU audiovisual regulations has been a difficult task. 
According to an inventory produced by Mr. Aurelio de Laurentiis, Europe's 
audiovisual policy consists of the following elements:
•24 national cinema laws;
•70 bilateral co-production agreements;
•53 regional laws;
• 130 different cinema support funds (Community, national, regional and 
local funds);
•p lus several thousand im plem enting decrees, regulations and various texts 
relating to the cinema which, I m ust admit, we have been unable to list (de 
Laurentiis, 1994, pp. 26-29).
165It m ust be noted that Sony Entertainm ent commissioned the London 
Economics quota study.
166However, Anderson (1992) argues that Canadian quotas on U.S. 
program m ing actually stimulates diversity because the quotas induce 
substitution into non-entertainm ent categories such as in fo rm ation  
program m ing.
167London Economics (1994) argues that quotas hit new channels, particularly 
subscription services, the hardest because established channels w ith a 
substantial m arket share already have enough European program m ing to
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M erians (1991) explains that if a foreign country buys only two year's 
w orth  of a hit U.S. TV series that was broadcast for three years in the U.S. 
domestic m arket, the show will be produced for one year w ithout foreign 
m arket sales revenue. The only other option for a producer is to place the 
series into domestic syndication; however, to do this the producer m u st 
provide four year's worth of shows, which means the studio m ust gamble 
that the show will be kept on air long enough to begin recouping costs in  
syndication.168 Merians adds that in the case of m otion pictures, the risks are
m eet the quota restrictions. New channels lack the resources and secondary 
rights to program m es to switch to European programmes. This, in turn, can 
lead to some channels going out of business, a delay in a channel's ability to 
accum ulate the resources to produce or acquire European program m ing, and 
lost revenues for European production. New channels could also be 
discouraged from forming.
168However, Hollywood has found a way around quota barriers in Europe 
through co-production agreements (Moore, 1994). Moore (1994) writes: "co- 
production agreements allow two or more countries to jointly produce film s 
and television programming. Those using co-production agreements can 
gain tax and national production subsidies by sharing the production w ith a 
foreign partner. An interm ingling of treaties, regulations and contractual 
arrangem ents may form the legal basis of co-production agreements" (p. 289). 
Ironically, Moore notes that one incentive for co-production agreements are 
the quota provisions of the Television Directive: "American producers could 
attem pt to take advantage of the per country funding subsidies used to 
finance productions meeting certain quota or other requirem ents" (1994, p. 
293). Co-production agreements allow U.S. producers to take advantage of the 
very same European tax and subsidy schemes they rem onstrate about to the 
USTR and Congress. Guback (1969) writes: "The American industry 's policy 
vis-a-vis the Common Market has not been developed as a frontal assault on  
trade barriers which the Community could erect. Rather, it has been aimed at 
bypassing possible restrictions by a flanking movement. This entails direct 
and indirect investm ent in European film production, which removes the 
'A m erican' label from a film and substitutes the nationality of the country in  
w hich the film was made. By this means, American companies can have  
their films, their revenues, but not the restrictions which may apply to them  
(pp. 97-98). However, the co-production is not a new idea. Dizard (1966) 
notes that U.S. film studios engaged in film co-productions during the 1940s,
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even greater: "There is no way of knowing if the cost of production, now  an 
average of $25 million per picture, will be recouped" (1991, p. 51). As a result, 
studios m ust hire high profile directors, writers, actors, and allocate even  
higher budgets for marketing. However, even these remedies have faults: 
the high profile 'talent' has been demanding more of the gross receipts, and 
because m any film projects fail, the successful films m ust carry the financial 
burden  of the losers. Valenti (1993) comments that "out of every ten  film s 
produced by the major US studios, only two ever recoup their total 
investm ent from theatrical exhibition in the United States. And six out of 
every 10 movies never retrieve their total investm ent in all m arkets in the 
w orld" (p. 148).169
Special 301: U.S. Government Retaliation
Prior to the enactment of the Television Directive, one senior Hollywood 
executive commented that Hollywood lobbyists were overly aggressive 
tow ards EU efforts to impose broadcasting quotas:
while in the early 1960s Hollywood increased its telefilm co-productions in  
Europe to escape high domestic labour costs, circumvent telefilm quotas, and 
enhance cinematography w ith location shots. Guback (1969) points out a 
sim ilar trend toward intra-European co-productions, which began in the late 
1940s and continued through the late 1960s. Buy the late 1960s, the co­
production had outpaced traditional domestic production in Spain, France, 
Italy and W. Germany.
169Squire (1992) notes two reasons for increased costs in producing Hollywood 
films in the 1980s: first, higher production costs associated w ith longer
shooting time to give audiences the production quality they dem anded and to 
pay for higher salaries of key stars; second, a false safety net in the form of 
hom e video, whose promise of revenues were factored into production deals 
despite the home video m arket's growth into a m ature market.
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W hen the Americans heard about the quotas, they hit the 
roof. The reason the Americans lost the battle was the  
way they fought. The U.S. delegation was not very 
pleasant. W hen you analyse from a program m e 
supplier's perspective what the Directive would have  
done, you see that the 'where practicable' phrase opens 
doors (interview w ith author, 30 November 1995).
In 1991 the MPEAA, supported by the IIP A, filed a 'Special 301' petition w ith  
Ambassador Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative from 1989 to January
1993.170 Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Com petitiveness Act of
1988.171 which am ends Chapter I of title ID of the Trade Act of 1974, requires 
the U.S. Trade Representative to identify foreign countries that "deny 
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, or deny fair 
and equitable m arket access to United States persons that rely upon  
intellectual property protection" (PL 100-418, 100th Congress, 102 ST AT 1179) 
and, if action is deemed necessary, to select from a num ber of possible 
retaliatory m easures.172 In testimony before Congress, U.S. governm ent
170In May 1989 Ambassador Hills sent a 'strongly worded letter' to members of 
the European Parliament, Commission officials and representatives of EC 
Member State governments. The letter warns that "support in the 
Parliam ent and in the Council for the 'local content' provisions in this 
directive w ould am ount to support for a major trade dispute w ith the U nited 
States" (House of Representatives, 1989c, p. 10).
171Section 301 is also referred to as 'Special 301' or 'Super 301.'
172According to Bhagwati and Patrick (1990), the '301' provisions require "one­
way, unrequited concessions" from other countries (p. 5). The authors trace 
the m otivations behind '301' to the acceleration of import protectionism  in  
the early 1980s and the Reagan adm inistration's concerns over the trade 
deficit, grow th of exports from Japan, the Pacific Rim and South America, and 
the broader consequences of 'deindustrialisation' and its effects on the U.S. 
economy, which has been declining as a world power. The MPEAA's 
mem ber companies, as producers and distributors of films and TV 
program m es, satisfy the statutory definition of 'persons that rely upon  
intellectual property protection.' Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and
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officials amplified the U.S. film industry's concerns over the Television 
Directive.173 In response to the MPEAA's petition, the U.S. Trade 
Representative placed the EU on its 'priority w atch' List (USTR, 1991).174
Earlier I distinguished between national or bilateral trade negotiations and 
multilateral or supranational negotiations. Valenti (1992) discusses bilateral 
trade negotiations between 1989 and 1992 involving the U.S. film industry
Com petitiveness Act of 1988 lists the following as possible retaliatory 
measures: "suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, benefits of
trade agreem ent concessions to carry out a trade agreem ent w ith  the foreign 
country...impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of, and, 
notw ithstanding any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the  
services of, such foreign country...enter into binding agreements w ith such 
foreign country that commit such foreign country to—elim inate, or phase 
out, the act, policy, or practice...eliminate any burden or restriction on U nited 
States commerce resulting from such act, policy, or practice, or provide the 
United States w ith compensatory trade benefits...." (102 STAT 1165-1166).
173In his opening statement, Rep. Edward J. Markey, Chairm an of the  
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, articulates the concerns 
of the U.S. film industry and the U.S. governm ent regarding the then- 
inchoate TV w ithout Frontiers Directive: "Is this proposal protectionism
m asquerading as cultural patriotism or does it reflect im portant sensibilities 
to which America m ust be sensitive as Europe transform s itself in 1992? Is it 
a call for television w ithout frontiers? Or television w ithout Americans? Is 
it a harbinger of post-1992 fortress Europe w ith om inous implications for 
other U.S. industries? Or is it an anomaly in a vast and complicated pattern  
of directives that will introduce enormous opportunity for U.S. exports and 
international economic cooperation?" (House of Representatives, 26 July 
1989d, p. 2). At the same hearing, J. Michael Farren, Undersecretary of 
Commerce for International Trade, described the concerns of the U.S. 
Departm ent of Commerce over the EC-92 Programme; at the top of the list 
was the Directive, described as "most urgent" and "pu re  and sim ple 
protectionism" (House of Representatives, 26 July 1989b, pp. 19-20).
174Section 310 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 requires 
the U.S. Trade Representative to identify priority practices, "including m ajor 
barriers and trade distorting practices"(102 STAT 1176), and to subm it a list of 
these practices to Congress (102 STAT 1177).
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and U.S. governm ent, and notes that in 1989 the MPEAA successfully 
petitioned the office of the USTR for help under Special 301.175 During the  
three-year period, the MPEAA and U.S. governm ent focused on 12 countries 
cited for failing to enforce or enact national copyright laws, failing to crack 
down on audio and video piracy, or closing their domestic markets to foreign 
distributors.176 Valenti argues that revised '301' provisions have "kept the  
pressure on countries to adopt good laws and enforce them, in the face of an  
annual U.S. review of trade problems" (1992, Addendum , p. 3) and 
"shortened the time period for USTR action from one year to six m on ths 
(with a possible, but maxim um, 3-month extension), in recognition of the  
fragility of intellectual property products" (ibid).177 However, an article in the  
Wall Street Journal (8 March 1994, p. 14) argues that Section 301 and its 
revision in 1988 have proven to be ineffective tools for opening foreign 
markets. The article quotes Powell (1989): "Since 1974, w hen Section 301 first 
became law, the U.S. has brought 78 cases against foreign governm ents. 
Threats of American retaliation have forced only 13 market openings — and
175Feketekuty (1988) argues that while m ultilateral negotiations "provide an  
efficient framework" for trade rules and reduced trade barriers, "the rules that 
emerge from the process tend to leave excessive room for na tional 
interpretations," and solutions can be difficult to find "that fit the great 
diversity of commercial interests represented" (p. 158). Feketekuty adds that 
bilateral negotiations "are always a necessary complem ent to m ultila teral 
negotiations" (p. 159).
176Of the 12 countries, Valenti (1992) lists Thailand, China, Korea, Taiwan, 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt (pp. 3-4).
177Valenti (1992) writes that countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, Korea, 
Malaysia India and Indonesia have subsequently agreed to introduce 
measures to im prove copyright protection and m arket access, and to p reven t 
audio and video piracy.
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those were generally trivial. And Section 301 actions have show n little  
im provem ent in subsequent years" (ibid).
According to a U.S. trade official, the rationale for the MPEAA's 301 filing 
was far from clear; indeed, Hollywood moguls harboured unrealistic  
expectations as to w hat a 301 filing and the U.S. governm ent could do in  
response to the Directive (interview with author, 1 February 1996). The trade 
official commented: "The MPA expected the U.S. governm ent to hit the EU 
hard by, for example, raising European white wine duties by 100 percent and 
stopping fois gras at U.S. borders." Indeed, one senior Hollywood executive 
noted that filing a 301 petition against the EU created the threat of EU 
retaliation against the United States (interview with author, 29 N ovem ber 
1995).178 However, Feketekuty (1988) writes: "Hints of retaliation can be a 
very effective tool for bringing an issue to a head, particularly if the proposed 
retaliation action can be designed to have a m axim um  political im pact on  
industries or regions of the country that m ight be putting political pressure 
on the governm ent not to perm it greater competition from foreign firm s" 
(pp. 157-58).
As the Television Directive headed toward enactment in 1989, and as the 
U.S. film industry and governm ent began to define the quota issue as a 
problem, coordination increased between the USTR and the MPA. In  
testim ony before Congress, Mr. Julius Katz, then-deputy U.S. trade
178 The executive commented: "Hollywood woke up and took a loud, forceful 
stance, a result of their habit of using Section 301 as a threat, which works 
better w ith underdeveloped countries than w ith developed countries. A 
developed partner can retaliate against you! O ur economic ties are too great 
to Europe to use 301" (ibid).
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representative, notes that during the sum m er of 1989, as the Council of the  
EU considered a draft of the Television Directive, the U.S. adm inistration — 
"up to the level of the President" (House of Representatives, 1989c, p. 13) — 
pushed, albeit unsuccessfully, for the rem oval of the local content 
provisions.179 Mr. Katz adds that "throughout this long process, the  
adm inistration — working closely w ith the representatives of the US m o tion  
picture industry — has made known its steadfast opposition to the enactm ent 
in the EC of a protectionist and GATT-illegal local content provision in  
connection w ith the broadcast directive" (pp. 13-14) However, according to 
the U.S. trade official, the U.S. film industry and governm ent decided to 
negotiate for an elim ination of the Television Directive's quotas rather th an  
to continue w ith formal dispute procedures involving Section 301. This 
decision further heightened the anticipation among film industry executives 
of a victory in the Uruguay Round.
Besides having to contend w ith the 'extra-sector' political pressure from , 
for example, the U.S. maritime transport services industry, U.S. negotiators 
on audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright had to defend their
179Throughout the Uruguay Round U.S. negotiators believed the EU had n o t 
been negotiating in good faith on the quota issue. Mr. Thomas Duesterberg, 
assistant secretary for international economic policy, comments: "The US
Governm ent continues to apply pressure on the EC at bilateral meetings to 
have the [broadcast] quota provision of the EC television broadcast Directive 
removed.... Other efforts to elim inate the quota have been unsuccessful" 
(House of Representatives, 9 June 1992b, p. 45). Indeed, in June 1992, U.S. 
officials were unsure whether broadcasting w ould be included in the GATS 
negotiations (ibid). Falkenberg (1994) notes that as far back as December 1988, 
during the GATT Mid-Term Review Meeting in Montreal, "there still existed 
a m arker as to the question w hether or not, in the end, all sectors would be 
covered by the [GATS] agreement. It is true also, to assume that some had 
probably thought of the audiovisual sector as possibly being an exception" (p. 
1).
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corporate constituents, the Hollywood lobby. Based on num erous in terv iew s 
w ith officials and executives on both sides of the Atlantic, hawkish senior 
executives and lawyers from Disney and M CA/Universal Studios, frustrated 
over defeats in the CUFTA and NAFTA and on the Television Directive, 
entered the Uruguay Round in an uncomprom ising mood and continued to 
set the agenda for the Hollywood lobby and U.S. negotiators. The next chapter 
will examine in detail the hawks' influence on the outcome of the  
audiovisual sector talks.
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CHAPTER 6 
—LEVEL I ANALYSIS—
HOLLYWOOD HAWKS: THEIR OWN WORST ENEMY
During the Uruguay Round the Hollywood hawks engaged in  
negotiations w ith  the French delegation while U.S. negotiators attem pted to 
satisfy them  on an official level. Ms. Field commented:
From [the hawk's] perspective they have had a lim ited 
degree of success in working out working arrangem ents 
on levies in some countries, and ultimately, even in the  
absence of provisions in the TRIPs, have m anaged over 
the years to accommodate them selves or develop 
relationships or practices in Europe that perm it them  to 
very successfully exploit the market" (interview w ith  
author, 11 June 1997).
But the informal talks were actually a ploy by the French delegation to d isrupt 
the formal talks. According to Ambassador Miyet, who led the French 
delegation's efforts to exclude the audiovisual sector from the Round, the 
objective was to prevent a U.S./EU compromise in the sector by 'radicalising' 
the U.S. position (interview author, 23 April 1996). This tactic included 
taking positions they knew would be rejected in order to make the job of 
Commission negotiators more difficult. W hen asked why a haw kish  
minority in the Hollywood lobby was allowed to dictate the U.S. positions in  
the GATS and TRIPs talks, Mr. Neil Terkowitz, executive vice president of 
international relations for the RIAA, commented: "The doves were afraid of 
the hawks" (interview with author, 12 June 1997). He added that the haw ks 
had a 'tyranny of information': "None of the other studios felt it had a
sufficient am ount of inform ation and sufficient political intuition about the
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processes in the EU to cause a change in their policies."180 Here is evidence of 
the second them e developed from Jarvie's (1992) work, that in fluen tia l 
Hollywood m oguls, who set the agenda for the lobby, expect their lobbyists 
and the U.S. governm ent to approach international trade negotiations 
aggressively, despite the consequences.181
180Besides a split between hawks and doves in Hollywood, a second split exists 
between the m ajor film studios and the independent sector of the U.S. film  
industry on their approach to film distribution in foreign markets. W hile the  
major studios prefer to distribute their films through U.S.-owned distributors 
such as UIP, the independents prefer to distribute their films through local 
distributors. According to Jonas Rosenfield, President of AFMA, the  
independents' m ethod of international distribution is to license "territory-by- 
territory and m edium -by-m edium  through local, national im porter- 
distributors rather than through a US company operating a netw ork of sales 
organizations in all major territories" (1993, p. 2). This m ethod is called the  
system of 'independent distribution' developed by European film m akers after 
World W ar II to encourage competitive export enterprises, reduce entry costs 
and support local enterprises (American Film Marketing Association, 1994, 
pp. 5-6). For example, AFMA member companies license their rights in  
France to Gaum ont, UGC, Canal Plus, Polygram and TFI. Rosenfield adds 
that "the healthier and more successful the local industry, the healthier and  
more successful our members' business" (1993, p. 2). The feature films of 
MPA member companies out-perform AFMA member films by roughly 10 to 
1. In 1993, the majors' feature film revenues reached over $10 m illion, w hile  
AFMA films totalled just over $1 million (Cicchetti et al, 1995, p. 38). Yet, in  
terms of job creation in the United States (mostly in California), AFM A 
companies more than  pull their own weight. In the same year, the m ajors 
employed 551,200 workers (64 percent), while the figure for AFMA com panies 
was 313,760 (36 percent) (Rosenfield, 1993, p. 30).
181Guback (1969) writes: "The MPEA embodies the interests of businessm en 
and diplomats (some who have actually represented our government), w hose 
principles and m ethods have clashed occasionally: on the one hand, business 
may be dem anding a swift resolution of a particular problem; on the other, 
diplomacy w ould call for negotiation and compromise. The blend of these 
viewpoints has not produced uniform  success for the MPEA in overcom ing 
foreign difficulties for statesm anship—it has, on occasion, given way to the  
approach favored by company management" (p. 92). Moreover, a Los A ngeles  
Times article offers a glimpse at Mr. Valenti's difficult job as head of the  
MPAA. According to the head of a major Hollywood studio (who chose to 
remain anonymous), "increased pushing and shoving among [Mr. Valenti's]
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Nevertheless, U.S. negotiators aggressively pursued all options to satisfy 
the hawkish element of the Hollywood lobby, who dictated negotiating term s 
to the lobby's chief spokesperson, Jack V alenti.182 The Hollywood hawks had  
three prim ary objectives in the Round. First, they wanted to secure coverage 
of the audiovisual services under the GATT-WTO regime. Second, they 
w anted to secure a standstill on the Television Directive and clarify its 
application to terrestrial TV and new forms of delivery technology and 
systems. To be fair, both haw k and dove alike were concerned w ith adverse 
changes to the Television Directive. They wanted to prevent EU M em ber 
States from increasing the quota on European program m ing beyond 51 
percent, and wanted to clarify provisions on the way the quota is applied to 
free, over-the-air terrestrial broadcasts and to new technologies or other form s 
of transm issions.183 The standstill com m itm ent would provide w hat an
peers has posed a severe test of Valenti's endurance and political skills" (3 
August 1989, part 6, p. 1). The studio head adds: "The members ought to treat 
Jack Valenti better.... I w ouldn 't w ant to put up with those animals. Sooner 
or later, Jack's going to get tired of the craziness" (ibid).
182According to the Los Angeles Times, Mr. Valenti relies on a 'rule of tw o' to 
make decisions on behalf of the MPAA member companies. "Rather th an  
depending on majority votes, and risking action on positions that a 
substantial minority might oppose, he has insisted that the association take 
no step to which any two members objected" (3 August 1989, part 6, p. 1). 
However, it appears that no such rule applied to the Hollywood lobby's 
decision-making in Geneva. Perhaps the hawks' 'tyranny of inform ation ' 
contributed to the lobby's apparent minority rule.
183U.S. negotiators defined new technologies as anything beyond terrestrial
television: satellite delivery systems, pay-per-view systems and near-video- 
on-dem and. From the U.S. perspective, Articles IV and V of the Television 
Directive covered only terrestrial television. But a DG-X official noted that 
Article I covers all 'point-to-m ultipoint' transmissions because of the 
reference to an initial transmission by wire or over-the-air, including satellite, 
of television programmes intended for reception by the public (interview  
w ith author, 28 November 1995). Therefore any new service that broadcasts
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MPAA official described as a 'comfort level' w ith the Television Directive.184 
Of great concern to the hawks was not being able to take advantage of the cost- 
savings associated with new delivery systems.185 Third, the hawks w anted to
from a single point to m any points falls under the quota stipulations of the  
Directive. From this reasoning, video-on-dem and services w ould not be 
subject to the quota rules because VOD services w ould constitute 'point-to- 
point' transmissions. The Europeans also argued that satellite and cable 
services have always been included in the Directive: The 1984 docum ent tha t 
sets out the idea of the Directive is titled, 'Green Paper on the Establishm ent 
of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable' 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1984). Nevertheless, the  
Commission official questioned that had the Directive been included in the  
GATS, m eaning had the EU made m arket access and national trea tm en t 
comm itm ents, would the EU have been bound by the non-binding  'w here  
practicable' phrase in Article IV of the Directive?
184The MPAA official commented: "The U.S. industry wanted to be assured 
continued m arket access — with restrictions, if necessary. We w ould h av e  
taken an offer that basically said things will not get any worse. Levies could 
have stayed; quotas could have stayed. Even with new technology we w anted 
a comfort level. We wanted a standstill com m itm ent, which w ould h av e  
quelled the fears of entertainment executives that had built up ever since the  
adoption of the Directive in 1989" (interview with author, 23 February 1996).
185An MPAA official placed the issue of new technologies in context: "The 
most im portant element of the new technology issue was the added 
industrial interests in the equation. You hurt more than just film studios 
w hen you curb entertainm ent flows of this nature. You hu rt profits of 
telephone companies, cable companies, hardw are and software com panies 
and m any other industries involved in the 'Inform ation Society' in Europe 
and the 'Inform ation Superhighway7 in the U.S." (interview w ith author, 23 
February 1996). Flint (1996) argues that new technologies will not only affect 
the film release window by allowing content providers to 'jum p' the six- 
m onth m inim um  requirement for cinema release before going to hom e 
video sales, pay TV and finally free TV; but also will affect the cost of 
distribution, currently dictated by market structures that have been in place 
since the 1920s. According to Flint, studios will only have to reach directly a 
smaller audience to recoup costs, primarily because digital delivery systems 
obviate the need for print costs and other methods. Money will therefore go 
into advertising, publicity and sales costs, as well as to content providers. 
Flint implies that perhaps European film producers will gain from the new  
delivery systems by channelling more funds into m arketing rather th an  
distribution.
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force EU Member States to abide by the principle of national treatm ent w h en  
distributing revenue from levies on the sale of recording devices or b lank 
audio and video tapes to compensate authors, producers and perform ers 
(Kantor's letter to Chancellor Kohl, p. 2); and w hen distributing royalties 
based on contract rights186 to producers, directors and performers (Talking 
points for the President, Entertainm ent Issues, approved by Am bassador 
Kantor, 12 Dec. 1993, p. 2; hereafter Talking Points).187
186In the United States, contract rights involve 'works for h ire / U nder this 
arrangement, a film or TV programme is created by a director, who receives a 
contractual fee for his services, but does not receive intellectual property 
rights norm ally granted under the U.S. system to a producer. Sorkin (1993) 
notes: "It is necessary that authors and artists—and, indeed, all w ho are in  
any w ay involved in the making of a m otion picture—be fairly com pensated. 
This is achieved...through collective bargaining and individual contracts" (p. 
46). However, one of the m ain concerns of U.S. film marketers is that large 
groups of neighbouring rightsholders m ight become obstacles to the effective 
launch, prom otion and distribution of films.
187France abides by the Berne Convention's obligations to provide national 
treatm ent to U.S. authors, bu t not to U.S. producers or performers. In o ther 
words, France does not recognise the 'neighbouring rights' of producers and 
performers associated w ith non-French films because the United States is n o t 
a signatory of the Rome Convention for the Protection of Perform ers, 
Producers of Phonogram s and Broadcasting Organizations. Dr. G orlin 
described the complicated and interrelated issues of national treatm ent of 
blank tape levies and contract rights this way: "In the U.S. the producer has 
the copyright and all the other participants in the film are under contract and 
what money they get is determ ined by contract only. Europe said that the 
director, notw ithstanding that he has a contract in the US w orth X percent of 
the film's take, should get 10 percent of this blank tape levy. They w anted to 
disregard the contracts negotiated in individual countries. Back in 1993, we 
said that w hen you give out these blank tape levies, we w ant you to treat us 
the same way you treat your own people, but we don't want you to create new  
rights in the allocation. We w ant to be able to say that if I own the copyright 
to this movie, then I should get the five percent royalty and I will then  tu rn  
around and distribute it based on the contracts I have. We w anted the 
Europeans to respect the contracts in allocations" (interview w ith author, 28 
March 1997).
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Historical precedent exists for Hollywood's concerns over Europe's use of 
funds generated by Hollywood films for European productions. Jarvie 
queries: "On w hat theory of international trade was a governm ent entitled to 
treat the export earnings of the industry of another nation as funds som ehow  
m isappropriated or diverted, and hence ripe to be sequestered and used to 
build up their own competing industry? (1992, p. 360). Jarvie notes that W ill 
Hays seemed pressured by his superiors, who were being criticised by their 
stockholders for not receiving production costs of U.S. films in B ritain 
because of the 1927 British Films Act (1992, p. 358). The concern am ong U.S. 
diplom ats and Hollywood executives alike was whether the British were 
attem pting to build up their own film industry at the expense of U.S. 
production (1992, p. 359). After negotiations spearheaded by Am bassador 
Kennedy, Britain agreed to allow a certain percentage of revenues rem oved  
from the country and substituted a "monetary obligation for the quota 
obligation" (1992, p. 353).
However, a proprietary document, a Commission legal opinion, som ehow  
obtained and published in Inside U.S. Trade two m onths before the 
conclusion of the Round, notes that Commission lawyers had no intention of 
recom m ending to the 113 Committee that the EU regulate new technologies 
because such programme transmission services "are not audiovisual services, 
bu t telecom m unication services applied to the audiovisual industry" (15 
October 1993, p. 19).188 The document states:
188U.S. and EU sources confirm that both sides engaged in espionage to gain 
an edge on the audiovisual and IPRs negotiations. A Hollywood executive 
adm itted that the Central Intelligence Agency regularly spies for Hollywood. 
"It's a fact of life in this business," the executive said. "But so does the French
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W hatever com m itm ents might be negotiated with regard 
to audiovisual services, they will not affect the ability to 
regulate existing and future technologies and audiovisual 
program m es transm ission techniques, since these are 
outside the scope of audiovisual industries, and there is 
additionally no intention to take bindings on the 
regulation of future technology developm ents in the 
audiovisual sector (ibid).
The docum ent explains that new technologies fall under the jurisdiction of 
the telecom munications annex to the GATS, which provides for a "right of 
access to and use of public telecom munications transport netw ork and 
services" (ibid) and "stipulates that its provisions are not applicable to 
measures affecting the cable or broadcast distribution of radio or te levision  
programming" (italics added for emphasis) (ibid).189
secret service for the French industry" (interview w ith author, 29 N ovem ber 
1995). The Los Angeles Times reported that five Americans, four of th em  
CIA officers, were caught in Paris spying on the French governm ent (11 
October 1995, p. Al). According to James Risen: "In the French operation, the  
CIA was, in effect, spying for Hollywood. At least part of the mission was to 
determ ine the strength of the French bargaining position in  television and 
telecom m unications trade negotiations" (ibid). Pascal Rogard, general 
secretary of the French film industry lobby, confirmed that the French 
intelligence service was gathering information for the audiovisual sector 
talks (interview w ith author, 15 April 1996).
189As for satellite, cable and other future 'signals/ the hawks were particularly 
concerned that the EU w ould require that each channel, such as the Comedy 
Channel or Nickelodeon, carry 51 percent of European content (New York  
Times, 15 December, 1993, p. 6). Here the hawks were willing to concede tha t 
the EU reserve 50-70 percent of all channels, bu t not on an ind iv idua l 
channel basis (ibid).
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W hite House Intervention
President Clinton intervened on behalf of the Hollywood lobby before the  
Round's deadline by making phone calls to EU leaders to urge them  to accept 
U.S. demands in the audiovisual talks (Talking Points, p. I).190 On 12 
December 1993, President Clinton phoned French Prime Minister Balladur, 
German Chancellor Kohl and Britain's Prime Minister Major to urge th e ir 
foreign affairs m inisters to accept Hollywood's counter-offer, based on the  
Commission's final offer on audiovisual services and IPRs related to 
copyright, in the 13 December General Affairs Council meeting. (Talking 
Points, p. 2). Mr. Clinton engaged in a display of brinkm anship that linked 
progress in the audiovisual sector talks to the success of the entire R ound .191 
A day later Ambassador Kantor sent a follow-up letter to Chancellor K ohl
190Besides Hollywood's fundraising capabilities, another reason w hy the  
Clinton A dm inistration had a vested interest in rem oving trade barriers to 
the developm ent of new transmission technologies was that they invo lved  
not only the U.S. film industry but the U.S. telecom munications industry as 
well, including telephone, cable, hardware and software companies. This 
issue directly affects one of President Clinton's pet projects, the In form ation  
Superhighway. McMurdo and Simpson (1994) note that inform ation policy 
has been high on the White House agenda as a way of 're-inventing ' 
government. Before Mr. Clinton was elected in 1992, little discussion 
between the two sides took place on interactive services or on-dem and 
services because the idea of the information superhighway had not yet been 
prom oted by the Clinton Administration. However, after the in fo rm ation  
superhighway became a priority of the A dm inistration (Gore, 1994), new  
technologies became an issue in the Uruguay Round.
191The opening two points of President Clinton's phone script read: "It is 
vitally im portant to the U.S. and the EC that we harvest the results of seven  
years of negotiations: the Uruguay Round will benefit Europe, the U nited  
States and the rest of the World. The U.S. and the EC m ust prov ide 
leadership in the closing three days of negotiations. We are prevented from  
doing so, because of the impasse on 'entertainm ent issues' (including 
audiovisual services and national treatm ent for copyrights)" (Talking Points, 
P. i ) .
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reiterating President Clinton's request (Kantor letter, 13 December 1993). 
According to a U.S. official, the letter was sent to Chancellor Kohl to 
neutralise any attem pt by French President M itterrand in the Council of 
Ministers meeting to sway a majority of Member States tow ards excluding the  
audiovisual sector in the General Affairs Council m eeting (interview w ith  
author, 10 May 1996).192 From the Hollywood lobby's perspective, the  
impasse, referred to by President Clinton and Ambassador Kantor as the  
'entertainm ent issue,' resulted from m onths of U.S. frustration over Europe's 
perceived unwillingness to table a satisfactory offer. A U.S. official 
comm ented: "We gave draft after draft and they still d idn 't give in." A n
MPAA official commented: "What we really wanted was an offer. We n ev e r 
got one" (interview with author, 23 February 1996). According to a senior 
U.S. trade official, "At the time the audiovisual sector was viewed as an  
im portant constituency. It was in our interest to satisfy the m otion picture 
industry" (interview with author, 2 February 1996).
However, the Commission's final offer on audiovisual services and IPRs 
related to copyright fell short of the Hollywood haw ks' dem ands. 
A udiovisual services would be placed under the GATT-WTO regime, the  
Television Directive's quota requirements would not be increased for 
'existing technology,' the Commission would consult w ith the United States 
if plans were m ade to extend the Directive's lim itations to new  technologies, 
and the Commission would negotiate on the issue of national treatm ent and 
levy systems (Brittan, 1994, p. 6). W hen the General Affairs Council rejected
192According to an editorial in the Financial Times, the Franco-G erm an 
relationship can be traced back to the Elysee treaty of 1963 between A denauer 
and de Gaulle (6 May 1998, p. 19).
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U.S. dem ands for more audiovisual concessions than the Commission and its 
constituent Member States wished to offer, the hawkish element of the  
Hollywood lobby set in m otion a series of events that sealed their own fate. 
Mr. Falkenberg commented: "We would have included audiovisual services 
in  our schedule of commitments until the 13th of December, w hen Mickey 
Kantor told us that w hat was in our schedule was not good enough and tha t 
he w ould w ithdraw  U.S. com m itm ents on audiovisual and take M FN  
exem ptions" (interview w ith author, 18 April 1997). As a result, the  
Com m ission decided it would not make commitments on audiov isual 
services to m arket access and national treatm ent and w ould take several 
MFN exemptions. However, at the last minute the Hollywood lobby decided 
to make commitments and did not take MFN exemptions. Falkenberg added: 
"This then led to the absurd situation where the Com m unity had no offer 
and two fairly broad MFN exemptions, and that really made France's day."193
According to Ambassador Paemen, who travelled to California over a year 
after the Round to meet w ith high-level Hollywood executives, the reason for 
Hollywood's apparent indecision on market access com m itm ents resulted 
from a phone call from President Clinton to Lew W asserman, head of 
Universal Studios.194 President Clinton had called Mr. W asserm an to brief
193The two 'fairly broad' exemptions from Article II (MFN) are as follows: the 
first m easure pertains to "redressive duties which may be imposed in order to 
respond to unfair pricing practices, by certain third countries' distributors of 
audiovisual works," which applies to all WTO members; and the second 
m easure pertains to "measures taken to prevent, correct or counterbalance 
adverse, unfair or unreasonable conditions or actions affecting EC 
audiovisual services, products or service providers, in response to 
corresponding or comparable actions taken by other Members," which also 
applies to all WTO members (GATS, 1994a, p. 1).
194According to the Los Angeles Times, Mr. W asserman 'cultivated' Mr.
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him  on the status of the audiovisual talks and to solicit his opinion. W h en  
Mr. W asserm an hung up the phone, he believed he had told Mr. Clinton to 
reject the EU's final offer, not to make commitments in the sector and to 
block the entire R ound .195 However, after consulting w ith Mr. C linton, 
Ambassador Kantor announced that an overall U.S./EU accord had been 
reached in sectors such as agriculture and services and on issues such as tariff 
reduction, but no U.S. com m itm ents would be scheduled in the audiov isual 
sector. Later, upon realising that Mr. Clinton had not blocked the U ruguay 
Round, the Hollywood lobby instructed Ambassador Kantor to schedule fu ll 
commitments but too late for the Commission to respond.196 Thus at the end  
of the Uruguay Round the U.S. government chose to let the Hollywood lobby 
seal its own fate rather than to derail the entire Round. W hen the  
Hollywood hawks misjudged their influence on the President Clinton, they
Valenti in the mid-1960s w hen Mr. Valenti was a presidential aid to Lyndon 
Johnson (3 August 1989, part 6, p. 1). Mr. W asserman was also prim arily  
responsible for Mr. Valenti's appointm ent as head of the MPAA (ibid).
195According to a senior Hollywood executive, Mr. W asserm an's decision n o t 
to make commitments in die GATS was based on advice from the legal 
departm ents of Universal Studios and Walt Disney (interview w ith author, 2 
October 1995).
196The USTR press release on the U.S. and EU multi-sector accord reached 
prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round reads as follows: "Because of 
the inadequacy of the EC's proposals, and their unwillingness to accept ours, 
w e decided that we would w ithdraw  our offer on audiovisual services, and 
take an MFN exemption" (USTR, 1993). According to John Siegmund, trade 
specialist w ith the U.S. Departm ent of Commerce, U.S. governm ent officials 
continued to believe the United States had pulled its offer several days after 
the Round concluded: "For several days, I and others here believed, based on  
the [USTR new release], that the United States had indeed w ithdraw n its 
audiovisual offer. After Christmas, I learned that the United States had  
instead maintained its offer" (Siegmund letter, 15 December 1995).
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handed the audiovisual protectionists in the EU, led by the French 
government, a victory.197
After the Round, Hollywood executives believed the U.S. governm ent 
had abandoned them  in order to salvage the entire Round. An M PAA 
official argued that the U.S. governm ent had not taken the Hollywood lobby 
seriously enough to declare a crisis at the G-7 Summit in Tokyo in July 1993 
(interview with author, 23 February 1996). Besides a lack of urgency, the  
official asserted that U.S. negotiators lacked a coherent strategy to gain 
concessions from the EU. Furthermore, the Hollywood hawks participated in  
informal negotiations with the French delegation because they felt U.S. 
negotiators were not pushing the EU hard enough for concessions. H ow ever, 
the official also admits that the aggressive lobbying and negotiating style of 
the hawkish element of the Hollywood lobby hindered efforts to reach an  
agreement.
To understand the Hollywood lobby's perspective on the R ound 's 
audiovisual sector talks in the final m onths, one m ust focus on the w ord 
'offer.' To the hawkish elements of the Hollywood lobby, an unsatisfactory 
offer was no offer at all. A Hollywood executive commented: "In the
Uruguay Round audiovisual talks we pushed the Europeans too God­
damned far. There was no give-and-take" (interview w ith author, 29
197The official U.S. account of the audiovisual sector talk's outcome differs 
substantially from the unofficial account. According to SPAC, "U.S. offers 
and flexibility were met by intransigence on the part of m ost of our trading 
partners, particularly the EC. The EC and others apparently never had any 
intention of seriously negotiating liberalization of trade in services for audio  
visual works" (1994, p. 10).
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Novem ber 1995). However, the Hollywood lobby's tough negotiating stance 
w as not the only reason for the audiovisual sector's denouem ent, for the U.S. 
governm ent, the voice of the Hollywood lobby in the talks, m ust also share 
responsibility for the defeat. As the MPAA official pu t it, "Both the U.S. 
governm ent and the industry failed to understand and to manage the  
em otional aspect of this issue." The MPAA official argues that the 
'en tertainm ent issue' should have been forced at an earlier stage, that there 
was a "lack of urgency on part of U.S. negotiators until too late" (interview  
w ith author, 23 February 1996). [See Appendix A for Hollywood's post-Round 
efforts to influence fast-track approval of the Round's im plem enta tion  
legislation.]
In defence of U.S. negotiators, a U.S. trade official asserts that efforts, albeit 
abortive, were m ade to link the revision of the Blair House agreem ent in  
agriculture to progress in the audiovisual sector talks — that during the 
sum m er of 1993 letters to this effect were exchanged between Ambassador 
Kantor and Sir Leon Brittan. But as the Blair House revision became a reality 
in the first week of December 1993, the linkage never m aterialised.198 
M oreover, the USTR attem pted to link a 'satisfactory' offer on audiovisual
198SPAC concurs w ith the MPAA official and suspects that the USTR's 
negotiating plan "delayed too long the exploitation of w hatever cross-sector 
leverages m ight have been identified and applied at earlier stages of the 7-year 
negotiation" (1994, p. 12). Furthermore, the U.S. trade official noted that the 
United States linked the agricultural negotiations, particularly during the 
sum m er of 1993, to talks in the audiovisual sector. During that sum m er, the 
Blair House Accord, reached in November of 1992, began to unravel. 
However, instead of putting pressure on Sir Leon to make an offer on  
audiovisual, U.S. negotiators allowed him to stall while the agricultural 
negotiations m ade substantial progress in September 1993 (interview w ith  
author, 1 February 1996).
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services to the USTR's willingness to compromise on the civil aircraft 
com ponent of the aeronautics talks. However, this linkage also appears to 
have been unsuccessful. Mr. Phillips said: "As we came dow n to the final 
moments, it became clear that Europe's offer on audiovisual was not going to 
be as good as we wanted. W hen that became clear, our willingness to try to 
w ork out problems in aircraft diminished...." (interview w ith author, 9 A pril
1997).
As the Round drew  to a close, the objective for Ambassador Kantor w as to 
examine the agreements made in all of the sectors, along w ith the ones still 
outstanding, and to assess this information according to U.S. goals for the  
Round (interview with author, 1 February 1996). W hen the 15 December 
deadline was reached, the U.S. maritime industry had succeeded in thw arting  
any attempts to liberalise the sector, U.S. anti-dum ping laws had not been 
radically changed and agricultural trade had been brought under GATT-WTO 
discipline. A lthough the audiovisual sector had not been excluded from the 
Round, negotiations on such issues as market access and the T elevision 
Directive and national treatm ent of IPRs related to copyright would con tinue 
after the Round.1"
199It m ust be noted that the music industry representatives in the Hollywood 
lobby have a more positive view of the TRIPs, the Uruguay R ound 's 
agreement on intellectual property, than their film and television  
counterparts. Mr. Turkewitz noted that for the music industry, the TRIPs was 
a "dramatic breakthrough in creating an international discipline for the  
protection of sound recordings." He commented: "Our goal was to look in to  
the future — to create the rules for the 21st Century. But the m otion picture 
industry was very much interested in getting entitlem ent to levies." 
However, he added that both the U.S. music industry and film industry  
lam ent the lack of national treatm ent provisions in the area of copyright in  
the agreement (interview w ith author, 12 June 1997).
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CHAPTER 7 
PARTI 
— LEVEL II ANALYSIS —
FRANCE'S ROLE IN THE URUGUAY ROUND AUDIOVISUAL TALKS:
DICTATOR OR GADFLY?
Schiller (1996) believes the French governm ent dictated the outcome of 
the Uruguay Round's audiovisual sector talks.200 Schiller notes the "inability 
of United States negotiators to prevail over French objections in the 
December 1993 GATT...." (1996, p. 121). Other scholars (cf. Waregne, 1994; 
Dehousse and Havelange, 1994; Joachimowicz and Berenboom, 1994) also 
believe the French governm ent held the upper hand in the talks. Indeed, 
evidence suggests that France continued its tradition of protectionism  
towards Europe's, as well as its own, audiovisual sector (cf. Forbes, 1987; 
Miyet, 1990; Porter, 1991; Seabury, 1929; Thompson, 1985) by m ounting a 
diplomatic and public opinion campaign beginning in August 1993 to 
pressure Commission negotiators for a 'cultural exception' under Article XIV 
of the GATS.201 This campaign was also directed at the TRIPs negotiations on
200Technically this proposition shifts the unit of analysis back to a state- 
centred perspective, bu t it still keeps Schiller's views w ithin the domestic 
determ inants category.
201Dehousse and Havelange (1994) rightly point out that technically European 
negotiators never proposed a bona fide 'exclusion' of the audiovisual sector 
from the GATS for fear of its consequences to other sectors. However, the 
authors note that the term  'exclusion' is often used to illustrate the effects of 
an 'exception' placed under Article XTV on general exceptions and XTVbis on  
security exceptions. Article XTV(a) provides for the exemption of any 
measures to the GATS discipline deemed necessary "to protect public m orals 
or to maintain public order" (GATT, 1994b, p. 339); Article XTV(b) provides for 
the protection of "hum an, animal or plant life or health" (ibid); and Article 
XIV(c) provides, inter alia, for the "prevention of deceptive and fraudulen t 
practices" and the protection of privacy and safety (ibid). Article XlV(bis),
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national treatm ent of levy and subsidy systems. France also encouraged 
linkages between the audiovisual sector talks and maritime transport services 
and geographic indications related to wines. The aggressive negotiating 
stance of the Hollywood hawks, adopted by U.S. negotiators, fuelled the  
French campaign by justifying French claims that U.S. negotiators and the  
Hollywood lobby did not respect EU cultural concerns.202
At the end of the Round, the French campaign appeared successful in that 
the EU listed several exemptions to the MFN principle in the GATS and did 
no t grant the United States national treatm ent of audiovisual levies in the  
TRIPs, although the audiovisual sector was covered under GATT-WTO rules 
and disciplines.203 However, the fact that France got most of w hat it w anted
inter alia, provides for security exceptions related to military m atters and 
fissionable and fusionable materials (p. 340). However, Article XIV also states 
that such exceptions m ust not be "applied in a m anner which w ould 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim ination betw een 
countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in  
services" (GATT, 1994b, p. 339).
202A senior Hollywood executive commented: "We continued to tu rn  people 
against us. We even turned European film producers, who norm ally w ork 
w ith us and depend on our money, against us" (interview w ith author, 30 
Novem ber 1995).
203A common misperception at the end of the Round was that France had  
succeeded in 'excluding' the audiovisual sector from the GATT-WTO 
agreement. However, the 'cultural exception' means that the audiovisual 
sector is covered, along with all other services sectors, by the GATT-WTO 
regime, which, inter alia, requires further negotiations w ithin five years of 
the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement pursuant to Article XDC(l) 
on progressive liberalisation (GATT, 1994b, p. 343), and Members m ust m eet 
the transparency requirements of Article III(l), which states in part that "Each 
Member shall publish promptly and, except in emergency situations, at the 
latest by the time of their entry into force, all relevant measures of general 
application which pertain to or affect the operation of this Agreement" (p. 
329). In essence, the 'exception' pertains to die EU having made no specific 
com m itm ents to market liberalisation in the GATS on audiovisual services
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does not mean the French governm ent dictated the outcome of the 
audiovisual sector talks.204 In this chapter I use Putnam 's (1988 [1993]) two- 
level analysis to challenge this notion and to argue that France was more of a 
gadfly than a dictator during the talks. While highly effective in terms of 
arousing nationalistic sentim ent and providing the media w ith  interesting 
news on the Round, the French delegation's campaign to dictate the talks was 
in  fact unsuccessful. At the same time, the Commission's ow n campaign to 
m ake comm itm ents on audiovisual services succeeded up  until the final 
hours of the Round, when the hawkish element of the Hollywood lobby 
deem ed the EU's final offer unsatisfactory and set off a chain reaction that 
prevented a U.S./EU bilateral agreement on audiovisual services and IPRs 
related to copyright. To balance the micro power struggle w ithin the 
Hollywood lobby discussed in the previous chapter, I examine a macro pow er 
struggle among EU Member States that pitted France, backed by Belgium and 
Portugal, against the more liberal EU Member States in the 113 Services 
Com mittee to control Sir Leon Brittan's negotiating m andate and, therefore, 
the course of the audiovisual sector talks.
French Audiovisual Policy: Strictest in  the EU
Collins (1992) argues that France has a national 'foreign policy' for 
television that has influenced Europe's policy agenda. France has set a 
domestic example of market developm ent and intervention in the nam e of 
cultural sovereignty — an example it expects other Member States to
and national treatment of copyright in the TRIPs.
204Ambassador Paemen notes that the French governm ent really w on a 
partial victory because the French governm ent w anted no coverage 
whatsoever of cultural issues.
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em ulate.205 Cultural protection and control over communications in France 
can be traced back to 1539 and the Villiers-Cotterets edict requiring the use of 
the French language, a m easure less designed to protect language and m ore  
designed to enable the French state to spy on its subjects (Financial Times, 5 
February 1996, p. 7). Findahl (1989) traces French concerns over culture back 
to 1637 and the founding of the Academie Francaise, arbiter of the French 
language. In 1975 the French Parliament passed the Bas-Lauriol Act 
prohibiting gratuitous use of anglicisms (p. 138). Thody's (1995) study of 'le 
franglais'206 and historical efforts by the French governm ent to legislate
205Contrast the French experience with the Television Directive w ith a 
constitutional challenge to the Directive in Germany, which takes a m ore  
liberal approach to audiovisual issues. On 22 March 1995, the G erm an 
Federal Constitutional Court ruled on a dispute between the Free State of 
Bavaria, joined by eight other Lander (roughly equivalent to U.S. states) and 
the Germ an Federation over the Television Directive (German Federal 
Constitutional Court, 22 March 1995, p. 57). According to the European 
A udiovisual Observatory, the question first brought before the Court in 1989 
was w hether the Federal Governm ent's endorsem ent of the Directive had 
infringed the Landers' constitutional jurisdiction over broadcasting (IRIS 
Legal Observations, 1995, p. 7). The Court ruled that the Federal 
G overnm ent's endorsem ent of the Directive could not be questioned un d er 
G erm an constitutional law, but that the way in which the Federal 
G overnm ent endorsed the Directive overstepped its legal right to speak on  
behalf of the Lander w ithout prior consultation. According to M arie-Therese 
H uppertz, liaison officer for Bertelsmann, the Lander believed they alone had 
the right to decide w hether to apply the Directive's provisions (Interview  
w ith  author, 12 April 1996). The Lander argued that broadcasting is a form of 
culture and that as a result, the Federal Governm ent had gone against their 
interests by negotiating w ith the EU without taking their views into account. 
The Court decided that while the EU had competence to develop directives, 
the Lander have exclusive jurisdiction over im plem enting them, and that 
the Federal governm ent had gone against the Landers' interests by 
negotiating w ith the EU w ithout first creating unanim ity at home.
206Thody writes: "'franglais' words are anglicisims and americanisms w hich 
are still visibly recognisable as such, terms which are as clearly foreign in  
origin as 'joie de vivre' or 'folie des grandeurs' are in English" (1995, p. 1).
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against the use of such words points out that "it is only in relation to the 
audio-visual m edia that English or American words occur w ith any 
frequency in French in an artistic or cultural context" (p. 31).207
France m aintains the highest quotas on television program m ing in the  
world; Sri Lanka and Canada are the only other countries w ith quotas h igher 
than 51 percent (MPEAA et al, 1994, p. 5).208 The Conseil Superieur de 
L'Audiovisuel, France's preem inent audiovisual regulatory agency, has
207Thody (1995) argues that "the law is not the most appropriate in stru m en t 
for dealing w ith the matter, and that languages have their own means of 
solving their problem s w ithout state intervention. It may also be that it is as 
dangerous to m eddle with the mechanisms whereby a language develops as it 
is to interfere w ith  the process of genetic inheritance" (p. 20). H ow ever, 
Thody also comments: "Native speakers of French who are sensitive to the  
beauties of their language may well be right to feel a certain hostility towards 
words which often epitomise the least attractive aspects of American and  
English society, and to be less than enthusiastic about the world of pop m usic, 
drug-taking and sexual deviance which is so frequently evoked by 'franglais' 
terms" (1995, p. 19).
208Article ID of the Directive states: "Member states can require broadcasters 
under their jurisdiction to adhere to even stricter rules in areas covered by 
the directive" (OJ L 298, 17 October 1989, p. 26). On July 1, 1992, the EU 
Commission granted permission to France to enact its own quota legislation 
after challenging several 1990 decrees that did not conform to the Directive 
(Fontanille, 1992, pp. 28-30) The 1990 decrees introduced a prim e-tim e quota 
for French and European works following a 60/50 ratio of European works 
and French works respectively, and a production tax for French and European 
productions (ibid). The French Broadcasting Act of 1992's interpretation of 
Article IV goes beyond the 'majority portion' stipulation: French TV
broadcasters are required to transm it at least 40 percent of French-language 
program m ing during both 24-hour day and prime-time slots and an 
additional 20 percent m ust be of European origin (ibid). The 1992 Act also 
gave more authority to the Conseil Superieur de L 'Audiovisuel (CSA), 
France's prim ary audiovisual regulatory body, to determine conditions for 
applying quotas during prime-time. According to the 1994 National Trade 
Estimates Report, the CSA defines 'prim e-tim e' for each netw ork on a yearly 
basis (USTR, 1994). It is the prime-time slot that most concerns the U.S. 
entertainm ent industry.
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imposed hefty fines on French cable operators for not enforcing the  
Directive.209 Thody (1995) examines efforts by Jacques Toubon, former French 
m inister for culture under the Conservative government of Edouard 
Balladur, to protect the French language w ith legislation. In April 1994, a 
French law was passed that restricts the use of foreign words in public 
comm unication. However, the French Constitutional Council, w hich  
assesses proposed legislation, limited the restrictions to public sector 
organisations, advertising and broadcast m edia, with fines levied for 
violating the 'loi Toubon' (Thody, 1995; Financial Times, 1 August 1994, p. 
2F). The French governm ent has even passed legislation to apply quotas o n  
non-French-language songs to French radio stations.210 France also has an
209In 1989, the CSA announced that broadcasters would be fined $10,000 for 
each hour they aired in violation of the quotas. The CSA imposed retroactive 
penalties on stations for airing too m uch foreign programming (USTR, 1994). 
According to the MPEAA (1993), the CSA imposed a fine of $6 m illion o n  
TF1, a major French private channel, for exceeding French quota restrictions 
by 13 hours (MPEAA, 1993, p. 9). A further example of arm-twisting can be 
found in a CSA news release to French cable operators. The CSA states that it 
has been approached by several editors of foreign programmes w ishing to 
conclude die agreements for distribution on the French cable service of 
television services broadcast by satellite from EU member states, some of 
which had not yet incorporated the Television Directive into their na tional 
legislation. The CSA adds that because of a 30 September 1986 French law, the  
Council cannot sanction the distribution agreements until the satellite 
services in the EU member states abide by the Directive. "The Council w ould  
advise French cable network operators to guard against broadcasting services 
which have not concluded agreements w ith the CSA, since such action w ill 
incur penalties" (CSA News Release, 7 September 1993, Com m unique No. 
242).
210On 1 January 1996, a French law known as the Pelchat Am endm ent, took 
effect requiring almost all of France's roughly 1,700 public and private radio 
stations to play a minimum of 40 percent of French songs during prim e-tim e, 
half of which m ust be either new French tunes or French tunes "interpreted 
by new French or Francophone singers" (USTR, 1994, p. 75 and Financial 
Times, 5 February 1996, p. 7). The definition of a French song is "variety 
m usic' w ritten or interpreted by French or Francophone writers and artists"
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extensive array of levy and subsidy systems for its audiovisual sector.211 
W hen compared to other levy systems for private copying th roughou t 
Eastern and W estern Europe, France's system generates revenues in a ratio of 
roughly 10:1; Germany's system generates a close second (Stichting de 
Thuiskopie, 1997, p. 7).212 In 1990, France allocated more money (ECU 268 
million or circa $243 million at exchange rate of ECU 1.1 per dollar [July 1998]) 
to its national program m ing than the EU did for the whole of its five year 
program m e to prom ote the development of the European audiovisual 
industry (MEDIA I) (ECU 250 million or circa $227 million) (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1994b, p. 28).
(USTR, 1994, p. 75). The USTR (1994) estimates that the music quotas w ill 
reduce the 'play time' of American music by 30 percent (ibid).
211The French audiovisual sector benefits from a range of direct and indirect 
aid schemes updated by the Cinema Plan of February 1989 (Dibie, 1993, p. 45). 
Schemes for aiding film production include automatic production subsidies 
derived from film box-office receipts, and selective subsidies allocated w ith  
"cultural and artistic rather than economic objectives" by 'specialist' 
committees, including the Commission des Avances sur Recettes, w hich  
provides 'advances on receipts' in the form of interest-free loans (Dibie, 1993, 
p. 44). Additional committees allocate subsidies for script-writing, film  
developm ent, original music and international co-production. There are also 
aid schemes for film distribution, exhibition, technical industries and foreign 
export. In 1993 France amended its state subsidy program m e to include v ideo  
sales and rentals and to add an additional FFr 25 m illion a year (circa $4 
m illion at exchange rate of 6 francs per dollar [July 1998]) for the French film  
industry (European Union Press Release, 30 June 1993).
212From 1991 to 1995, France's levy system on private copying alone generated 
an average of FFr732 million (circa $122 million at exchange rate of six francs 
per dollar [July 1998]), while Germany's system generated an average of 
DM136 million (circa $80 m illion at exchange rate of 1.7 DMs per dollar [July
1998]) (Stichting de Thuiskopie, 1997, p. 7). It is interesting to note that w hile  
Germany is considered a free-trader as far as the Television Directive is 
concerned, it still has one of the more lucrative levy systems in Europe.
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However, several scholars have taken a more cynical view of France's 
preoccupation w ith protecting its audiovisual sector. On French aud iov isual 
policy during the 1980s, Dyson and Hum phreys (1988) write that the Socialists
sought regulatory protection for the French 'cu ltu ral 
industries' from excessive foreign com petition 
and...protection for French culture itself. They presented 
cultural arguments for im port quotas and o ther 
regulations in order to safeguard broadcasting standards 
and to ensure that the new m edia led to a 'controlled 
deregulation' and not to 'broadcasting anarchy' (p. 115).
Thom pson (1985) notes that historically "the French governm ent was little 
inclined to support the film industry in general; there were constant 
complaints through the 20s of high ticket-taxes and government indifference" 
(p. 126). According to the Washington Post, during the 1980s the Socialist 
governm ent poured $15 billion into the arts — an unprecedented sum  for 
any state support (16 June 1995, p. Bl). However, the Post argues that the 
ultim ate aim was not to boost the arts but to w in elections. The Socialists 
have increased subsidies to filmmakers, curbed the growth of the French 
video industry and fought a 'veritable crusade' against U.S. cu ltural 
im perialism  in return for support from the elite caste of French directors 
know n as 'auteur directors,' who have helped to 'rejuvenate and glam orise' 
the Socialist Party.213 In his examination of the French governm ent-film  
industry relationship from the early part of this century, Tacchella (1995) 
argues that not until 1993 and the battle for the 'cultural exception' in the
213Messerlin (1997) comments on the link between the audiovisual sector and 
politics in France: "French subsidies granted between 1978 and 1994 reached 
strong peaks in 1978,1981,1986 and 1988, which were all years characterised by 
major elections. It would be interesting to check w hether the sam e 
phenomenon exists in other EC countries" (p. 9).
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U ruguay Round had French filmmakers and politicians joined forces to 
prom ote the French film industry.
UIP Scapegoat
The French delegation's public opinion campaign to secure the cultural 
exception began in earnest in September 1993 w ith a series of speeches by 
French officials at film festivals throughout Europe. The focal point of the  
cam paign was the success of the 'blockbuster' U.S. film Jurassic Park and the 
film 's distribution company, United International Pictures (UIP).214 In July 
1993, just six m onths before the 15 December deadline for the conclusion of 
the U ruguay Round, UIP's European antitrust exemption expired.215 UIP
214United International Pictures was formed under N etherlands law in 1981 
by Param ount Pictures Corporation, MCA Inc. and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Film Co. to distribute and license on an exclusive basis feature films, short 
subjects and trailers produced by the parent companies (OJ L 226, 12 July 1989, 
pp. 25-26). The purpose of forming UIP was to reduce fixed overhead 
expenses (p. 27). UIP had not been the first company to represent exclusively 
a group of U.S. studios in Europe. In 1970, Paramount and MCA founded G C 
to jointly distribute their films outside the US; in 1973 Q C  became the 
exclusive agent for the two studios. The Commission notes that for eight 
years, G C  therefore did for Param ount and MCA w hat UIP does for 
Param ount, MCA and M GM /UA (p. 26).
215Article 85(1) of the Treaty of the European Economic Com m unity prohibits 
any collaborative activity by more than one company that "affects trade 
between M ember States" by "the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
com petition w ithin the common market" (OJ C 224, 31 August 1992, p. 28). 
However, Article 85(3) states that an antitrust exemption can be granted if the 
collaborative activity contributes "to im proving the production or 
distribution of goods or to prom oting technical or economic progress, w hile 
allowing consum ers a fair share of the resulting benefit" (ibid). In July 1989, 
the Com m ission granted UIP an antitrust exemption, citing as benefits to 
consum ers an increase in film availability and production in the 
Com m unity, a result of the efficiency enjoyed by UIP and its partners in  
avoiding duplication of distribution (Hollywood Reporter, 18 July 1989, p. 31). 
The exem ption was backdated to July 1988 and rem ained in effect until July 
1993. At some point in July 1993, UIP filed an application w ith Directorate- 
General IV, the Commission department responsible for competition, for
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became a lightning rod particularly for the French and Portuguese 
delegations, which used UIP's antitrust expiration and the success of Jurassic 
Park as a way of highlighting the 'dinosaur-like' presence of the U.S. film  
industry in Europe.216
Mr. Toubon, speaking at the Deauville Film Festival of U.S. cinema in  
September 1993, declared that Jurassic Park "threatens the French culture; 
w ith 450 copies, it will take over one cinema out of every five in towns w ith  
less than  20,000 inhabitants" (Liberation, 14 September 1993, p. 42). Toubon 
concluded his speech by saying: "We like the Americans provided that they 
do not w ant to crush everything" (ibid). At Venice Film Festival in the sam e 
m onth, Mr. Toubon and Jack Lang, former m inister of culture, issued their 
'Venice Declaration,' which announced the creation of a 'W orld Film  
Directors Union' for the protection of copyright. Mr. Toubon and Mr. Lang 
said: "American works occupy 80 percent of European screens w hile
European works occupy 1 percent of American screens: where is the
protectionism?" (Le Film Francais, 17 September 1993, p. 9).
renewal of its exemption regarding its theatrical film operations (UIP News 
Release, 20 July 1992, p. 2). However, earlier the same day the C om m ission 
had announced its intentions to probe UIP's pay television operations for 
possible violations of Com munity competition law pursuant to Article 85. 
Chi 19 Novem ber 1993, the European Parliament adopted a non-binding 
resolution that called upon the Commission not to renew UIP's exem ption 
(European Parliament Resolution B3-1639/93).
216A week before the conclusion of the Round, the New York Times pu t it 
this way: "A wide variety of French resentm ents and doubts have coalesced 
around a dark vision of Hollywood's dinosaurs gobbling up the last vestiges 
of cultural independence in Europe" (8 December 1993, p. 1).
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Just as the U.S. film industry had met w ith President Clinton, so French 
film executives lobbied President Francois M itterrand at the Elysee and had  
been assured of his support {he Film Francais, 17 September 1993). The 
French Minister of European Affairs, Alain Lamassoure, met w ith m em bers 
of L'ARP, to whom  he gave his support (ibid). A nd Alain Carignon, French 
m inister for communications, accompanied a delegation of French actors to 
Strasbourg to lobby the European Parliament. On the 15th of September, 
Ambassador Miyet went before the European Parliam ent to rem ind MEPs 
that in 1992 the European Commission had tabled a proposal to include a 
'cultural exception' in Article XIX of the Draft Final Act of the GATT 
(Waregne, 1994, p. 35). Ambassador Miyet commented: "This proposal
w ouldn 't have been supported by others involved in negotiations and was 
therefore dismissed by the GATT Secretariat. We have returned to that 
position" (ibid). A lthough the European Parliam ent had been in favour of a 
'cultural specificity' annex, on 30 September they chose instead the principle 
of the cultural exception (ibid). On 20 September in Brussels, at a m eeting of 
European foreign affairs m inisters in Brussels, Alain Juppe, then French 
foreign minister, defended the 'cultural exception' (he Film Francais, 17
September 1993).
On 17 September Turner Broadcasting launched TNT Classic Movies and 
the Cartoon Network in eight European languages; both networks were based 
in London. On 23 September, Reuters reported that Commissioner Joao de 
Deus Pinheiro, a former Portuguese foreign m inister, who was head of DG-X 
during the Round, had sent a letter to the British governm ent w arning that 
its decision to grant Ted Turner's TNT and Cartoon Channel a license m ight 
violate the Television Directive (Reuters, 23 September 1992). France and
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Belgium had banned cable transmission of Turner's network because it did 
not comply w ith quotas on European programming. Reuters also notes that 
the letter coincided w ith French lobbying efforts to influence the GATT talks 
(ibid). In Novem ber Prime Minister Edouard Balladur w ould prom ise 
French film stars and directors that he w ould defend French culture w ith  a 
'cultural exem ption' (Reuters, 17 November 1993).
French Press Reaction: 'Aggressive Chauvinism '
Liberation notes that "it is not completely by chance either that the bullets 
are whistling around the head of United International Pictures" (14 
September 1993, p. 42). The paper traces the targeting of UIP back to Mr. 
Antonio Pedro Vasconcelos, who, in Beaune the previous year had protested 
against the dom inant position of UIP in his native country, Portugal. Mr. 
Vasconcelos, chairm an of the Commission's audiovisual Think Tank and a 
Portuguese TV and cinema producer, reported to Commissioner Pinheiro in  
DG-X. Indeed, Portuguese distributors claimed that UIP controlled 75 percent 
of the distribution market in Portugal (Hollywood Reporter, 9 July 1993, p.
10).
The French press criticised the French governm ent for scapegoating the 
U.S. film industry rather than addressing the true problem w ith the French 
cinema: French films.217 Le Point describes the source of fear of the French
217A study by the Economics and Finance Ministry of France argues that the 
traditional scapegoat for the crisis in the French film industry is the U nited 
States. However, the real reason for the crisis is that the supply of French 
films is poorly adapted to dem and (Cluzel and Cerutti, 1992). The au thors 
write: "French movies offer neither the themes nor, according to some, the 
faces that respond to the expectations of an increasingly younger public.... The 
American film industry, meanwhile, has filled this very niche of adventure, 
action, comedy, science-fiction and anim ated movies for the past ten years
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Government over the fate of the country's cinema and TV industry as "a very 
simple diptych: a real crisis, an im proper campaign" (18 September 1993, p. 
47). Le Figaro queried: "Was it necessary for the world of the French cinem a 
to sink into aggressive chauvinism  and lose its cool to the point of 
denouncing once and for all 'American cultural imperialism '? Frankly, I 
don 't think so" (24 September 1993, p. 2). The paper points out 'tw o 
embarrassing truths': that the French cinema industry is based on small-scale 
production and the U.S. industry is not; and that the French film is 'typically 
French' — "m ore talk than action and the angst in them  takes the place of 
intrigue" (ibid). Furthermore, Le Nouvel Observateur challenges Mr. 
Toubon's assertion that numerous copies of Jurassic Park hu rt French culture 
by noting that the Centre National de la Cinematographie (CNC) takes a 
percentage of the film's receipts and allocates it to French cinem a.218 
M oreover, the paper states that Daniel Goldman, head of UIP's French 
company, often receives requests from the French authorities to obtain m ore 
copies of successful U.S. films to boost the production fund (23-29 Septem ber
w ith conspicuous success" (1992, p. 11). However, compared w ith the film  
industries of other European countries, the French industry is the only one 
that can be considered 'a significant force.' Cluzel and Cerutti (1992) write: 
"In other European countries, attendance at domestic films ranged in 1991 
from 5.5% of total cinema attendance (UK) to 24% (Italy), and broadcasting of 
domestic films on television channels is even rarer, given that o ther 
European countries' broadcasting quotas, for the most part based on the EU 
directive 'Television sans frontieres'..., are less stringent than in France" (p. 
9).
218This point is punctuated by Daniel Toscan de Plantier, president of 
Unifrance, the French film lobby: "We receive 100 percent of the [foreign film  
tax] and US movies account for 57 percent of the box-office return , so 
Hollywood supports us. What is good for France is not good for the U nited 
States and other countries" (New York Times, 8 December 1993, p. 1). 
According to the Times, the French foreign film tax amounts to 11 percent on  
a ticket (ibid).
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1993, p. 62). [See Appendix B for the post-Round war of words between DG-X 
and UIP set off by inaccurate news reports.]
M yth of M ons
The French campaign's m ain political event was an informal C ultural 
Affairs Council meeting, arranged by the Belgian presidency of the Council,219 
held during the first weekend of October 1993 in Mons, Belgium. A t the  
m eeting's conclusion, cultural affairs ministers issued the 'M ons D eclaration/ 
a set of principles aimed at excluding Europe's audiovisual sector from the 
GATT-WTO regime.220 At the same time, the Commission had been
219The fact that the informal meeting of cultural affairs ministers took place 
in Belgium is significant for two reasons: first, French is one of Belgium 's 
official languages, and Belgian cultural and political elites have custom arily 
been draw n from the francophone population; second, and more im portantly  
from a procedural point of view, from July 1993 to January 1994 Belgium 's 
Premier Jean-Luc Dehaene was president of the Council of die EU; therefore, 
one of the committees he presided over was the 113 Services Committee.
220The Conclusions of the Presidency (Mons, 5 October 1993) states: "The 
audiovisual sector is the most powerful instrument of culture of our century. 
It emerges from the discussions of the Audiovisual Ministers of the European 
Com m unity the unanim ous conviction that Europe m ust be able to support 
and develop the creation of the Audiovisual Industry" (Vasconcelos, 1994, p. 
41). Cultural affairs m inisters developed the following six principles in  
Mons:
• MFN exemptions for all support schemes to the audiovisual sector, both at 
Com munity and Member States level.
• M aintaining and protecting public support and operating subsidies, both at 
Community and Member States levels, when considered appropriate.
• M aintaining the ability to regulate existing and future technologies and 
audiovisual programmes transm ission techniques, for the Com m unity and 
its Member States.
• Maintaining the freedom of the Community and Member States to develop 
in the future all policies and m easures aimed at supporting all aspects of the 
audiovisual sector, in particular creation, production, transm ission, 
broadcasting, distribution and exploitation.
• The audiovisual sector not to be subjected to the principle of increm ental
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conducting its own campaign for a 'cultural specificity' to cover the  
audiovisual sector under the GATS and to schedule audiovisual services 
commitments on m arket access an d /o r national treatment.221 Mr. Falkenberg 
noted that a primary goal of the Commission was to protect Europe from  
unilateral trade pressure by placing the audiovisual sector under the GATT 
regime. Indeed, this was one of the EU's fundam ental objectives in the  
Round (Reflection Paper, 1993, p. 2).
Dehousse and Havelange (1994) and Joachimowicz and Berenboom (1994) 
focus on the informal m eeting of Cultural Affairs Ministers in Mons as the  
pivotal moment in the audiovisual sector negotiations when, ostensibly, all 
EU Member States set strict negotiating guidelines for the Com mission to 
protect the audiovisual sector.222 However, in Chapter 2 it was noted that the
progressive liberalization as defined under Article XIX of the draft 
Agreem ent.
• Maintaining the 'acquis com m unautaire/ first of all and as a m inim um  the 
effective im plem entation of the 'Television W ithout Frontiers' Directive 
provisions (Inside U.S. Trade, 15 October 1993, pp. 18-19).
221The cultural specificity would have placed language in Article XIX 
(progressive liberalisation) of the GATS, acknowledging the special nature of 
the audiovisual sector by protecting against unconditional 'roll-back,' bu t 
allowing commitments to market access an d /o r national treatm ent to be 
m ade (Reflection Paper, 1993, pp. 3-4). Article XIX(l) states in part that fu ture  
negotiations "shall be directed to the reduction or elim ination of the adverse 
effects on trade in services of measures as a means of providing effective 
m arket access. This process shall take place w ith a view to prom oting the 
interests of all participants on a m utually advantageous basis and to securing 
an overall balance of rights and obligations" (GATT, 1994b, p. 343).
^D ehousse  and Havelange write: "Les conclusions de ce Seminaire reveten t 
une double importance. Les objectifs com m unautaires ont ete enfin  
clairement definis et un  consensus europeen se dessinait, faisant passer au 
second plan le debat de principe entre l'exception et la specificite" (1994, p. 
123). ["The conclusions of this Seminar take on a double importance. The 
Com munity objectives had at last been clearly defined, and a European
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General Affairs Council had the final say on trade negotiations in the  
Uruguay Round, and that all other Councils could only offer opinions in  
their official capacity. The scholars do not discuss the General Affairs Council 
meeting held in Luxembourg on the same weekend as the Mons meeting (4-5 
October) in which foreign affairs m inisters voted in fa vo u r  of allowing the  
Commission to draft an offer on m arket access to present to U.S. negotiators, 
albeit com m itm ents deemed by the General Affairs Council as 'defensive' in  
nature (Draft M inutes of General Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 4-5  
Oct. 1993).
W hat France could not achieve pursuant to EU protocol in the G eneral 
Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg it heralded as a fait accompli in  
Belgium that same weekend w ith the Mons Declaration that purportedly 
m eant that the Cultural Affairs Council backed French efforts to protect 
Europe's audiovisual sector. However, in the General Affairs m eeting, 
m inisters voted 10-2 in favour of letting the Com mission craft an  
audiovisual services offer w ith com m itm ents to present to the USTR. Two 
Member States expressed reservations: France and Spain223 (Draft M inutes of
consensus was forming which p u t the debate about the exception and the  
specificity in the background."] Similarly, Joachimowitz and Berenboom  
write: "Mais la position des Europeens s'est durcie au fur et a mesure qu 'on  
s'approchait du terme des negotiations. Reunis a Mons le 5 octobre 1993, les 
m inistres europeens de l'A udiovisuel on adopte une position com m une...." 
(1994, p. 111). ["But the European position grew tougher as the end of the  
negotiations grew nearer. Joined in Mons on 5 October 1993, European 
Audiovisual Ministers adopted a common position...."]
^R ecall that these were the two Member States m entioned by the DG-X 
official in Chapter 6 as particularly anti-American in the Uruguay R ound 
audiovisual sector talks and therefore the U.S. governm ent's focus in post- 
Round bilateral negotiations.
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General Affairs Council Meeting, Luxembourg, 4-5 Oct. 1993). Am bassador 
Miyet adm its that the Luxembourg meeting gave the Commission a green 
light to negotiate (interview with author, 23 April 1996). However, as the 
leader of the French campaign to exclude the audiovisual sector from the 
Round, he also argued that the Mons Declaration curbed Sir Leon's ability to 
negotiate. Karl Falkenberg responded that EU protocol rendered the M ons 
Declaration irrelevant.224
Indeed, the Belgian delegation appears to have breached EU protocol by 
organising and participating in the Mons meeting. According to the Council 
of the EU's General Secretariat, each Council presidency, held for six m onths, 
m ay organise informal m inisterial meetings: "The aim of the inform al
m eetings is to consider jointly and exchange ideas on topics of a general 
scope" (General Secretariat, Vol. II, 1996, p. 6). However, the Secretariat adds:
They are not Council meetings and cannot replace the 
Council's activities. In order to preserve their inform al 
character, there is no agenda and the discussions cannot 
give rise to the drawing-up of documents prior to or after 
the meeting. Informal meetings obviously cannot adopt 
decisions in spheres falling within the field of competence  
of the institutions, under the Treaties (italics added for 
emphasis) (ibid).
^ M r . Falkenberg quipped: "Every now and then, one has situations like in  
Mons, w here at the cultural ministers level there was more willingness to 
have an open ear to lim itations for cultural reasons then the same M em ber 
States felt was necessary at General Affairs level. Throughout the 
negotiations we had the possibility to negotiate based on the General Affairs 
Council's guidelines, and the French, despite all their efforts, never m anaged 
to block us in the process" (interview with author, 18 April 1997).
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In a separate Secretariat document can be found the following passage on the 
presidency: "The Presidency must, by definition be neutral and impartial. It 
is the m oderator for discussions and cannot therefore favour either its ow n 
preferences or those of a particular Member State" (General Secretariat, Vol. I, 
1996, p. 5). Therefore, the Mons Declaration was a violation of Council rules, 
as w as the Belgian presidency's involvement in the event.
Chem istry in the General Affairs Council
Earlier I noted that EU Member States had formed two groups in the 
developm ent of the Television Directive: the free-traders and the
protectionists. According to David Hollister, Mr. Heaton's deputy during the 
Round, EU Member States that had originally been very keen on the 
Television Directive when it was developed in the late 1980s continued to be 
so during the Uruguay Round (interview with author, 11 April 1997).225 He 
recalls a clear line between Member States in the 113 Services Committee that 
had originally supported the Television Directive (France, Spain, Italy,
^ M em b er States have implemented the Television Directive according to 
their roles as free-traders or interventionists. For example, the 1993 A nnua l 
Report of the U.S. President notes that Member States' im plem entation of the 
Directive varies considerably. Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the UK have incorporated "where practicable" in to  
their ow n legislation (p. 75). Moreover, the Commission's analysis of the 
EU's application of Articles 4 and 5 concludes that compliance am ong 
Member States is overall on an 'upw ard trend,' but the 'where practicable' and 
'progressively7 language is problematic (Commission of the European 
Com m unities, 1994a). The Commission, not surprisingly, found strict 
compliance among French broadcasters, but not among UK broadcasters, 
particularly satellite channels. A recent report on Member State compliance 
raised concerns over the differing methodology used to show adherence to 
the Directive, as well as technical and legal problems that complicate the 
Com mission's monitoring task (Commission of the European C om m unities, 
1995a).
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Portugal) — what Mr. Heaton calls 'Club M ed' — and those that took a m ore 
liberal view towards the audiovisual sector (Britain, Germany, D enm ark, 
Holland) (interview w ith author, 11 April 1997).226 However, if one takes 
into consideration Mr. Andriessen's earlier comments regarding the 
frustration of EU M editerranean Member States over the Blair H ouse 
agreement, one m ust add  a N orth /South  division over agricultural reform to 
the division over the Television Directive. Nevertheless, the free-traders 
appeared to be in the majority in the October 1993 General Affairs Council 
m eeting in Luxembourg (Draft Minutes of General Affairs Council M eeting, 
Luxembourg, 4-5 Oct. 1993).227
^ E v e n  w ithin the European Commission, the Directorates responsible for 
aspects of audiovisual policy differ on the appropriate level of in terven tion . 
According to Mr. Scheele, during the Uruguay Round DG-X and C om m ission 
President Delors' Cabinet represented the interventionists, while DG-I, DG- 
Xm and DG-XV were the free-traders (interview w ith author, 17 April 1997). 
In 1994, during a similar abortive effort by the European Commission to 
propose tighter quota language in the Television Directive, the French 
newspaper Le M onde  (29 December 1994, p. 9) published an intercepted 
com m unique between officials of the MPA on the potential of such changes 
coming to fruition. The communique is im portant not only because it show s 
the thoroughness and intensity of the MPA foreign operation, but because it 
shows the support m any Commission officials had for the lobby's objectives. 
Indeed, the com m unique indicates that DG-I and DG-XV officials were 
sympathetic to the MPA's goals, as several MPA officials and film executives 
estimate the likelihood of the Directive not being changed based on  
inform ation from inform ants w ithin the directorates themselves. In 1996, 
efforts by the European Parliam ent failed to remove the 'w here practicable' 
loophole in the Television Directive, making the content quota (51 percent 
European works) nonbinding.
^ C o llin s  (1998) writes: "La France s'est ainsi efforcee de traduire dans le 
cadre de l'Union europeenne ses politiques interieures bien etablies de quotas 
et d 'aide a la production. Elle a defendu le program m e MEDIA, a fait inserer 
un  quota de diffusion d'oeuvres europeennes dans la directive de 1989 (article 
4) et a regulierement, quoique jusqu'ici sans succes, tente d'obtenir des quotas 
plus im portants dans une nouvelle directive Television sans frontieres" (p. 
142). ["France sought to translate into a European Union context its well 
established domestic policies of quotas and production support. It established
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However, the chemistry in the General Affairs Council related to the issue 
of national treatm ent of audiovisual levies was far from split, as EU M em ber 
States showed solidarity against the United States. A prim ary reasons for the  
solidarity was the different approaches taken by the EU and United States to 
IPRs w ithin  the audiovisual sector. Dr. iur. Jorg Reinbothe comm ented tha t 
in Europe the emphasis is on protecting performers' rights, while in the U.S. 
the concern is w ith producers' rights (interview with author, 28 N ovem ber 
1 9 9 5 ) 228 Verstrynge (1993) notes that the two approaches dictate the way each
the MEDIA program m e and inserted a European content quota (Article 4) 
into the 1989 Directive and has consistently, but thus far unsuccessfully, 
sought stronger quotas in a new Television w ithout Frontiers Directive."] 
The developm ent of the directive highlights the lobbying muscle of the  
French delegation, yet it more im portantly shows the influence of m ore  
liberal M ember States on the French position. The Los Angeles T im es  
reported that on 13 March 1989, Edith Cresson, then French Minister for 
European Affairs, backed down from her dem ands to make the Directive 
binding by  acquiescing to the insertion of the words 'where practicable' and 'by 
appropriate m eans' as well as 'progressively' in Articles IV and V. M inister 
Cresson comm ented that France was totally isolated on the m atter (12 A pril 
1989, part 6, p. 1). One month later, a 'common position' on the Directive was 
reached among the Council of Ministers, which included the 'watering dow n' 
of the French-led quotas on European programming. Instead of being bound  
by the 60 percent quota on European origin programmes, advocated by France, 
Member States were given flexibility to im plem ent a 'majority proportion ' of 
broadcast transmission time 'w here practicable' and 'by appropriate m eans' as 
well as 'progressively' (House of Representatives, 1989c, p. 8). In early 
October, the Council voted 10:2 in favour of the non-binding directive — 
Belgium and Denmark were the two dissenting nations. According to the 
New York Times, Denmark, the Netherlands, Britain and W. G erm any 
pressured France to accept the 'majority proportion' quota and the n o n ­
binding language in Articles IV and V (4 October 1989, pp. A l, D20).
228Dr. Reinbothe commented: "Our legal tradition and practice call for the
protection of performing artists' rights. In the U.S., the producer is considered 
to be the author of the film or work; there is no other author; o ther 
contributors, such as screenwriters, actors, etc., get there payment for services, 
bu t have no other rights in the marketing, modification and financial 
exploitation of the film. Risk is on the producer in the U.S. In Europe an
189
country applies the principle of national treatm ent of rightsholders w hen  
distributing revenue from audiovisual levies. According to Mr. Turkewitz, 
EU M ember States were primarily focused on the outflow of m oney from the 
levies and did not w ant a broad national treatm ent provision in the TRIPs 
that proscribed their ability to allocate revenue as they saw fit (interview w ith  
author, 12 June 1997). Mr. Turkewitz added that because the United States 
was not a member of the 1961 Rome Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, th is 
gave EU Member States an excuse not to give U.S. entities their full share of 
revenue from the levies.229
Nevertheless, according to Mr. H annu Wager, legal affairs officer for 
TRIPs at the WTO, the EU politically linked issues in the GATS and TRIPs 
together, meaning that although the Television Directive's quotas technically 
fell under the jurisdiction of the GATS, and the issues of levies and subsidies
audiovisual work has all sorts of rights holders — sometimes m ore than 10 to 
20 groups of rightsholders involved in a film (interview w ith  author, 28 
Novem ber 1995).
^ P o r te r  (1991) notes that the 1961 Rome Convention for the Protection of 
Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations 
extends intellectual property protection to 'neighbouring rights,' while the 
1908 Berlin Act revised the Berne Convention to protect authors of works 
reproduced by photography, sound recording and cinematography. 
Reichman (1995) comments: "International protection of so-called
neighboring rights often leaves foreign rights holders to the vagaries of 
domestic laws and at the mercy of residual conditions of m aterial reciprocity" 
(pp. 364-65). According to Porter (1991), the Rome C onvention 's
"inconsistent, and sometimes arbitrary, provisions" stem from three fears of 
authors: that protection of neighbouring rights might take precedent over 
authors' rights in some countries; that the right of a perform er to refuse the  
broadcast or recording of a work m ight supersede the right of an  author to do 
the same; and that authors might receive fewer royalty payments as a result of 
sharing w ith performers (p. 17).
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fell under the TRIPs, the EU treated audiovisual services and IPRs related to 
copyright as a package (interview with author, 13 September 1996). Mr. 
Turkew itz concurs, noting that the audiovisual aspects of both agreem ents 
became part of a 'political package' in the final m onths of the Round, despite 
the GATS and TRIPs having been treated separately throughout most of the  
R ound 's seven-year period (interview with author, 12 June 1997).
PART II 
— LEVEL I ANALYSIS —
BATTLE OVER SIR LEON'S NEGOTIATING MANDATE
From the last week in November 1993 to the end of the R ound, 
Am bassador Kantor and Sir Leon Brittan m et several times to discuss a 
variety of sectoral issues including audiovisual. Sir Leon continued to 
negotiate in consultation w ith the 113 Services Committee pursuant to the  
cultural specificity drafted by DG-I. However, in the final m om ents of the 
Round, Sir Leon exceeded his negotiating m andate from the General Affairs 
Council by offering to include the Television Directive under GATS rules and 
disciplines. Ambassador Paemen commented that he and Sir Leon took a 
great risk because their negotiating instructions did not cover such an offer. 
H e added: "We were ready to go into a package where we would have  
consolidated the TV w ithout Frontiers commitments. At a certain m om ent, 
Mickey Kantor was ready to do this. And then he got the famous telephone 
call from President Clinton" (interview with author, 25 April 1997). France 
appears to have succeeded in rallying support for its protectionist cause 
am ong EU heads of state. But Mr. Falkenberg and Ambassador Paemen once
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again assert that General Affairs Council guidelines took precedent in the 
Round, even over Council meetings of heads of state. Therefore, while the 
'exceptional and separate' decree attracted headlines, it was the final General 
Affairs m eeting on 13 December that was most im portant. M oreover, 
Ambassador Paemen notes that the 'exceptional and separate' decree was 
acceptable to the Commission because it did not exclude audiovisual issues 
from the negotiations. He argues that the decree was in fact the  
Commission's specificity (interview with author, 25 April 1997). Mr. 
Falkenberg notes that w hat the Hollywood hawks ultim ately rejected was n o t 
an offer from France bu t an offer from all of the EU Member States (interview  
with author, 18 April 1997).
W hen the General Affairs Council rejected the USTR's final offer on  
audiovisual services and IPRs related to copyright, and w hen Ambassador 
Kantor, under the instruction of the Hollywood lobby, then declared that the 
United States w ould not make audiovisual com m itm ents in the GATS, the 
Commission pulled its own schedule of GATS com m itm ents and the French 
governm ent secured its victor, claiming that it had successfully dictated the 
outcome of the audiovisual sector talks. However, the prim ary influence on  
the outcome of the GATS audiovisual services talks was the haw kish 
element of the Hollywood lobby, which misjudged its influence on the U.S. 
president. In the TRIPs talks, a majority of Member States, interested in  
preserving their right to operate audiovisual levy and subsidy systems as they 
wished, dictated the outcome on IPRs related to copyright.
The Commission, led by Sir Leon and Ambassador Paemen, had battled 
through the French campaign to exclude the audiovisual sector and the
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'horse-trading' in the waning moments of the Round on audiovisual, 
maritime, financial services and civil aircraft issues; only to face U.S. 
negotiators imbued by the hawkish element of the Hollywood lobby and 
therefore unwilling to forge an agreement that, in essence, would have  
allowed Member States to be defensive in their approach to Hollywood's 
success in Europe. W hen the Hollywood lobby rejected the Com m ission's 
final offer and initially decided not to make GATS commitments, leading to a 
comedy of errors that left the Commission w ithout a schedule of its ow n, 
French Prime M inister Balladur seized the m om ent by declaring a French 
victory — that France all along would never have signed an agreement that 
jeopardised its cultural identity (Financial Times, 16 December 1993, p. 6). In  
the end, the Hollywood hawks made the greatest contribution to Mr. 
Balladur's declaration.
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION
W hy did  Hollywood lose the Uruguay Round? Jarvie's (1992) scholarship 
on the U.S. film industry's export system during the first half of this century 
turns out to be a good place to begin formulating an answer. Mine is based o n  
prim ary research completed over a three-year period, which invo lved  
gathering prim ary documents and conducting over thirty interviews w ith key 
U.S. and EU negotiators and film executives, and I conclude that Hollywood's 
loss stem m ed in part from the U.S. government placing the interests of o ther 
U.S. industrial lobbies ahead of the those of the Hollywood lobby, and in part 
from the haw ks' aggressive approach to international trade negotiations.
Despite assertions by Acheson and Maule (1989), Golding and M urdock 
(1996)230 and Mosco (1996) that the com m unication commodity is unlike any 
other commodity because of its capacity to 'affect cultural evolution,' 'organise 
images and discourses' or 'shape consciousness/ U.S. and EU negotiators 
haggled over movies and television programmes in the Uruguay Round as if 
they had no such capacity — as if they had the same m onetary and cultural 
value as crops, financial services and civil aircraft. By exam ining 
com m unication as a commodity during the Uruguay Round, Schiller's (1969
230Acheson and Maule (1989) write: "An obvious difference between program  
and goods trade is that media content directly affects cultural evo lu tion , 
assessments of domestic life, and not unim portantly in explaining policy, the  
popularity  of the incumbent governm ent" (p. 47). Golding and M urdock 
(1996) argue that while cultural industries share features in common w ith  
other areas of production, cultural goods "play a pivotal role in organizing 
the images and discourses through which people make sense of the world" (p.
11).
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[1992]) belief that U.S. media corporations dictate the U.S. governm ent's 
foreign trade agenda does not stand up. In the end, the U.S. governm ent's 
agenda for the Round placed a higher priority on commodities other th an  
com m unication.
As Jarvie's (1992) work indicates, in international trade negotiations 
involving many industry sectors, the U.S. governm ent tends to place the 
interests of other U.S. industrial lobbies ahead of the those of the Hollywood 
lobby. How did the U.S. governm ent find itself in a position of having to 
choose between satisfying the Hollywood lobby and risking the entire R ound, 
or securing gains made in other sectors and enduring the w rath  of the lobby? 
From the USTR's perspective, U.S. domestic politics involving Congress and 
the U.S. maritime transport services industry had forced the U.S. governm ent 
to protect the domestic maritime transport services sector from liberalisation. 
This, in turn, hindered efforts to satisfy the Hollywood lobby because EU 
Member States to varying degrees had forged linkages early in the R ound 
between progress in the audiovisual sector talks and progress in the m aritim e 
talks. Moreover, the signing of the Blair House agreement in Novem ber 1992 
prom pted Member States w ith strong interests in agriculture to direct their 
frustration over the agreement by backing the French governm ent against the 
United States on audiovisual services and IPRs issues. EU concessions on  
U.S. domestic anti-dum ping laws also erected an obstacle to satisfying 
Hollywood. In the TRIPs agreement, w hen the Com mission's lead IPRs 
negotiator offered to make concessions on the issue of national treatm ent of 
levies on blank tapes in return  for concessions on the use of appellations 
associated with wines, California wine-makers quickly put an end to such a 
potential trade. And, in the final hours of the Round, the 'horse-trading'
195
betw een U.S. and EU negotiators involving maritim e transport services, 
financial services, aeronautics and audiovisual services also created obstacles 
in the audiovisual sector talks. However, the USTR's choice to secure the 
Round without satisfying the Hollywood lobby should not lead one to believe 
that the Hollywood lobby was a victim of the bargaining in the G eneva 
'm arketplace.' Evidence suggests that the one truly insurm ountable obstacle 
U.S. and EU negotiators faced while trying to reach a bilateral accord o n  
audiovisual and IPRs issues was the Hollywood lobby itself.
Through Putnam 's (1988 [1993]) level II analysis of domestic influences on  
trade negotiations, a clearer picture of the relationship between the U.S. film  
industry and governm ent in Europe begins to emerge. There are really two 
relationships: one at a national or bilateral level and one at a m ultilateral or 
supranational level. Schiller (1969 [1992]) believes that U.S. m edia 
corporations have more authority than most governments, and are no longer 
dependent on the U.S. governm ent in rem oving trade barriers. This 
proposition needs to be unpacked. At the national or bilateral level, evidence 
suggests that the 'little State Departm ent' both negotiates on its ow n w ith  
governm ents and calls in the U.S. governm ent when it needs help. It is 
difficult to determ ine the film industry's success rate on its ow n versus its 
rate w ith  the help of governm ent officials. However, it is clear that U.S. 
governm ent intervention is im portant to the film industry 's overall strategy 
in individual foreign markets, particularly markets in the EU. While the U.S. 
film lobby has had success in rem oving barriers on its own on a bilateral or 
national level, even Valenti (1992) himself concedes that governm ent 
pressure from such trade weapons as Special 301 is vital to correcting m arket 
access, copyright and piracy problems. Based on Valenti's list of problem
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m arkets throughout the world, Schiller's proposition will rem ain discredited 
for some time to come. But even if the U.S. governm ent intervenes, there is 
no guarantee that political pressure will in the end make a difference, 
particularly in major industrialised markets in which the threat of reta lia tion  
tends to counter aggressive actions.
At a m ultilateral or supranational level in Europe, a relationship also 
exists between the U.S. film industry and government. On the surface, the 
relationship appears similar to the bilateral relationship: In the case of
adverse legislation such as the Television Directive, the U.S. governm en t 
will intervene on behalf of the film industry brandishing Special 301. In the  
case of the Uruguay Round talks, the governm ent will offer assurances 'from  
the highest levels' that the interests of the film industry will be met. But at 
least three constraints can be seen to work against the productivity of th is 
relationship. First, the U.S. government's treatment of the U.S. film industry  
at the end of the Round was less important than the film industry 's trea tm en t 
of the governm ent throughout the Round. Jarvie's research indicates tha t 
historically, influential Hollywood moguls tend to expect industry lobbyists 
and government officials to approach international negotiations aggressively. 
In the Uruguay Round, the aggressive style of the hawkish elem ent of the  
U.S. film lobby precluded U.S. negotiators from pursuing more subtle, 
creative approaches to trade barriers in the EU. Second, as the outcome of the  
audiovisual negotiations in the CUFTA, NAFTA and GATT suggest, the  
political influence of the U.S. film lobby is not as great as the influence of 
more powerful U.S. industries, which have the clout to set the U.S. 
governm ent's trade agenda well before actual negotiations begin. Third, as 
Guback (1969) and others have suggested, at a supranational level the EU has
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historically turned the U.S. film lobby into 'interested observers' and resisted 
U.S. pressure to remove barriers to U.S. audiovisual products.
Mosco (1996) writes that the challenge has been to locate the role of the  
state in the media industry between the extremes of either an "independent 
arbiter of a pluralistic field of pressures" or as the "instrum ental and  
dependent arm of capital" (pp. 91-92). The relationship between the U.S. film  
industry and governm ent in the Uruguay Round 'marketplace' suggests th a t 
the U.S. governm ent is a dependent arbiter of a pluralistic field of corporate 
pressures. However, despite the high profile of the Hollywood lobby during  
the Round, and President Clinton's intervention on behalf of the lobby 
during the final two days, the U.S. governm ent is less dependent on pressure 
from the U.S. media industry as it is on pressure from more pow erful 
industries such as m aritim e transport services and agriculture. In the end, 
President Clinton would not block the conclusion of the entire R ound 
because the Hollywood hawks thought he should. A nd yet Mr. Clinton, w ith  
the help of the USTR, showed a great deal of interest in the outcome of the  
audiovisual sector talks by m aking phone calls and sending follow-up letters 
to EU leaders. This suggests that the U.S. film industry was still an im portan t 
constituent of the Clinton Adm inistration because of the industry 's 
fundraising capabilities.
Indeed, by concluding the Round w ithout satisfying the Hollywood 
hawks, the Administration has begun to feel the consequences. An article in  
the Guardian notes that Hollywood donations to the Republican Party since 
the Round have increased dramatically. In 1995, 58 percent of Hollywood's 
political donations went to the GOP, an increase of 31 percent in 1993 and
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1994. Fox, MCA, MGM and Time W arner contributed more to the GOP th a n  
to the Democrats. According to Jonathan Freedland, "the shift is partly a 
punishm ent for Mr. Clinton's failure in 1994 (sic) — during the final 
negotiations of the GATT trade deal — to guarantee unlim ited access for U.S. 
films to the European market" (2 July 1996, p. 11).
The haw ks' aggressiveness fuels campaigns by protectionist countries such 
as Canada and France to remove the audiovisual sector from trade 
agreements. Their aggressiveness also portrays all members of the  
Hollywood lobby, particularly Jack Valenti, as hard-driving Americans w ho  
are insensitive to the cultural and commercial concerns of im port countries. 
M oreover, the nature of the hawks' aggressiveness is w orth exam ining 
because it ostensibly stems from the tough negotiating style of Hollywood 
executives. Yet comments by Mr. Terkowitz suggest that the reason for the 
haw ks' table-pounding approach was their lack of understanding of EU's 
institutions and policy formation. Perhaps the U.S. film industry needs to 
develop a new breed of legal advisor trained in law and diplomacy. Indeed, 
m ore research is needed on the influence of the hawks during the CUFTA 
and NAFTA negotiations. It is conceivable that audiovisual deals could have  
been struck in those agreements were it not for the hawkish influence on U.S. 
negotiators. Research is also needed on the U.S. film lobby's post-Round 
public relations and public affairs campaigns to im prove relations betw een 
the United States and the EU. Have the doves really begun to set the agenda 
for the U.S. film industry, or have the hawks continued to set the agenda 
using more subtle means?231
231An MPAA official commented: "Valenti was indeed aware of the
negotiating style directed from California. He was aware of the subtleties of 
negotiating at the m ultilateral level and at the congressional level. But his
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A senior U.S. trade official described one of the hawks as 'obsessed' w ith  
the subsidies issue/' even though, as the official noted, the MPA had a history 
of encouraging subsidies to indigenous film industries because the 
association's figures showed that people would go to the movies more often if 
their domestic industry were a healthy one (interview with author, 2 
February 1996). A senior Hollywood executive, speaking on behalf of the 
doves, said: "We really didn 't care about subsidies. It was a negotiating chip 
to trade away for something else later. In fact, the U.S. in retrospect d idn 't 
really care anymore that it d idn 't get what it wanted. Jack Valenti just w anted 
to change the tone and style so it w ouldn 't happen again" (interview w ith  
author, 30 November 1995). It is common for negotiators to push  for 
concessions, only to give in at the last m inute to meet other objectives. But 
w hen this tactic is employed aggressively in negotiations involving cultural 
issues, the tactic can backfire.
superiors were not" (interview with author, 23 February 1996). H ow ever, 
according to several U.S. sources, the Hollywood lobby has begun to take a 
more diplomatic approach to negotiations. One example of the new approach 
is the MPA's decision after the Round not to seek immediate Special 301 trade 
sanctions against the EU from the USTR (Variety, 28 February-6 March 1994, 
p. 12). According to a DG-X official, after the Uruguay Round the U.S. strategy 
switched to a more cooperative, subtle, bilateral approach, negotiating directly 
w ith each Member State, isolating anti-U.S. Member States — France and 
Spain, for example (interview with author, 28 Nov. 1995). W hen the 
Commission introduced a proposal to revise the Directive in December 1995 
to cover new technologies, the official notes that the proposal was aborted 
because of pressure felt by Commissioners from the national governm ents, in  
particular, those of Britain and Germany. In 1995, Europe's culture m inisters 
voted to give jurisdiction over programming content and advertising to the 
Member States. In 1996, efforts by the European Parliam ent failed to rem ove 
the 'w here practicable' loophole in the Television Directive, m aking the 
content quota (51 percent European works) non-binding.
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Perhaps Commission negotiators intended all along to wait until the last 
m inute to make an offer on audiovisual services and IPRs related to 
copyright in order to place the Clinton Adm inistration in a dilemma. A nd 
perhaps the Commission's final offer fell short of w hat could have been 
offered. But perhaps, too, the hawks' demands could never be m et by 
Commission negotiators. Yet the hawks did not go home em pty-handed. 
The audiovisual sector was covered under GATT-WTO rules and disciplines, 
m eaning, inter alia, future negotiations would take place, and domestic laws 
related to audiovisual issues would have to be transparent. The French 
government might have declared victory, but it was not a total victory.
More research is also needed on the m ethods the U.S. film industry uses 
to open foreign markets themselves, and on the reasons why bilateral 
governm ent intervention on behalf of Hollywood fails. Do Hollywood 
lobbyists negotiate w ith other U.S. industry lobbyists to get them  to change 
their positions on an issue posing as an obstacle to Hollywood's interests? 
W hen the U.S. governm ent intervenes at a bilateral level, w hat issues 
unrelated to the audiovisual sector tend to be linked to progress o n  
audiovisual talks? Moreover, research is also needed on post-Round in ter­
corporate summits, such as the 1995 Transatlantic Business Dialogue, to 
determ ine if CEOs of the global entertainm ent corporations, frustrated over 
need for governm ent intervention on a supranational level, have begun to 
negotiate among themselves for the reduction of trade barriers, leaving 
governm ent officials to fulfil the adm inistrative details. Perhaps Schiller's 
proposition, modified to include the power of EU and U.S. m edia 
corporations, might stand up in the future.
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In the case of scholarship on France's role in the audiovisual services and 
IPRs negotiations, the problem is not so much an incongruity between theory 
and empirical evidence, as an incongruity between legal argum ent and 
empirical evidence. Put another way, the problem is one of 'spin' placed o n  
events during the Uruguay Round. For example, Joachimowicz and 
Berenboom served as legal counsel to the Belgian presidency during the  
Mons meeting. However, Schiller's assertion that U.S. negotiators could n o t 
overcome French resistance to an audiovisual accord is less 'spin ' and m ore 
irony to contrast w ith his diatribes against the dom inance of Hollywood in  
foreign markets. Yet both legal scholars and political economists alike have  
failed to appreciate the importance of EU protocol during the Round and the  
Commission's efforts, in consultation w ith the 113 Services Committee, to 
reach an audiovisual sector accord w ith the United States.
Another oversight in scholarship to date on the audiovisual sector talks is 
the sparse analysis of the role of EU Member States other than France. 
Indeed, France was one of 12 countries acting as constituents to C om m ission 
negotiators. Alliances among dirigiste and more liberal Member States were 
formed out of political necessity, often for reasons unrelated to the  
audiovisual sector talks. The French/Belgian alliance was based on a shared 
language among governing elites, while the liberal/'C lub Med' split observed 
by several sources was related not only to the developm ent of the Television 
Directive but also the Blair House Agreement and agricultural issues in  
general. And the alliance formed by France w ith m aritim e countries such as 
Greece and Denmark to open the U.S. m aritim e services industry to foreign 
competition also affected the audiovisual sector talks. Yet the talks are 
generally viewed as a battle between the commercial concerns of the U nited
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States and the cultural concerns of France. Indeed, it is far easier to 
encapsulate the negotiations in this way, rather than attem pting to explain 
cross-sectoral M ember State alliances that reduce the importance of 
com m unication — the 'shaper of consciousness' — to a mere com m odity 
'horse-traded' w ith crops, shipping, financial services and the like.
O n a more theoretical level, conceptions of media globalisation that focus 
on abstract notions such as tim e/space compression cannot flesh out Carey's 
(1989) observation of Innis' 'tensions, contradictions, and accom m odations' 
between trading and communications partners. These conceptions certainly 
cannot bring to light micro power struggles (Mosco, 1996) am ong film  
lobbyists, let alone m isunderstandings between m edia moguls and heads of 
state. Yet it appears that in the case of the Uruguay Round, these pow er 
struggles played a decisive role in shaping the conditions in which the U.S. 
film industry was able to 'go global' under the auspices of GATT rules and 
disciplines. Perhaps political economists of mass com m unication should  
focus less on the power of media TNCs and m ore on the legal and business 
m inds behind the individuals who run the TNCs.
Moreover, Mosco's (1996) micro-macro approach, operationalised w ith  
Putnam 's (1988 [1993]) two-level analysis, offers political economists of 
com m unication a new interdisciplinary method w ith which to examine the  
state's role in the media industry. By paying careful attention to units of 
analysis, and by conducting more rigorous prim ary research, scholars of 
political economy can begin to move away from broad themes of governm ent 
'support' for m edia corporations to more specific themes that explain
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situations in which the governm ent/industry relationship does and does n o t 
remove foreign barriers to trade.
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APPENDIX A
POST-ROUND POLITICS
In a statement published in the appendix of ACTPN's (1994) report on the  
Uruguay Round, Jack Valenti urges the Clinton Adm inistration to "re-set the 
imbalance in the EU marketplace which the final GATT treaty sanctifies" (p. 
163).232 To secure the support of the U.S. film industry for fast-track approval 
of legislation to alter U.S. law in accordance with the U ruguay R ound 's 
results, the Clinton Adm inistration on 8 December 1994 agreed to several 
provisions on intellectual property that address some of the Hollywood 
lobby's concerns. Section 315 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (PL 
103-465, 103rd Congress, 108 STAT 4809-5053) lists several objectives related 
not only to the TRIPs but to the NAFTA. Section 315 com plem ents the 
intellectual property provisions in the Omnibus Trade and Com petitiveness 
Act of 1988. However, the U.S. film industry seems to be sim ultaneously  
relying on U.S. domestic legislation to change EU supranational and M em ber 
State law, and m oving away from using aggressive weapons such as Special 
301. Recall that after the enactment of the Television Directive and after the  
U ruguay Round the U.S. film industry chose not to increase pressure on the 
EU w ith Special 301 provisions beyond the 'priority watch' request granted by 
the USTR in 1991. It remains to be seen how the U.S. film industry plans to 
enforce Section 315.
23Xlt  is interesting to note that Mr. Valenti m entions the EU's w ithdraw al of 
its audiovisual comm itm ents in the GATS in the final m om ents of the 
Round, but he does not m ention that his hawkish superiors set off the chain 
reaction that led to the EU's action.
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Section 315(2) states as an objective "to seek enactment and effective 
im plem entation by foreign countries of laws to protect and enforce 
intellectual property rights that supplem ent and strengthen the standards" of 
the TRIPs and NAFTA" (108 STAT 4942). W hat is interesting about Section 
315 is that its language seems to cover both national treatm ent of IPRs and  
m arket access, the latter during the Uruguay Round associated w ith  
audiovisual services, the Television Directive and the GATS. Section 315(2b) 
states, "to prevent or elim inate discrim ination w ith respect to m atters 
affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance, use, and 
enforcem ent of intellectual property" (108 STAT 4943). Section 315(3) states, 
"to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscrim inatory market access opportunities 
for United States persons that rely upon intellectual property protection" 
(ibid). In a sense, the Adm inistration allowed the Hollywood lobby to codify 
in U.S. law its frustrations over the Round.
However, the U.S. film industry was not the only industry to shape the 
language of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Note, for example, that 
U.S. trade lobbyists succeeded in countering m any of the concessions m ade by 
the U.S. governm ent in the Round's anti-dum ping talks (Financial Times, 1 
A ugust 1994, p. 4). Recall that the EU's acquiescence to the U.S. position on its 
tough anti-dumping laws was considered by U.S. negotiators as a quid pro quo 
for not satisfying Hollywood during the final days of the Round. Indeed, the 
Round's anti-dum ping accord was hailed as a watershed because it required 
clearer guidelines for deciding injury and investigating claims (Financial 
Times, 16 December 1993, p. 5). However, trade lobbyists, particularly those 
representing the U.S. m anufacturing sector, inserted language in the 
Agreements Act that in some cases nullified the ground-breaking m easures
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agreed to at the conclusion of the Round (Financial Times, 1 August 1994, p. 
4).
Here the importance of strategy in international trade negotiations 
involving several industry sectors crystallises. W hat the U.S. governm ent 
concedes at the conclusion of a Round m ight be revoked by U.S. industries 
interested in correcting any perceived 'imbalances' during the domestic 
ratification stage of the trade treaty. As discussed in Chapter 2, this ratification 
stage involves a battle in the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and 
Means Committee over the U.S. president's ability to gain fast-track approval 
of the treaty in Congress. However, Hollywood's ability to take advantage of 
this strategy during the Uruguay Round was dim inished by the fact that its 
goal was not to protect U.S. law, but to weaken the EU's Television Directive 
and its strict implementation in dirigiste Member States.
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APPENDIX B
POST-ROUND WAR OF WORDS
The battle over UIP continued well beyond the 15 December deadline. In a 
press conference on 22 February 1994, the Associated Press and the Wall Street 
Journal reported that Commissioner Pinheiro accused UIP of "controlling 80 
percent of US film distribution in the EU," and opposed renewal of the 
com pany's antitrust exemption (Associated Press, 22 February 1994; W all 
Street Journal, 23 February 1994, p. A14). However, Reuters, the Financial 
Times and Agence Europe, as well as other media worldwide, reported that 
Prof. Pinheiro said UIP "controlled 80 percent of film distribution in Europe" 
(Reuters, 22 February 1994; Financial Times, 23 February 1994, p. 6; Agence 
Europe, 23 February 1994). This difference in reporting set off a confrontation 
between Europe and UIP.
In its defence, UIP claimed its average m arket share (in box-office receipts) 
across Europe for 1992 was only 18 percent, a figure "lower than UIP's m arket 
share w hen the Commission granted UIP's original exemption in 1989 (UIP, 
News Release, 23 February 1994, p. 2). he Monde corroborates UIP's assertions:
In fact, these shares of the m arket fell considerably 
between 1989 (date of the exemption) and 1993: from 35% 
to 18% in Great Britain, from 39% to 16% in Germany,
from 51% to 31% in the Netherlands and from 23% to
11% in France (20-21 March, 1994, p. 8).
On 25 February, Prof. Pinheiro responded to UIP's defence, saying that "I
have never said that UIP controlled 80 percent of film distribution in Europe,
but that roughly 80 percent of films shown in Europe were of A m erican 
origin and that UIP was a m ain supplier" (European Commission Press
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Release, 25 February 1994). On 25 February, a spokesperson for Prof. P inheiro  
said: "Of course the UIP share of U.S. film distribution in the EU is less th an  
80%. W hen he (Pinheiro) used that figure, he was referring to the overall 
market share of US films in the EU. The press m ust have m isunderstood 
what he was saying" (Variety, 28 February-6 March 1993, pp. 59-60).
Screen Finance, citing Anthony Davis of London Economics, notes tha t 
between 1988 and 1992, UIP was the second largest distributor behind W arner 
Bros, (in box-office receipts) in the UK, France, Spain and Germany, which as 
a group make up about 70 percent of the total EU market (Hobdell, 1993, p. 11). 
However, Davis notes that in countries where UIP shareholders control a 
large num ber of local cinemas, the screen time allocated to UIP films is h igher 
than might be expected from the films' box-office performance (p. 12). W hile  
the Commission — DG-IV (Commission directorate for competition) in  
consultation with DG-X and DG-XV (internal market) — considers UIP's 
status, UIP remains exempt from Article 85(1). Eventually the  
Commissioners themselves will decide the m atter (Hobdell, 1993, p. 2). The 
UIP case study illustrates the extent to which m edia reports can differ on a 
single event.
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